"Bloody Stalin": repression in the Red Army and marshals-exposers

100
Every day is approaching the next anniversary of the Great Victory. Alas, this day is not holy and bright for everyone, even in our country. Surely, as it has been more than once, there will be those who try not only to cast a shadow on one of the greatest achievements of our people, but also abundantly pour mud on the leaders who headed the country during the Great Patriotic War. Talk will again begin that it was won “contrary to Stalin and the Communists”, “exorbitant price” and, in general, it is still unknown whether it’s good that it was won ...





Well, no matter how many are those who will try to poison people's minds and souls with such a vile lie, we need to find the strength in ourselves to withstand it.

Is it possible to believe the marshals?


One of the favorite "black myths" of our liberals, all-pervasive and tenacious, like a kitchen cockroach, is the following thesis:

Planned and sanctioned by Stalin, the mass repressions of the executioners from the NKVD against the command staff of the Red Army weakened it to such a state that the USSR almost lost the war.


Moreover, the possessed Führer of the Third Reich decided to attack our country almost exclusively because "the military leadership was cut out by order of Stalin." I looked, you see, foe, on the lists of the Red Army command staff densely redrawn with a red pencil - and on the run let's get the Barbarossa plan out! Bullshit, God forgive me ...

However, among the commentators of my recent Articles (by the way, devoted to purely economic issues of the life of the Stalinist USSR), the most ardent adherents of this crazy theory were discovered. In their support, they even quoted a quote from Marshal Vasilevsky himself - they say that one of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War later lamented that the war in the forty-first year “might not have happened without the thirty-seventh year”. The commander suddenly imagined that in Hitler’s decision to launch the invasion "an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of military personnel" that occurred in the Soviet Union. Yes, such words go on the Internet. True, the source of the citation invariably indicates the 9th issue of the journal "Communist" from 1988, that is, the source is more than dubious. Firstly, the aforementioned printed one, sorry for the expression, the “organ” in the mentioned year should already be renamed into “Anti-Communist”. Secondly, Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky died in 1977. That is, at the time of publication, it was completely harmless to ascribe any words ...

Personally, I am much more convinced by the words from the book of Vasilevsky himself, “The Case of All Life,” in which the marshal speaks of Stalin with exceptional respect, repeatedly emphasizing that such was the “most powerful and colorful figure” of the Soviet military command. In his own memoirs, the marshal clearly indicated that the Victory is the "undoubted personal merit" of the Supreme. If you take into account that the book was published after the Twentieth Congress, such assessments were a courageous act ... However, when talking about the "Stalinist crimes against the Red Army" the gentlemen from the liberal camp, who want to introduce themselves as experts in military history, will certainly add a couple more marshal’s quotes “by topic. " For example, from Andrei Eremenko, who allegedly claimed that Joseph Vissarionovich was “significantly guilty of exterminating military personnel,” and this, of course, “had an effect on the combat readiness of the army.” Or - from Georgy Zhukov, who sang with might and main in his "Memoirs and Reflections" about "unjustified arrests" in 1937, during which "prominent military men" were repressed. Next - again about the damage to "combat effectiveness and the development of the Armed Forces."

I want to say - both of the sources mentioned above, with all the great gratitude to them, as commanders of the Great Patriotic War, personally cause extremely negative feelings for me as participants in the Khrushchev party and military coup that destroyed the USSR and the heinous bacchanalia of the blackening of Stalin, which was subsequently unleashed. Eremenko personally ran to Nikita Sergeevich, offering himself as a speaker at the XX Congress. It is clear on what issues ... For which, by the way, he was granted a Marshall star. Everyone knows about the role of Zhukov. By the way, both of these leaders could not endure each other organically. Eremenko was the only commander whom Zhukov spat on in his memoirs, describing him as a swaggering fool who “did not use love in the army”! The same, in turn, bonfired the “Marshal of Victory” to all the crusts, exposing him as a “usurper and rude”, “a terrible and near-sighted man” Both are good! And there is no faith for them ...

