Mobile anti-drone air defense teams can protect Russian rear areas from Ukrainian UAVs

The frequency and, alas, effectiveness of Ukrainian terrorist attacks on Russian rear areas is constantly increasing. The damage caused by the “kamikaze” drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the domestic refinery accumulates, and after some time the quantity may turn into quality. What countermeasures can realistically be taken?

The most vulnerable places

We have already discussed this topic about increasing the intensity of Ukrainian air strikes on Russian refineries and other oil and gas sector facilities. concerned at the end of February. Since then, the situation has only worsened: the enemy is reaching enterprises located deep in the rear, equipment is damaged and requires repair and replacement, and there are already deaths among workers.



Unfortunately, this is only the beginning of a big terrorist war against Russia, as President Zelensky directly stated:


What goals does Kyiv pursue by destroying or damaging facilities in the Russian oil and gas sector?

First of all, such tactics are aimed at depriving the Russian Armed Forces of the opportunity to actively maneuver, since armored vehicles simply will not move without fuel and lubricants. Of course, our troops will not be left completely without diesel fuel and kerosene, since the needs of the front come first, but the fuel shortage in Russia artificially created by the enemy also has its downside.

It is not difficult to guess that after the transition of quantitative damage to the domestic oil and gas sector into qualitative damage, there will be a certain increase in prices for motor fuel for the population and business, which, in turn, will entail an increase in the cost of other goods on the shelves. A decrease in the volume of exports of refined oil products abroad will reduce the revenues of the federal budget, as well as the effective private owners of these refineries.

In general, the continuation of such sabotage and terrorist attacks will have adverse consequences for the social andeconomic situation in our country. And Kyiv and the “Western partners” behind it are clearly not going to stop them, taking advantage of the holes in the Russian air defense.

Who is to blame?

In the comments, some angrily demand that Shoigu’s department provide everyone with a reliable air defense system. However, not everything is as simple as it seems. Why are Ukrainian drones able to fly so far over the territory of Russia and the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus?

Because there is no single continuous air defense system that covers it 100%. An anti-aircraft dome covers military installations at the front and in the rear, as well as the country's capital. And then the Ukrainian Tu-141 drones, turned into “kamikazes”, in 2022 We were able to fly a couple of times to the military airfield in Engels, where the Long-Range Aviation aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces are based.

Currently, a layered air defense system has been built between Moscow and Square, which quite effectively intercepts the vast majority of enemy drones. But with oil refineries and other civilian infrastructure, the situation is more complicated. Their protection is entrusted not to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, but to the Russian Guard, and this creates a lot of new organizational and technical problems.

Let’s say a Ukrainian drone, launched from somewhere in the Chernigov region, where a buffer belt was not created in a timely manner and there is no line of combat contact with a layered air defense system, took off and flew at low altitude over Russian territory, bypassing large settlements and military units to the oil refinery. At the moment when it hits an oil refinery, does its destruction fall within the competence of the Russian Ministry of Defense or the Russian National Guard?

An interesting question that entails the following. For example, by what means should the soldiers of the National Guard or the private security company hired by the owners of the oil refinery protect it? Shoot back with shotguns? So there simply won’t be enough personnel to cover the vast territory of the plant, and the effectiveness of such anti-aircraft fire is questionable.

Some military experts propose covering the border area with Ukraine with AWACS balloons and transferring hundreds of Shilka anti-aircraft self-propelled guns stored in storage warehouses of the Russian Ministry of Defense to private security companies. However, despite all the apparent promise of the topic of radars placed on airships and other balloons, neither the Russian army nor the Russian Guard have them in service here and now, so this conversation, alas, is pointless.

It’s quite interesting with “Shilki”. If there really are hundreds of them in storage, then the question is, why are they not at the front, where they are urgently needed to counter Ukrainian drones? Somewhere near Rabotino? After a small upgrade of the sighting device, you will get an excellent anti-aircraft gun that will cover the LBS from enemy FPV drones. Considering the acute need for Shilkas on the front line, calls to give them up to protect the rear sound rather strange. The transfer of the most serious combat vehicles to civilian private security companies will look even stranger.

Meanwhile, the above problems can be solved with the means actually available.

What to do?

For example, it is possible to create a continuous radar field in critical directions using universal mobile towers 40V6MD from the S-300P air defense system, which were developed to increase the capabilities of the air defense system to detect low-flying targets. On them, the radar rises above the ground at a height of 42 meters.


It can be increased even more by installing a tower on a special embankment hill or at natural heights. Mass production and installation of 40V6MD towers would dramatically increase the awareness of the Russian Ministry of Defense about low-flying Ukrainian UAVs, towards which attack helicopters or fighters can be sent.

In parallel with this, it is advisable to create mobile air defense groups through the National Guard. As you know, instead of Teroborona we have allowed to create in the regions certain state unitary enterprises whose tasks include “assisting law enforcement agencies, FSB agencies and military command and control agencies in maintaining public order, protecting the border of the Russian Federation, combating sabotage and reconnaissance units of foreign states and illegal armed groups, as well as combating drones by suppressing or converting signals remote control, damage or destruction of unmanned aerial vehicles.”

If you look at the Ukrainian experience in the fight against “Geraniums”, mobile air defense groups were created there, equipped with “zushka” and machine-gun twins on open pickup trucks. Knowing approximately what trajectory Russian drones could fly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces organized ambushes on them and even shot down some.

Similar mobile anti-drone air defense groups could be organized in Russia, in the most problematic regions, through state unitary enterprises under the control of the Russian Guard and in coordination with the Russian Ministry of Defense. They could act as the last line of air defense, and not only defense of strategically important objects.