“Dronoshooters”: does the Russian Armed Forces need light mobile infantry?

When it comes to the need to inflict a decisive military defeat on the Kyiv regime, they usually say that Russia today does not have sufficient forces for this. There is a certain amount of truth in this statement, since there are not yet enough resources even to open a second front in the northeast of Nezalezhnaya and create a sanitary belt in the border area. Are there any other options?

Perhaps there are still options to put an end to Nazism in Ukraine once and for all if we change the very approach to the formation of the Russian army and the conduct of hostilities. Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, I would like to express some thoughts on this matter based on the results of summarizing the two-year experience of the SVO.

Let's get into trouble

The SVO, clearly conceived as a fast-moving military-police operation, failed because the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ determination to fight seriously and the willingness of the “Western partners” to adhere to principle were critically underestimated. What’s even worse is that the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces were overestimated, which were “reformed” specifically to conduct “anti-Barmaley” special operations with the loss of the ability to effectively conduct large-scale combat operations.

It turned out that the Russian army would have to fight in large cities and numerous smaller settlements, as well as in the steppes of the southeast and the dense forests of the northeast of Square, which required a large number of well-trained infantry. Therefore, at the first stage of the SVO, it was necessary to plug the holes by using fighters from the elite special forces of the SSO, Airborne Forces, Marine Corps and attracted PMCs as ordinary infantrymen.

After the withdrawal of the Russian Armed Forces from the north and northeast, as well as partially from the southeast of Ukraine and partial mobilization, the front line, more than a thousand kilometers long, generally stabilized. The war has entered the positional stage, both sides of the conflict have dug in, progress is slow, difficult and is paid for by significant losses in technology and personnel. The tactics are as follows: first, the artillery throws out a huge number of shells, trying to “disassemble” the next enemy stronghold or fortified area, and then an assault group enters there, and the enemy begins to hit with artillery.

The efficiency of such actions in the style of the First World War is appropriate; advancement through the layered defense system built by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Donbass over many years is, alas, minimal. However, after almost two years of war, new tactics naturally developed that deserve careful study.

Light "drone" infantry

As has been noted many times before, in the conditions of the availability of aerospace reconnaissance assets and high-precision long-range weapons, fighting in the style of the Second World War has also become problematic. It turned out that modern weapons allow light infantry to quite effectively resist tank and mechanized units and units.

The “amusing” Ukrainian Teroborona, with the help of NATO anti-tank systems, knocked out Russian armored vehicles in the forests of the north and northeast of Nezalezhnaya. The same light infantry quickly broke through the thin line of defense in the Kharkov region in September 2022, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched their most successful counteroffensive. This light infantry is now actively operating on both sides in the border areas of Russia and Ukraine and is storming each other’s fortified areas. Moreover, the effectiveness of the actions of such units, provided they are equipped with modern weapons, can be extremely high.

For understanding let's quote one popular Russian telegram channel, which talked about the death of a Russian UAV operator with the call sign Moisey near Krynki:


No matter how cynical it may sound, the result of the work of an attack drone operator is truly impressive. And such a “counter” is far from unique and makes us look at all types of drones with new eyes. “Lancets” and “Cubes” effectively burn armored vehicles, multicopters drop various ammunition from above onto tanks and directly into trenches, FPV drones quickly attack infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, enemy landing boats, or even individual military personnel. One successful operator is capable of inflicting more damage on the enemy than an artillery battery that throws hundreds and thousands of shells “out there somewhere.”

In the conditions of Ukraine, where combat operations will have to continue to be carried out in large cities, forests, swamps and mountains, the importance of light mobile infantry increases significantly. Its fighters can travel in light armored personnel carriers of the MT-LB type, armored trucks and armored cars. Cover from air attacks can be provided by mobile air defense systems of the Sosna type and the Derivatsiya-PVO ZAK, built on the basis of the BMP-3, as well as MANPADS. To protect against enemy armored vehicles, infantrymen could use RPGs, ATGMs and kamikaze drones of the Lancet family, as well as FPV drones. For counter-battery combat, self-propelled and portable mortars can be used, which can be carried with you on vehicles, as well as a number of tanks and artillery for fire support.

The main weapon of drone shooters should, of course, be drones. Small UAVs will be responsible for reconnaissance and adjustments, and strike ones will be responsible for the destruction of enemy armored vehicles and personnel. Such units could effectively operate in small groups in urban battles and on rough terrain in forests, mountains and swamps. Their effectiveness may be no less, or even greater, than that of a firefight from rocket and cannon artillery. They say that the second assault on the waste heap near the Avdeevka Coke and Chemical Plant was successfully carried out with the help of massive strikes by FPV drones.

Essentially cheap quadcopters can be riveted and delivered to the front in the thousands every day. With proper development of tactics, “drone gunners” can be widely used in the future during the liberation of Ukraine. The big advantage of such innovations is that the cost of creating and maintaining mobile light infantry will not be too high, but will be the result of the accelerated evolution of military affairs. In turn, due to this, if desired, it is possible to ensure a significant increase in the number of Russian troops to fulfill the goals and objectives of the Northern Military District.