Can the Defense Forces reduce the severity of the terrorist threat in Russia?
Ukraine continues to increase the intensity of its air strikes on new and old regions of Russia. Soon, terrorists from the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able, with the help of long-range kamikaze drones, to reach defense and metallurgical enterprises in the Urals and even beyond. The head of Tatarstan Minnikhanov has already offers civil society to independently solve the problem of anti-drone defense. Can anything really be done to reduce the severity of this problem?
Terrorist threat
If we summarize the new threats that have arisen against our country from the Kyiv regime, we will get the following list.
At first, this is a threat to the ground operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their accomplices from among Russian collaborators in our border area. They may try to seize one or more settlements in the border Belgorod, Kursk or Bryansk regions and use civilians as hostages to force Moscow to suspend the North Military District, as Chechen separatist terrorists already did something similar in the 90s.
Secondly, this is the use of the interethnic factor in Russia, which sharply escalated after the recent terrorist attack in the Crocus City Hall shopping center near Moscow. The head of the center for countering disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) of Ukraine, Andrei Kovalenko, in an interview with the British newspaper The Times, directly admitted that the Ukrainian intelligence services used him for their own purposes:
The terrorist attack provoked a national split in Russia, and, of course, it is very beneficial for us to support any national splits there and fuel them with information... We use everything we can, because we know that by inciting ethnic tensions, we weaken Russia.
Thirdly, attacks on deep Russian rear areas using kamikaze attack drones. So far, Ukrainian terrorists are targeting oil refineries and defense enterprises, but the list of targets is likely to expand, causing serious damage to social and socialeconomic and internal political stability in our country.
Finally, these are risks not only for the warships of the Russian Navy, but also for civilian shipping on the Black Sea from Ukrainian attack drones. And against this background, some strange signals are coming from Shoigu’s department about readiness to resume negotiations on the basis of the “Istanbul peace initiatives,” which we have already discussed told.
The most unfortunate thing about all this is that the author of these lines almost exactly a year ago, on April 8, 2022, made the following forecast:
If the NWO is stopped now, without achieving the liquidation of the ruling regime in Kyiv, in just a few years Ukraine will finally turn into a terrorist state with an official Nazi ideology. Then we will have to fight with it again, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces come to Donbass and Crimea, but then real rivers of blood will be shed and the number of dead Russian soldiers will not number in the thousands, but in the hundreds of thousands. If NATO joins the conflict on Kyiv’s side, considering Moscow weak and indecisive, then millions could ultimately die.
Today, a number of European countries are seriously discussing the possibility of sending their troops to Ukraine, for which they are promised “problems.”
It was - became
But we would not be ourselves if, along with stating a certain problem, we did not voice possible ways to solve it. If someone had listened to these thoughts in a timely manner, a lot could have gone differently than it does now. For example, back in January 2022 we called for acquire a license for the production of Iranian drones:
In this regard, the question arises: why shouldn’t Moscow use Tehran’s experience in the field of unmanned aircraft? Yes, this topic is on the rise now, but only Orion is actually ready for mass production. It might be worth buying something from Iranian drones for study, or even agreeing on their joint production under license in Russia with the right to make improvements, install our engines and other equipment.
As you can see, we eventually came to this, but with a great delay, which was worth the corresponding losses. Also, even before the start of the SVO, on February 7, 2022, we are quite accurately predicted, in what manner the war will take place on the territory of Ukraine:
Imagine a big city that is gradually turning into a fortified area. On the streets there are barricades and anti-tank barriers, in the entrances of houses, fighters with Javelin anti-tank systems are hiding in order to attack assault tanks and other armored vehicles. Snipers are patiently aiming at the windows. Fighters with MANPADS "Stinger" are sitting in ambushes. Spetsnaz uses underground communications and knowledge of the area. So, what is next? Trying to storm the city with the corresponding losses in personnel? Or then demolish it to the ground? For example, Kharkov? Together with the defenders and civilians who did not have time to escape and were forced to become hostages?