In my opinion, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky can be considered the standard in this matter. That's who really had the full right to judge the pre-war repression - having passed the basements of the NKVD, where he lost all his teeth, subsequently, the camp. So, when jackals from Khrushchev’s pack rolled up to Rokossovsky, annoyingly offering to print a dirty mud over the Supreme, he sent them in a truly marshal's way. Very far. According to one version, Konstantin Konstantinovich snapped: “Stalin for me is a saint!”

Personnel of the Red Army - beating, reduction or purification?


It would be fundamentally wrong to deny the repressions that took place in the ranks of the Red Army (though, far from being only in it alone!) During the period 1937-1939. It was, of course ... However, to observe without horror and indignation how the number of repressed people grew - first in the writings of the "perestroika" publicists and "historians", and then in the mouths of their followers from the camp of modern "democrats" and "human rights activists ", Decidedly impossible! If Dmitry Volkogonov still had some conscience and, speaking of 40 thousand “commanders” who were given away during these years, he specified that in view of this there were not only “innocent people who had sat down,” but also simply dismissed from the army, then it started ! Moreover, in all serious ways ... The “perestroika” who had crashed from high stands was already shouting about 70 thousand, who were “innocent killed”, Geller and Rappoport raised their stakes to 100 thousand, and Kirchner was moaning about “destroying more than 50 before the war % of the officer corps. " Nothing that there was not a single officer in the Red Army until 1943 - only the red commanders ?! Although they would learn the terminology, bullshit ...

True, it is worth taking all these issues seriously - with numbers and facts in hand, as everything immediately turns upside down. From head to toe, naturally. A striking moment - if in the “terrible” 1937 and 1938 the shortage of command staff in the Red Army was 34 and 39 thousand, respectively, then in 1940 and 1941, when, as even the most stubborn anti-Stalinists are forced to admit, there was no mention of any repression equaled 60 and 66 thousand people! What kind of mysticism ?! And there was no mysticism - there was the development of the army, which Stalin, who had "slept through the war" and "did not prepare" for it, conducted an unprecedented, accelerated pace. It was the deployment of more and more new units and formations of the Red Army, commanders for which there was definitely not enough. Here it is necessary to mention one more specific and extremely important aspect - in the Red Army there was a clear overabundance of senior and average command personnel - in the complete absence of a practically qualified junior. There were neither corporals, nor sergeants, that is, those who were non-commissioned officers in the Imperial Army of Russia. Even the ensigns were not. But those whom we call officers today are abundant.

Let us recall one more thing. Speaking of "general purges in the army", our dear liberals lump everyone in one heap - from those dismissed from service due to their age, illness to those expelled from it for unrestrained drunkenness, or those who fell on bunks for banal theft of state property. They have all these people - crystal clear "victims political repression ". Well, it's complete nonsense! The data on the activities of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the military tribunals, which, in fact, passed the corresponding sentences, are perfectly preserved. So: specifically “for counter-revolutionary crimes” they were convicted in 1937 - a little more than 4 thousand people, in 1938 - more than 3 thousand, and in 1939 - just over a thousand. Accordingly, 1938 people were sentenced to death in 52, and 1939 in 112. I could not find data for 1937, but by analogy with other years, it is easy to calculate the possible numbers. At the same time, I want to clarify - these figures apply to all categories of military personnel, including privates! Where are the "tens of thousands destroyed"?

There is other data, according to which during the mentioned period about 37 thousand people of the command staff were dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army. But again, bad luck - only 9 and a half thousand people were arrested from them. Moreover, after the work carried out by the commission of the personnel Glavk of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, more than 12 thousand laid-offs returned, of which more than 10 thousand were expelled from the army specifically for political reasons. Fifteen hundred people were released from custody. Such "mass repressions" are obtained.

A conspiracy that ... could not have been!


