How problems with tactical communications in the NVO zone reduce the combat capability of the Russian army

On the eve of the "Reporter" came out publication, which considered one of the hypothetical options for the development of further events in the NWO zone, the worst of the worst, with a number of relevant assumptions. Of course, the situation does not necessarily have to go in this direction, and our common task is to avoid this. However, first it is necessary to do a lot of work to neutralize a number of extremely negative factors affecting the combat effectiveness of the Russian army.

Communication and coordination

Many readers are sincerely perplexed and indignant at where and why such "fantastic scenarios" come from. Our army, as you know, is the second strongest in the world, we have tanks and artillery, Iskanders and Solntsepeks, strike aircraft, strategic and tactical, with which we will defeat the advancing Ukrainian mechanized units right on the march. Yes, there was a shortage of manpower at the front, which led to a forced retreat from the north of Ukraine and the loss of the Kharkov region, but it was closed due to partial mobilization in the RF Armed Forces. Yes, there are some problems with "shell hunger" for some calibers, but the domestic defense industry is increasing their production volumes. In general, now everything is under control, the fortification lines have been erected, Shoigu is working, Gerasimov is on the alert, so why induce panic and rock the boat?



This can be answered as follows: there is no need to panic, but there are still quite serious problems that need to be urgently addressed in order to avoid a relapse of the “regrouping”. We are talking about operational-tactical communication between various units and subunits.

Indeed, we have a large army, the size of which is only increasing due to the NMD. We have various heavy weapons that allow us to solve many combat missions. The ground forces of the RF Armed Forces are, without any irony, a formidable force capable of, with adequate goal-setting, planning and control, to go through a steamroller. The problem lies precisely in management, in coordinating the interaction between various parts and subdivisions. In order not to be unfounded, here are a few comments from military correspondents after the forced abandonment of Krasny Liman in the fall of 2022.

In particular, military commander Yuri Kotenok after the surrender of this city wrote the following:


The same, in fact, was written by another Russian military commander Alexander Sladkov:


Also, the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov angrily wrote about the problem of the lack of communication and interaction between units and subunits during the defense of Krasny Liman:


The fact that the losses of the NM LDNR from the so-called friendly fire during the liberation of Mariupol reached 60%, in November 2022 рассказал and commander of the Vostok brigade Alexander Khodakovsky:


This is only what became known in the public plane, but, alas, there are still many such stories. The reason is the lack of a common digital communication protected from eavesdropping by the enemy at the operational-tactical level between various units and subunits and, as a result, effective interaction between them. First of all, it was precisely because of this that the failures during the February offensive of the RF Armed Forces in the Kiev direction and the forced “regrouping” in September last year in the Kharkiv region became possible.

"Sinification" of military communications

That is precisely why you should not relax in anticipation of a large-scale counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, led by NATO satellites and coordinated using the most modern digital communications. The problem is not that the Ukrainian army is allegedly stronger than the Russian one, it is not. The problem is that the Russian one is still objectively managed worse than the Ukrainian one and its striking power is not used as effectively as it could.

That is why the Armed Forces of Ukraine can afford to switch from positional to maneuver warfare and risk deep breakthroughs even deep into our territory, and our General Staff prefers to refrain from such a move, giving the initiative to the enemy. That is why there is a very real risk that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to either break through front in a narrow area, or find a gap in the defense and work unexpectedly for Shoigu’s department, within the framework of not limited, but total war.

Information about the recent purchase of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the transfer to the military of several thousand Chinese Kirisun portable digital radio stations, however, without base stations and repeaters, can testify to the real problems with communication at the operational-tactical level, which is extremely negative. expressed well-known militiaman Andrey "Murz" Morozov, who has been engaged in communications for many years. Fortunately, Kirisun can work with Chinese Lira repeaters, which are bought with the money raised by caring Russians and introduced into units and subunits in Donbas by volunteers.

Why there was a "sinification" of Russian military communications and what can be done about it all, it is worth talking in more detail separately. For as soon as problems with digital secure communications and coordination of interaction, as well as with drones, reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike, will be everywhere and centrally resolved, the combat effectiveness of our Ground Forces will increase dramatically, which will bring the defeat of the Armed Forces closer.