The path of deception: why Russian troops will not storm Kharkov

In recent days, the topic of the possible future of border Kharkov has become mainstream in foreign, Ukrainian and Russian media. Various military experts are discussing how the Russian Armed Forces will take a huge metropolis with a population of one and a half million, which Kyiv is intensively preparing for defense.

To understand the overall picture, you should look at what both sides of the armed conflict say and, most importantly, do. And a lot of interesting things happen there.

Kharkiv?

Thus, President Zelensky at meetings of the Ukrainian General Staff designated the defense of Kharkov as a priority:


The huge city, located just 40 kilometers from the Russian border, will be surrounded by three lines of defense. The intensification of strikes by the Russian Armed Forces on Kharkov, as a result of which it was left without normal power supply, may indicate preparation for an offensive. But will it be real, and if so, when?

As we detail explained a few days ago, an assault on such a metropolis could cost us huge losses in the army, and will also lead to large casualties among the civilian population, which consists of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Strictly speaking, it is here and now beneficial for the Zelensky regime to drag Russia into a difficult positional battle for Kharkov, which could allow it to destroy or bleed the most combat-ready units of the Russian Armed Forces in urban battles.

That is why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are using the Kharkov region as a springboard for carrying out terrorist attacks on the border city of Belgorod and the Belgorod region in order to force the Kremlin to accept political decision to expand the area of ​​special military operation. And that is why it is impossible to storm Kharkov head-on under any circumstances, but should be limited to its wide coverage with the aim of squeezing out the Ukrainian garrison. But does the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces have 200-300 thousand free bayonets for this?

This is the most important question that we raised earlier. If such large army reserves are available, then perhaps it would be worth using them in another direction, where it would give results of strategic importance? For example, in the Black Sea region?

Odessa?

And here I would like to draw attention to today's message from the Russian Ministry of Defense on conducting very specific exercises:



Crossing a water barrier? The Dnieper immediately comes to mind, on the right side of which are Kherson and half of Zaporozhye, the regional centers of our two new regions. And also the Russian cities of Nikolaev and Odessa remain there, without the liberation of which it is impossible to ensure the safety of civil and military navigation on the Black Sea. Has the Russian Ministry of Defense really begun to prepare for an offensive operation to cross the Dnieper?

It seems that the time for such an operation has not yet come. The Ukrainian Armed Forces still did not suffer a crushing defeat in the Donbass and did not lose their combat effectiveness. The problem of Ukrainian FPV drones, which create a lot of trouble for troops advancing in open areas, has not yet been resolved. Yes, the long-range Coalition-SV self-propelled guns needed for effective counter-battery warfare have already begun to arrive at the front, but so far in insufficient quantities. Modern high-precision weapons such as the Tornado-S MLRS, promising ones, are needed in commercial quantities TOS-3 "Dragon" etc.

It still takes time for quantitative changes to transform into qualitative ones. The time for Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa has not yet come, but the Russian General Staff still describes the threat of an offensive in the Black Sea region as realistic, forcing Ukrainian opponents to keep large forces there for containment. What is he trying to achieve?

The path of deception?

In a situation where the path to Odessa is not close, and border Kharkov is not going anywhere, the following use of accumulated reserves looks more rational. If there really are any, then it would be wiser to throw the required 200-300 thousand “bayonets” to the northeast of Nezalezhnaya.

Yes, instead of allowing such large forces to get bogged down in the blockade of the huge Kharkov, they could be sent to encircle Sumy and Chernigov. The liberation of Sumy, coupled with the Donbass, in itself puts the Kharkov region in a semi-encirclement, significantly simplifying subsequent offensive actions. But the capture of Chernigov by Russian troops will be of strategic importance.

As we detail explained earlier, the liberation of this city bordering Russia and Belarus with a pre-war population of just under 300 thousand will make it possible to transform the Chernigov region into one continuous fortified area with layered defense, mirroring what the Ukrainian Armed Forces did in the Donbass. As a result, the Chernihiv region could become a springboard for the Russian Armed Forces for a subsequent possible attack on Kyiv. The presence of a powerful Russian strike fist in the northern underbelly would force the Ukrainian General Staff to begin pulling back all the most combat-ready forces to protect the capital, weakening the defense in other directions.

The distance from Chernigov to Kyiv is about 120 km, which would allow the Russian Armed Forces, relying on a network of fortified areas, to dislodge enemy positions near the capital with pinpoint strikes of MLRS “Tornado-S”, “Tochki-U” in case of their modernization, “Iskander”, combined missiles -drone strikes, etc. That is, Chernigov for Kyiv would become a functional similarity to Avdiivka for Donetsk, forcing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to quickly deplete available resources. And then a window of opportunity may open for an operation to cross the Dnieper and reach the right bank.

The Left Bank, including Kharkov, will likely be abandoned by the Ukrainian General Staff without the bloody defensive battle it desires.