I foresee a heated objection and reproach: “But what about the“ army head ”that was destroyed in 1937, marshals and commanders, brigades and commanders ?!” Next - the usual tramp about the "military geniuses" Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Uborevich and others like them. And, of course, about the "mercilessly cut out by the Stalin heroes of the Civil", about the "shot commanders who passed Spain." Tired of it already! Are you, in all seriousness, trying to assert that all of this public would play a positive role for our army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War ?! Oh, they would have fought ... Tukhachevsky, who was shamefully beaten by the Poles in 1920, who climbed to Warsaw without reserves, secured communications and flanking ... Blucher, who spread a complete mess in the Far East entrusted to him, which naturally ended in unreasonably large losses of the Red Army in battles near Lake Hassan, after which, in fact, Blucher took up seriously ... "Strategists" were still there!

All these “commanders” who participated in the First World War, at best, in the junior officer ranks, and in the Civil worked at the level of field commanders, in the Great Patriotic War would be not only useless - harmful! Participants in the fighting in Spain, too, in no way could get there experience that would be useful in 1941. The phrase that the generals are always preparing for the last war has long been winged, and corresponds exactly 100% to reality. What was the use of the “first marshals” in the Great Patriotic War, the “participation” in it of Voroshilov and Budyonny, who were not allowed to get close to the active army, testifies to after Clement Efremovich “marked” himself near Leningrad. But these were still the best!

By the way, there is one more thing. As long as the Soviet program for the creation of jet weapons was under the leadership of Tukhachevsky and his people, there was nothing practical in it. As soon as there was no “genius”, nor his team, and Voroshilov got down to business - the Red Army received the famous Katyusha. In turn, Uborevich, as soon as he could, slowed down the production and adoption of submachine guns in the Red Army, stubbornly repeating that it was a "purely police weapon", leading, in addition to the excessive cost of ammunition. There are a great many such examples. In fact, the real rearmament and development of the Soviet Armed Forces began only after all this gang-watering can be removed from the highest echelons of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. And this, inevitably, leads to very bad suspicions ...

Our democratic community traditionally reacts to any talk about the reality of a military conspiracy in the Red Army, revealed in 1937, as a notorious incense line. It could not be! Because it could never have been ... Launched with a hard hand of Khrushchev, this idiotic formulation for decades outweighed both the heap of evidence for the existence of this very conspiracy (including that received in the 30s from foreign intelligence), as well as elementary common sense. It turns out simply enchanting: the operation "Valkyrie", during which the lamp-bearers from the Wehrmacht tried to reset the Fuhrer and his entourage - this, of course, is reality. And in the Red Army, nothing like this could exist in principle! Even as it could. It was not for nothing that Tukhachevsky gave very lengthy and detailed confession statements in this regard just the day after the arrest, and without any beating in the “gloomy basements of the Lubyanka”. Presumably, they pinned the Marshal to the wall with evidence already gathered. It happens...

The conspiracy of the military, and tightly soldered both with the Trotskyist underground and with colleagues from the Third Reich, actually existed! Moreover, the tragedy of June 22, 1941 was due not to “mass repressions in the Red Army”, but to the fact that all the threads of this conspiracy were not unraveled, and the participants were neutralized! The further I delve into this topic - the more evidence. I thoroughly promise to publish a thorough and reasoned study on it a little later - on the anniversary of the tragic date.

