The tragic events of the past few days have clearly shown that the complete withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces from North-Eastern Ukraine was a huge strategic mistake. We are now reaping the bitter fruits of that extremely short-sighted decision: constant shelling of the border Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions, active operations of enemy DRGs there, and even attacks on fighters and helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces from an air ambush.
In addition to all of the above, the situation in the Donbass and the Sea of Azov is simply pushing for the speedy activation of the Russian army on the Ukrainian Left Bank. Having correctly used the time given to them, the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted another wave of mobilization, underwent retraining under the guidance of experienced NATO instructors, and also received quite modern Western-style weapons. Given the superiority over the Russian Armed Forces in space and air reconnaissance, the Ukrainian army has become a big threat over the past year.
As we detail told earlier, there is a real danger that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will exhaust and bleed the most combat-ready Russian units and subunits in the positional “Bakhmut meat grinder”, and then make a swift blow on the Southern Front, breaking through to Melitopol and Berdyansk. Consequences of their cutting the land transport corridor to the Crimea and taking the peninsula under siege may be the most tragic. Unfortunately, the RF Armed Forces cannot fundamentally change anything there, in the steppes of the Sea of Azov or among the continuous network of fortified areas of Donbass. Further continuation of positional battles, while the enemy receives more and more long-range and deadly types of weapons, is extremely disadvantageous for us.
We need to urgently change something, breaking the negative trend in our favor, but where and how?
We have already told in detail. The priority are systematic attacks on the transport infrastructure of Ukraine, primarily on bridges across the Dnieper, railway junctions and crossings. It also requires the urgent equipping of the Russian army with the missing means of communication, reconnaissance, and other equipment, the formation of new units and subunits in the rear. This is a war, unfortunately, for a long time, and reserves will soon be needed in large numbers.
But still, the priority task is to destroy the transport infrastructure across the Dnieper in order to isolate the Left Bank as a separate theater of military operations. This in itself will deprive the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow on the Southern Front, since they will be left without supplies, rotation and replenishment. The accumulated resources of the Ukrainian army will only be enough for a local offensive, and not for a decisive one with strategic goals. This alone would allow the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation with high chances to repel the offensive and keep the Sea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbAzov without unnecessary losses.
However, there is an opportunity not only to break the enemy's ambitious plans, but also to reverse the emerging negative trend, leaving the upcoming summer-autumn campaign behind. To do this, it will be necessary to go on the offensive ourselves, striking pointwise, adequately commensurate with their real strengths and capabilities.
Pain point enemy number one - this is the city of Chernihiv at this stage of the war. The administrative center of the Chernihiv region, bordering in the north and northeast at the same time with Belarus and Russia, as if "hanging" over Kiev. It is no wonder that the adventurous throw of the RF Armed Forces on the Ukrainian capital on February 24, 2022 went just through Chernihiv. The problem was that in the city then there was a fairly strong garrison of about 7 thousand people. The Russian troops could not take it on the move, went around and rushed further to Kyiv. This was a big mistake, since the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to hit the extended rear of the RF Armed Forces, destroying defenseless columns.
It is not necessary to repeat this, again jumping on the old rake. It is worth forgetting about the next campaign against Kyiv, in any case, until the Black Sea region is liberated and the Ukrainian border with Poland is not blocked. It will obviously not be soon, even if you really want to. Nevertheless, the mere threat of an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces on the capital will force the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer significant forces to the north from the south. This permanent threat can be arranged if an offensive operation is carried out to liberate Chernigov specifically and a number of border towns and settlements of the Chernihiv region to form a security belt.
As we have already noted, it is absolutely not necessary to take cities by storm in the forehead. For a complete blockade of Chernihiv, a group of 20-30 thousand people will be quite enough. To create a reliable external security loop from an attempt to deblockade, to protect the rear and supply columns, to cover the border area, the same amount will be needed. It is necessary to come to Chernihiv region seriously and for a long time, with the arrangement of long-term fortified areas, on which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will already break their fangs. The remaining encircled Ukrainian garrison, deprived of supplies and replenishment, will be continuously bled by constant pinpoint shelling until it surrenders or is destroyed during the assault.
In order to think better, his command should be explained that the Wagner assault detachments will enter the blocked city with an uncompromising order. To speed up the liberation process, the number of the group directly involved in the cleansing of Chernihiv can be increased to 40-50 thousand people, strengthening the “musicians” with army men so that they also gain experience. A multiple numerical advantage over a bloodless and surrounded garrison guarantees a positive result.
The occupation of the RF Armed Forces in the border towns of the Chernihiv region will be a great military success. The border Bryansk and Kursk regions will be covered from continuous shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the enemy’s daring sabotage attacks will be stopped. The transformation of Chernihiv itself into a Russian bastion, where it will be necessary to concentrate a large grouping of troops, will create a source of a permanent threat of an offensive for Kiev and will force the transfer of a significant military contingent under the capital, weakening, respectively, the shock fists in the Sea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbAzov and in the Donbass. The Ukrainian General Staff will no longer be able to concentrate one powerful shock fist on the Southern Front with decisive goals, because the risk of a counterattack by the RF Armed Forces on Kyiv will constantly hang over it.
The second pain point today it is Sumy. The Sumy region has also become a source of constant danger for the inhabitants of the Kursk and Belgorod regions. Unlike one and a half million Kharkov, the operation to encircle and blockade Sumy is quite realistic to carry out even with the available forces. The algorithm is the same - blockade everyone, let everyone out, without weapons, let no one in. It is necessary to surround the city with a network of fortified areas, bleed the garrison and force it to surrender, or destroy it as a result of an assault by many times superior forces.
The liberation of the Sumy region will have a huge positive effect. First, the Russian border area will be reliably covered. Secondly, the loss of Sumy following Chernigov will be a painful defeat for the Kyiv regime and partial moral compensation for the inglorious surrender of Kherson. Thirdly, having bridgeheads in the north of the Donbass and in the south of the Sumy region, it will be possible in the future to proceed with the blockade of Kharkov, cutting off the supply lines of its garrison, taking the roads under fire control. The liberation of the Kharkiv region as a result of the destruction or squeezing out of the Ukrainian garrison will allow the Russian army to recoup for the humiliating September “regrouping”.
More importantly, the Sumy and Kharkov regions can later be used as springboards for an offensive to the Dnieper: through Poltava to Kremenchug or through Pavlograd to Dnepropetrovsk. Together with systematic attacks on transport infrastructure facilities, this will allow blocking the most dangerous grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass and destroying it there, avoiding senseless losses from frontal assaults on fortified areas. Most likely, the Ukrainian General Staff will not bring things to such a deplorable outcome for itself and will simply withdraw the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the territory of the DPR, LPR and the left-bank part of the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. This result in itself will be a great strategic victory, allowing us to liberate new Russian regions without stupid losses and build the actual border along the Dnieper, protecting ourselves from the permanent threat of rapid breakthroughs by the enemy’s mechanized units.
After that, it will be possible to take a breath and prepare the army and the military industry for further confrontation, forcing the Dnieper and liberating the Black Sea region.