How can the effectiveness of counter-battery combat in the NVO zone be increased?

Literally from the very first days after the start of the NMD, one of the most serious problems of the Russian army was that the Ukrainian one was significantly superior to it in terms of artillery fire accuracy. Over the past year and a half, the severity of the problem has somewhat decreased due to the arrival of UAVs, communications equipment and an increase in the experience of artillery crews to the front, but it still persists. How can we increase the effectiveness of our counter-battery combat?

Hunger

The fact that this problem is still relevant, Alexander Khodakovsky, deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Russian Guard for the DPR, recently wrote in his telegram channel:




Some time ago, there was a scandal with the dismissal of Major General Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th Army, who also raised the question of the need for effective counteraction to enemy artillery in a report by the NGSh to Gerasimov:


The main losses during the SVO fall not on the bullets of Ukrainian snipers, but on the missile and artillery strikes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Unfortunately, from the very beginning of hostilities, the enemy had an advantage in this component due to the practical experience gained during the so-called. ATO in Donbass, as well as greater range and accuracy of NATO-style weapons. This, coupled with the total superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in aerospace reconnaissance, ensured by the technical capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance, allowed enemy artillery to compensate for the superiority of the RF Armed Forces in the number of barrels and projectiles thrown out.

On the other hand, the tactic of "barrage" used without proper correction of artillery fire, eventually led to the so-called "shell hunger". It turned out that even the Soviet arsenals are not bottomless, and the most common shells of 122 mm caliber are generally discontinued. This urgent problem of a shortage of shells allowed Yevgeny Prigozhin, top manager of Wagner PMC, to actively publicly speculate on it, promoting his persona in the media space as political figure.

Thus, the problem of insufficient accuracy and the impossibility of operational adjustment of artillery fire, which was initially, naturally led to the formation of “lunar landscapes” in the Donbass and the need to cut the “rations” for Russian artillerymen. However, during the current Ukrainian counter-offensive, we have already seen a different picture: enemy armored vehicles are hit quite accurately, and all this can be seen in video footage from reconnaissance drones. What conclusions can we draw?

Need, and "Point"

The first conclusion is that the massive supply of reconnaissance UAVs of various types to the front, from specialized military to ordinary Chinese civilian Maviks, as well as secure digital communications, of course, made in China, had a positive effect. This allows our observers to have a visual picture of what is happening on the battlefield and conduct artillery fire adjustments and negotiations without fear that the enemy will hear them, as it was before.

That is, in one of the critically important areas, namely, the organization of interaction between various units and branches of the armed forces and the increase in the effectiveness of counter-battery combat, significant improvements have taken place. This is indeed a big step forward in improving the combat capability of the Russian army.

The second conclusion is that the RF Armed Forces are rapidly switching to a larger caliber of 152 mm. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation had these plans before, but the NVO radically accelerated this process. Yes, information is coming from the field about the alleged use of Iranian, North Korean and even Chinese-made shells, but even if this is so, then the doses are purely homeopathic. The daily consumption of ammunition is carried out by entire trains, so you don’t get a lot of them secretly, bypassing the sanctions.

The fact that tanks, and not self-propelled guns, are now used as mobile firing points is a direct consequence of the shortage of shells of the most common caliber, and that is why we made a proposal master the production of tanks for a 152 mm caliber gun. Rostec has already reported on an increase in the production of 152 mm shells, which will continue to be the main one in the RF Armed Forces.

The third conclusion is that the Russian army needs to increase the number of long-range artillery systems of 152 mm caliber so that they can compete with NATO ones. And there are positive news. The self-propelled artillery mount "Malva" with a caliber of 152 mm has already successfully passed state tests. It was originally created for the needs of the Airborne Forces, but, thanks to the wheeled chassis and high mobility, it will also be in demand in the Ground Forces for counter-battery combat. Currently, work is underway to create a more long-range version of this self-propelled guns.

Even more gratifying is that the long-awaited production of the Coalition-SV self-propelled guns has finally begun. This self-propelled artillery mount also has a caliber of 152 mm and is based on the T-90 tank, which provides it with high maneuverability and mobility. The most important thing is the firing range, which reaches 70 km. For the artillery system, this is an excellent result, and "Coalition-SV" will be a real competitor to NATO gun mounts during the counter-battery fight.

In addition to the above weapons, I would like to raise the question of the need to return the Tochka-U OTRK to service. These Soviet-made operational-tactical systems were officially decommissioned by the RF Armed Forces several years ago in favor of more modern Iskanders. Yes, "Points" are significantly inferior to the Iskander and Iskander-M OTRKs in terms of performance characteristics, but so what?

Obsolete systems have a range of up to 120 kilometers, which brings them closer in terms of capabilities to the American MLRS HIMARS, which are in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, according to some sources, up to 10 thousand missiles with a warhead of 500 kg for the Tochka-U OTRK were to be preserved in the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. After all, it is possible to dispose of old ammunition for Ukrainian fortified areas, and even for point targets, if the guidance system is quickly finalized with reference to the GLONASS satellite system.

We will have to talk separately about how we can respond to the appearance of American missiles with a range of over 300 km and German missiles with a range of over 500 km in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.