In conclusion, I want to give one quote - from the one written in 1937 regarding the processes of the “military case”: “The show trial in Russia continues. Madness reigns there, Stalin is mentally ill! It is otherwise impossible to explain his bloody regime ... ”This is all from the personal diary of the Reich Minister of Nazi Germany Joseph Goebbels. You have a good company, gentlemen, “anti-Stalinists”! Worthy of you completely and completely ...
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  1. +5
    April 27 2019 09: 39
    It is useless to explain anything in our country to liberal fascists and descendants of underelicated and (or) finished off in due time, and by the way, very on time, Zionist-Trotskyists, enemies of the people. The vast majority of them are well aware of all this. They just hate Russians and Russia. And the Stalinist period in the history and life of the Russian people was God's blessing, almost in our entire history. They, all these Pozners, Svanidzy, Bonch-bruevichs, Bonners and other dandruff, cannot forgive him that their ancestors — the Jews who for the first time in their cunning history — came to the sole authority in a state like Russia, were destroyed. Then only twice more did they come to full power: in their terrarium, Israel and present-day Ukria.
    Glory to Stalin!
    1. +3
      April 27 2019 10: 25
      Explain something in our current country to the liberal fascists and descendants of the uninhabited ...

      It is necessary to explain the youth, whom the liberal fascists regularly brainwash (litter).
      Such materials are needed and useful.
    2. -2
      3 June 2019 07: 56
      not a single comment without Ukraine ...
  2. -4
    April 27 2019 10: 38
    It is not the first year that I have noticed that before May 9, a profuse slinging of mud on the military, repressed in 1937, begins. Especially M.N. Tukhachevsky. It seems that the current admirers of Stalin are still either envious or afraid of him. Therefore, over and over again, the Soviet-Polish war emerges, the fault for the loss of which lies not only with Tukhachevsky, but also with Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, and the RVS of the South-Western Front. And about his successful operations (the defeat of Kolchak, Denikin) no one remembers. And speculation begins on the topic of a mythical "conspiracy". And his services in the creation of the Red Army are denied. Meanwhile, thanks to M.N. Tukhachevsky (and his associates) received new types and types of troops - aviation, mechanized and airborne troops. It was only thanks to him that the world's first Jet Research Institute was created, i.e. We owe him the creation of the base, which laid the foundation for all domestic rocket and space technology! Yes, and the development of the "Katyusha" began under Tukhachevsky. The fact that her volleys did not meet the Nazis on our borders is the result of repression by talented designers. It is clear that you cannot prove anything to the author of the article. But maybe someone will not believe the lie about Tukhachevsky and will read the works of real historians, for example, N. Shilo and A. Glushko, S. Lazarev, A. Pechenkin and others, and not the yellow literature and the press.
    1. +1
      April 27 2019 11: 33
      real historians

      Your purely personal opinion
      1. -3
        April 27 2019 14: 27
        Unfortunately for you, this is not my purely personal opinion. There are criteria for the authenticity of historical research. All the authors I mentioned have worked with a huge array of documents for more than one year. Each of their words can be checked, which the authors of "yellow" literature and articles, which broadcast rumors, abundantly flavored them with their conjectures, cannot boast.
        1. 0
          April 28 2019 14: 16
          Jaundice are these crystal clear authors, hist.
          1. 0
            April 28 2019 19: 10
            How everything is turned upside down, I wonder. Crystal clear authors are just those who carefully study the documents. And if you do not like the true information that does not denigrate M.N. Tukhachevsky, but refuting the philistine myths about him, then this is your problem. Read jaundice who have not seen a single document in their eyes, I do not even want to pronounce their names.
      2. -3
        April 27 2019 16: 05
        The opinion of millions of people and do not la la!
        1. -2
          April 27 2019 16: 41
          it is precisely that this is the opinion of millions of people, which is based only on rumors and speculation. People are too lazy to think, read normal research, and that’s herd thinking. So millions of people with brainwashed is not an argument, millions of people are watching Andryusha Malakhov or whatever ...
          1. +1
            April 28 2019 12: 17
            What are speculations and rumors? See how many fresh flowers are all year round at Stalin's grave! No where else is there! Here you have all the arguments and arguments! The older generation will not betray Stalin. And for 30 years, the young brains were steeped in bourgeois propaganda!
            1. -2
              April 28 2019 19: 16
              See how many fresh flowers are all year round at Stalin’s grave!

              People servile titles are real dogs sometimes. The heavier the punishment, the better gentlemen they are!

