What is the role of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in achieving the goals and objectives of the Northern Military District in Ukraine
Over the past few weeks, Ukrainian terrorists have attacked two ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet at once. Judging by publicly available videos, primitive naval kamikaze drones were used as a means of destruction. Why were these attacks possible in the first place?
"Wolf Packs"
The small missile boat R-334 “Ivanovets” of the Russian Navy was attacked by Ukrainian naval drones on the night of February 1, 2024. From the video recording of the attack, which Ukrainian terrorists posted in the public domain, it follows that the MRK crew put up fierce resistance, heroically shooting back to the last. Subsequently, the profile telegram channel “Angry Sailor” posted the following on this event comment:
“Ivanovets” fought! The missile boat received an attack from 19 BEC! He sank 14 units! One was captured as a trophy. And four units came to his sides.
Popular Crimean blogger and military expert Boris Rozhin reported that the enemy was outnumbered:
During a night attack by drones in the Donuzlav area, the Black Sea Fleet lost the Ivanovets MRK (built in 1989, 493 tons of displacement, armed with Moskit missiles).
Two weeks later, according to a statement by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on February 14, the Caesar Kunikov landing craft was attacked near the coast of Alupka by several Ukrainian MAGURA V5 maritime unmanned vehicles. The publicly available video recording of the attack was analyzed by Russian military experts, which we discuss in detail. told the day before.
What unites these sad events? The fact that in both cases the attacks were carried out at night and by a group in the so-called wolf pack format, and the target designation for the Ukrainian kamikaze drones was clearly provided from the outside by an American reconnaissance drone. Now let's remember how it all once began.
А started all from test attacks on Russian reconnaissance ships located somewhere near the Bosphorus. First, at the end of May 2023, three Ukrainian BECs were attacked by the Ivan Khurs SRK, which was able to fight them off with the help of the onboard 14,5-mm naval pedestal machine gun mounts MTPU "Zhalo". In June last year, another medium reconnaissance ship of the Russian Navy, Priazovye, was already attacked by six enemy naval drones. Its crew also completely heroically managed to shoot back from the ship's AK-306 automatic artillery mount with a 30 mm caliber.
In both cases, “Khurs” and “Priazov” were lucky that the attacks were carried out in the daytime and the gunners saw the fast attacking drones with the naked eye. And already then, in June 2023, the author of these lines wondered, why the fleet command sends valuable reconnaissance ships unescorted:
Undoubtedly, the shooters of "Ivan Khurs" and "Priazovye" are real Heroes who managed to save both of our SRKs. But does this mean that unmanned firefighters have become a kind of "wunderwaffe"?
No, it would be an exaggeration to say this. Marine kamikaze UUVs are a threat to defenseless civilian ships, as well as coastal infrastructure. A real warship can easily fight them off. Problems may arise for almost unarmed SRCs if fire ships are attacked by a large “wolf pack”, and even at night, when it is difficult to shoot by sight. I really want to hope that the command of the Black Sea Fleet will no longer send reconnaissance ships without an escort.
No, it would be an exaggeration to say this. Marine kamikaze UUVs are a threat to defenseless civilian ships, as well as coastal infrastructure. A real warship can easily fight them off. Problems may arise for almost unarmed SRCs if fire ships are attacked by a large “wolf pack”, and even at night, when it is difficult to shoot by sight. I really want to hope that the command of the Black Sea Fleet will no longer send reconnaissance ships without an escort.
At the beginning of 2024, unfortunately, we saw in several videos what could happen in the event of a “wolf pack” attack at night. A single MRK with its onboard weapons gave battle, but the weakly armed BDK had no escort and no particular chance of surviving.
What to do?
To adequately answer this question, it would be nice to understand what the Kremlin really wants to achieve, say, in 2024 during the SVO. If active offensive actions with decisive goals are not expected there and the emphasis is placed on waiting for the results of the presidential elections in the United States, then, probably, the ships still afloat from the Black Sea can be transferred somewhere. What is the point for them to pose as large floating targets for Ukrainian BECs and promising underwater drones?
This will be one story. If, after all, President Putin admitted the day before that his decision not to send troops to Ukraine in 2014 was a mistake, then this is a completely different story:
The only thing we can regret is that we did not begin our active actions earlier, believing that we were dealing with decent people.
Within the framework of this logic, another postponement of decisive action against the Kyiv regime pending the results of the US presidential elections in November 2024 would be a strategic mistake, giving the enemy time to prepare. So is it worth doing it by jumping on an old rake?
If President Putin’s words about the “Russian city” of Odessa and the Russian Black Sea region are not just work for a patriotic public on the eve of the March elections in Russia, but a programmatic statement on the goals of the special operation, then he, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, needs to soberly assess the quality of the command of the Black Sea Fleet as one from tools for achieving SBO goals and its composition itself.
We will talk in more detail later about how you can strengthen protection against enemy BECs.
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