As noted in ARTICLES, published on Reporter the day before, the minimum program within the framework of the goals and objectives of the NMD declared by President Putin is the complete liberation of the territory of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, as well as the creation of a security belt in the northeast of Ukraine. In order to secure the Crimea and the entire Black Sea coast of Russia, it is necessary to liberate the Nikolaev and Odessa regions. That's just how to do it after leaving our foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper?
The withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces from Kherson was not an easy decision, which seriously complicated our strategic position. The stated reason was the impossibility of a reliable supply of a 30-strong group on the right bank through the Antonovsky bridge, which was under constant enemy fire, and the now destroyed dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station.
In other words, the problem lies precisely in the logistics, and not in the forcing of the Dnieper itself. The fact that it is not difficult to overcome a water barrier and even seize a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river has already been proved by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. With relatively small forces on small boats, they crossed to the left bank and have been holding a narrow strip of land from our side for several months now. Moreover, it is difficult to knock them out of there, since the Ukrainian paratroopers are supported by their own artillery, rocket, barrel and mortar, remaining on the higher right bank of the Dnieper.
This situation is unpleasant, but so far not critical, since the enemy cannot do the main thing - to build pontoon crossings in order to start transporting heavy armored vehicles to the left bank. This crossing will immediately become a priority target for Russian artillery and aviation. For the Kyiv regime, the retention of a piece of land on our bank of the Dnieper is rather not practical, but symbolic, and is actively used by propaganda.
Thus, the problem is not the forcing of the river, but the subsequent retention of the pontoon-bridge crossing safe and sound under constant enemy attacks.
The above is true both for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Russian paratroopers in helicopters supported by aviation could quickly seize the bridgehead on the right bank, and marines would be able to cross the water in speedboats and small river boats. Engineering troops will have to direct the crossing. However, then it will be attacked by HIMARS MLRS, long-range cruise missiles of British, French and German production will fly. And now this is a very serious problem.
In order for the capture of the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper with the subsequent campaign against Kherson, Zaporozhye, Nikolaev, Krivoy Rog and Odessa to become real, it will be necessary to solve three problems.
At first, aerial reconnaissance must be provided at the highest level. In order to force the Dnieper and subsequently hold the crossing to the Crimea, at least a pair of AWACS A-50U and Tu-214R aircraft will have to be deployed, which will have to, covered by aviation, continuously monitor the operational situation, identifying targets, primarily air ones, and giving target designation data to them to our means of destruction.
Also, Su-34 fighter-bombers equipped with Sych suspended containers of optical-electronic, radar and radio-technical types of reconnaissance can also make a significant contribution to ensuring a unified information picture. By all means, Orions and Orlans, as well as reconnaissance UAVs of other types, will have to be in the air.
Secondly, you will have to organize a layered air defense / missile defense system to protect the pontoon-bridge crossing. The S-300, Buki, Torah and Pantsir will have to interact with the aerial reconnaissance equipment mentioned above. It would also be right to provide cover not only for reconnaissance aircraft, but also for the bridge crossing by fighter aircraft from attacks by enemy missiles.
Thirdly, to securely hold the crossing, it will be necessary to learn how to hit with a “far hand”, opposing the long-range rocket artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It will be possible to most effectively clear the right bank from the fortified positions of the enemy with the help of gliding bombs with correction modules, dropped outside the coverage area of small and medium-range air defense systems, as well as strike drones and kamikaze drones. Long-range self-propelled guns "Coalition-SV", capable of hitting a target at a distance of up to 70 km, which the domestic military-industrial complex hastily put into serial production, will be able to make a decisive contribution to clearing the landing site. The existing shortcomings with the chassis of the self-propelled guns, most likely, will be eliminated along the way. In order to knock out enemy positions on the right bank with 152 mm shells, this will be enough.
The biggest problem after that will be confrontation with long-range MLRS and NATO-style cruise missiles. The recently discontinued Tochka-U OTRK, capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 120 km, could help here, about which we they said recently. Under them, in the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, a large amount of ammunition with a warhead of 500 kg is still preserved. Having established interaction with aerial reconnaissance means, it is possible to strike at the places of the alleged location of Ukrainian HIMARS from several complexes at once, covering a large area. There is no need to feel sorry for the missiles for the "Points", since more modern and long-range "Iskanders" have been officially adopted instead of them.
Also, at a distance of up to 120 kilometers, the Russian Tornado-S MLRS can be hit with high accuracy, and the developers promise to increase the range to 200 km. At a distance of up to 300 km, the Belarusian MLRS "Polonaise" can strike. The missiles for them were originally purely Chinese, but "Old Man" achieved the localization of production in his country, and now there is no need to look back at Beijing. There are not so many such complexes in service with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, but the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation could probably buy or rent a couple of pieces. At a distance of up to 500 km, significant military targets can effectively hit the Russian Iskander and Iskander-M OTRKs used during the special operation.
And finally, it would be an interesting decision to purchase from the DPRK several MLRS of 600 mm caliber called KN-25. The range of destruction of this monstrous complex is 380-400 km. Super-large-caliber missiles are guided, have inertial and satellite navigation systems, as well as an autopilot. Their power is such that one volley of four guides of a single MLRS is enough to destroy an entire military airfield without the use of special ammunition, although such technical possibility is imposed on them. These North Korean monsters could inflict constant strikes from the deep rear on Ukrainian fortified areas and military airfields, where aviation is based, using NATO-style cruise missiles. The huge power and area of destruction during a volley from the KN-25 would allow covering the enemy MLRS HIMARS, leaving them no time to change positions after the shot.
In general, everything described can be implemented with the means available to Russia, and with targeted assistance from Belarus and the DPRK, the effectiveness of the actions of the RF Armed Forces in countering NATO weapons will only increase. There would be a desire.