              - No one can say better than Nekrasov. Read the classics) As for the "bourgeois" propaganda, I disagree - now in our society there is only "neo-Stalinist" propaganda, and some voices against it simply drown in the general stream, unfortunately. This article and the comments are evidence of this. Alas.
              1. -1
                April 29 2019 09: 31
                hist - are you slaves of the west?
                1. 0
                  April 29 2019 17: 53
                  how everything is started ... wassat
                  1. 0
                    April 29 2019 20: 59
                    Yes it is started! They told a story! For 30 years they have turned the country upside down! What was white turned black! And vice versa!
    2. -1
      April 27 2019 13: 36
      Yes Yes. And about the use of chemical weapons in the Tambov region.
      1. +1
        April 27 2019 14: 23
        Nonsense invented in the 90s The story with "chemical attacks" looks like this. The decision to use gases against rebels (not civilians) was adopted in Tambov on June 9, 1921 at a meeting of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, chaired by V.A. Antonova –Ovseenko. And then, this was not a priority issue, but one measure of struggle against the Antonovites. The commission decided “to use gases to smoke bandits from forests, in each case notifying civilians about this ...” (no one planned to use gases against civilians). Tukhachevsky signed the order as commander of the troops of the Tambov province. And then, this decision and order were not fulfilled, because there were: 1. Trained personnel for conducting chemical attacks; 2. There were no gas cylinders. Only 3 (three) gas-projectile attacks were recorded that did not result in human casualties. And the main component of the shells sent to the Tambov region was chloropicrin (tear gas). In addition, an amnesty was held in parallel - from May 28 to July 26, 1921, more than 5 thousand rebels voluntarily surrendered (more than 1 thousand with weapons), who were released to their families! See the work of Bobkov, Shilo and Glushko. They are all based on genuine, documentary sources. Victims in the use of chem. weapons were when whites suppressed peasant uprisings in eastern Siberia in 1919.
        1. 0
          April 27 2019 14: 36
          I would believe, but there is a photo archive of the use of OM. The moment of release of chlorine. And the result of the application. Over the past years, many things have flowed.
          1. +1
            April 27 2019 16: 43
            These are pictures from a training film for the Red Army. Which for some reason are attributed as "examples of atrocity" in the Tambov region.
    3. +1
      April 27 2019 15: 36
      The order of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the beginning of repressive measures against individual bandits and their families sheltering

      11th of June 1921

      No. 171, Tambov

      To the commissions of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

      Starting from June 1, a decisive fight against banditry gives a quick reassurance of the region. Soviet power is gradually being restored, and the laboring peasantry is moving to peaceful and quiet work. Antonov’s gang was defeated by decisive actions of our troops, scattered and caught separately.

      In order to permanently eradicate the eserobandite roots, and in addition to the previously issued orders, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee orders:

      1. Citizens who refuse to give their name to be shot on the spot without trial.

      2. To the villages where the weapons are hiding, by the authority of the political commissions and the regional political commissions to announce orders to seize hostages and shoot those in case of non-delivery of weapons.

      3. In the case of finding the hidden weapon to shoot on the spot without a trial, the senior employee in the family.

      4. The family in whose house the bandit took refuge is subject to arrest and expulsion from the province, her property is confiscated, a senior worker in the family is shot on the spot without a court.

      5. Families who shelter family members or property of bandits should be considered as gangsters and the senior employee of this family to be shot on the spot without trial.

      6. In the event of the family’s escape, the property should be distributed among the peasants faithful to the Soviet regime, and dismantled or burned at home.

      7. This order should be enforced severely and mercilessly. "

      Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Antonov-Ovseenko

      Commander Tukhachevsky

      Chairman of the Executive Committee Lavrov

      Secretary Vasiliev

      Read at rural gatherings.
      ----------
      Order of the command of the troops of the Tambov province on the use of gases against rebels

      12th of June 1921

      No. 0116, the city of Tambov / ops

      The remnants of the broken gangs and individual bandits who fled from the villages where Soviet power was restored, gather in the forests and from there raid civilians.

