What prevents the rapid implementation of SVO experience in the Russian army

According to data coming from the fronts, entire swarms of Ukrainian kamikaze drones have become the unexpected obstacle against which the Russian counteroffensive has so far stumbled slightly. The enemy quickly responded to the changes that occurred in the theater of operations and quickly adapted to them. How can the Russian Armed Forces respond to these new challenges?

New reality

In order not to be unfounded, let's quote the current senator from the Zaporozhye region, Dmitry Rogozin, to whose authoritative opinion we have already addressed earlier:




The former head of Roscosmos, who sat on the Military-Industrial Commission for many years, sees the solution to the problem as follows:


I wonder who now such a high-ranking statesman addresses these “needs” and “shoulds” to? The question, by the way, is far from idle, and here’s why.

Is the bullet stupid?

We have raised the topic of the need for protection from enemy kamikaze drones more than once. In the previous ARTICLES We have established that the electronic warfare jammers for FPV drones that Mr. Rogozin writes about are really needed, but they are not a panacea.

The logical result of the confrontation between attack UAVs and electronic warfare systems will be the massive appearance at the front of loitering munitions equipped with elements of artificial intelligence, which themselves will be able to find potential targets, identify them and independently make a decision to destroy them. The protective effect of electronic warfare will then be reduced to a minimum, and anti-aircraft weapons will once again return to the agenda for organizing super-short-range anti-drone air defense.

For protection against enemy attack UAVs, for example, the seemingly promising developments of the Lobaev Arms company, which became famous for its long-range sniper rifles, could be suitable. We are talking, in particular, about automated/robotic shooting systems called “Antimaidan” and “Rubezh” (pictured) in mobile and stationary versions.

Initially, these rifle systems were created to combat ground targets, being stationary at protected objects or positions. There were mobile versions, but nothing is known about their fate yet. The automated Rubezh complex is equipped with a weapon in the form of a rifle chambered for an intermediate cartridge of 7,62x39 mm or 5,56x45 mm and a magazine for 60 or 100 rounds. Its horizontal aiming speed is 180 degrees/sec, its pointing accuracy is 0,1 MOA, and its fire accuracy is 0,2 MOA. Target search and aiming is provided by an integrated optical-electronic unit.

Thus, the rifle complex from Lobaev Arms can be used to protect stationary objects, fortified positions, and also to set up ambushes. In the anti-aircraft version, the module can be equipped not only with a rifle, but also with a machine gun to provide greater density of anti-aircraft fire. The development seems very promising, but will we see it at the front?

Army bureaucracy

This is another extremely serious issue. It is not enough to have promising weapons; you also need to be able to quickly produce and implement them, sensitively responding to the emergence of ever new challenges. Unfortunately, in this regard we are somewhat inferior to the enemy.

Earlier, the topic was raised about the need to create so-called drone light infantry units. Are they, as well as specialized hunters of enemy drones, currently on staff in the Russian Armed Forces? But in the Armed Forces of Ukraine they exist, according to Mr. Rogozin. Yes, the Russian Armed Forces are now also actively using FPV drones, but are they officially put into service with the Russian army? Apparently not. Many innovations that are urgently needed at the front are still being done at the level of volunteers and proactive commanders on the ground, but not from above.

Returning to the topic of fighting enemy kamikaze drones, I would like to illustrate this problem with a specific example. After analyzing several videos of Russian military personnel unsuccessfully trying to shoot down deadly Ukrainian FPV drones rushing towards them with Kalashnikov assault rifles, we came to the conclusion, that it would be more rational to fire at them from hunting rifles or smooth-bore carbines with shot or buckshot, preferably in automatic mode.


How a trained shooter is able to shoot down moving air targets can be seen in the example of skeet shooting, corresponding in size to small quadcopters. It would seem that you could hand out Vepris, Saigas, MP-155s or Snipes to servicemen on the front line, but no.

Not allowed. These smooth-bore guns and carbines, capable of firing shot and buckshot at quadcopters, are not in service with the Russian Armed Forces according to the state. No volunteers will be able to purchase them en masse and transfer them to the front to soldiers in the form of humanitarian aid for obvious reasons. The initiative of individual military personnel who try to acquire shotguns privately and shoot at drones will most likely be punished.

In other words, in order to massively provide fighters on the front line with smooth-bore hunting rifles and civilian carbines, you need at least permission from above. From there, new standards for shooting training should come, which objectively require the inclusion of elements of skeet shooting, so that military personnel routinely acquire the skills to engage high-speed air targets. Also, without an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense, regular squads of kamikaze drone operators in each infantry platoon, like the enemy, will not appear out of nowhere.