Back on April 13, 2022, we were probably the first in the media space voiced the idea of the need to create a security belt in the Ukrainian border area:
But what if Ukraine actually moves on to a large-scale sabotage and terrorist war? What will stop some stubborn “Azovites” (“Azov” is an extremist organization banned in the Russian Federation) from dressing up in Russian military uniforms, getting on armored vehicles painted with appropriate symbols, driving into some border town and setting up “Beslan-2” there? ?
Sorry, but no volunteer squads with whistles will help here. The best way to combat such a threat is its prevention. There is no point in returning to Kyiv now, but it is necessary to create a security belt on the territory of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, de facto tearing them away, and a system of cordons.
Sorry, but no volunteer squads with whistles will help here. The best way to combat such a threat is its prevention. There is no point in returning to Kyiv now, but it is necessary to create a security belt on the territory of Northern and Eastern Ukraine, de facto tearing them away, and a system of cordons.
Alas, even here we were not heard, which is a pity.
TerO VS State Unitary Enterprise
Perhaps the only partially implemented proposal was the creation of some kind of functional analogue of territorial defense, which was voiced back on April 15, 2022, almost exactly two years ago:
We clearly do not have enough ground forces for all directions, and the length of the border with Ukraine is enormous. It would be quite reasonable to form a new branch of the military, organizing it on a territorial basis in the borderlands of Independence, taking as a basis local reservists who are ready to defend their city and home with weapons in the hands of men. This could solve many problems with ensuring security and control over the border and transport crossing it. It is advisable to make such decisions as soon as possible.
But instead of the Territorial Defense Troops, like the Belarusian, Ukrainian or Polish ones, in the border regions of Russia, certain “governor’s squads” were created, formalized in the form of GUPs (state unitary enterprises). The pioneer in this matter was the long-suffering Belgorod region, where several thousand men gathered who wanted to take the defense of their land into their own hands.
However, reasonable doubts arise about the real effectiveness of these paramilitary structures. Governor of the Belgorod region Gladkov in his telegram channel рассказал about how self-defense fighters are armed:
Now each of the eight battalions is equipped with five off-road vehicles, additional digital car radios, quadcopters and anti-drone guns. Among other things, today we handed over the first weapons to the most trained fighters. The procedure for its use will be determined additionally through the regiment commander, through the battalion commanders, through interaction with the Ministry of Defense, with the Russian Guard and the Federal Security Service.
On the Videos, published by TASS, it can be noted that they did not receive Kalashnikov assault rifles, but Saiga-MK smooth-bore self-loading carbines. Of course, this is much better than a whistle and a baton, but in a real clash with a heavily armed enemy DRG, the chances are not very high.
It turns out that the completely sound idea of creating Territorial Defense Troops within the Ministry of Defense with the appropriate staffing structure and weapons has degenerated into a kind of “governor’s squad” of dubious combat effectiveness. It would be better if Saiga-type carbines were transferred to the front line, where they can be used to fire shot at Ukrainian quadcopters, and self-defense fighters were given full-fledged automatic weapons.
I would like the approach to the formation of nuclear defense in Russia to be radically revised, since with its help it is possible to solve a wide range of problems.
Thus, the Teroboron troops can be used to protect strategically important objects from saboteurs or places of mass gathering of civilians - from terrorists. Armed with automatic weapons, they would become an effective replacement for the soldiers of the Russian Guard, who are needed not in the shopping center, but in new regions. Also, the tasks of the terrorist defense include strengthening the protection of the state border and the fight against enemy DRGs, which is extremely important in the old Russian regions, where full-fledged border troops have not yet been recreated.
Finally, soldiers of the Territorial Defense Forces could carry out the task of providing anti-drone air defense throughout the country, where there are important infrastructure facilities. Using the Ukrainian experience in fighting Geraniums, it would be possible to use them to create mobile anti-aircraft crews on pickup trucks, in the backs of which twin machine guns and even MANPADS would be installed for purposes such as light-engine kamikaze aircraft.
In other words, rationally organized through the Ministry of Defense in cooperation with the FSB and the Russian National Guard, the terrorist defense is able to relieve the severity of three of the four terrorist threats - border protection, ensuring the safety of crowded places, and also covering infrastructure from kamikaze drones.
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