      For the immediate cleaning of forests, I order:

      1. Forests where bandits are hiding should be cleaned with poisonous gases, precisely calculated so that a cloud of asphyxiating gases spreads completely throughout the forest, destroying everything that was hidden in it.

      2. The Artillery Inspector shall immediately submit the required number of poisonous gas cylinders and the necessary specialists to the field.

      3. The commanders of the battle areas persistently and vigorously carry out this order.

      4. Report on measures taken.

      Commander Tukhachevsky

      Nashtavoysk, General Staff Kakurin

      Angel in the flesh....
      1. +1
        April 27 2019 16: 54
        This will be worse.
        “Guilty villages will be burned.” The order of the governor of the Yenisei and part of the Irkutsk province, General S.N. Rozanova (March 27, 1919)

        In the spring, the partisan movement in the Krasnoyarsk region intensified. To pacify, Rozanov was sent, who gave the following order. This order was carried out with severe ruthlessness. Suffice it to say that in one Yeniseisk, which totaled 7000 souls, 700 people were executed in the first days of the arrival of punishers. Punishers flogged peasants, burned entire villages.

        The chiefs of military units operating in the area of ​​the uprising.
        I order you to be guided by the following:
        1. When occupying villages captured earlier by robbers, demand the extradition of their leaders and leaders; if this does not happen, but reliable information about the availability of such is available, shoot the tenth.
        2. The villages, the population of which will meet government troops with weapons, burn; adult male population to shoot without exception; property, horses, carts, bread, and so on, selected in favor of the treasury.
        Note: all selected must be carried out by order of the detachment.
        3. If, when passing through the village, residents on their own initiative do not notify the government troops about the enemy staying in the village, and there was a possibility of notification, impose monetary indemnities on the population for mutual responsibility. Collect indemnities mercilessly.
        Note: any indemnity must be carried out by order, moreover by detachment. Amounts subsequently deposited in the treasury.
        4. During the occupation of the villages, according to the case study, steadily impose indemnities on all those persons who contributed to the robbers at least indirectly, having connected them with mutual responsibility.
        5. To declare to the population that for the voluntary supply of robbers not only with weapons and ammunition, but also with food, clothing and other things, the guilty villages will be burned, and the property will be taken away in favor of the treasury. The population is obliged to take away their property or destroy it in all cases when robbers can use it. For the property destroyed in this way, the population will be paid the full value in money or reimbursed from the requisitioned property of the robbers.
        6. Among the population to take hostages, in case of action of fellow villagers directed against government troops, shoot hostages mercilessly.
        7. As a general guideline to remember: a population that explicitly or secretly helps robbers should be looked upon as enemies and cracked down mercilessly, and their property should be compensated for losses caused by the hostilities of that part of the population that is on the side of the government.

        Lieutenant General Rozanov
        mountains Krasnoyarsk

        The text is reproduced according to the publication: Boldyrev V.G. Directory, Kolchak, interventionists: Memories. - Novonikolaevsk. 1925.P. 543 - 544.
        1. +6
          April 27 2019 17: 06
          Are we discussing who issued the more terrible orders? Or who was more cruel in the Civil War?
          It seemed to me that we were discussing a specific person - M. Tukhachevsky. Was he "white and fluffy", or was he the same bastard as the rest of the "innocent victims"?
          Did he sign the order? The fact that the order was not executed is another matter. He ordered to shoot hostages? That's enough for me.
          For example: when visiting a concentration camp (it seems near Smolensk), Heinrich Himmler fainted from what he saw. Does this somehow justify this impressionable former teacher?
          1. -2
            April 27 2019 17: 14
            In the Civil War brutality on both sides. Only for some reason only Tukhachevsky is being watered with mud. And nobody has the right to insult Tukhachevsky and other innocent victims (without quotes).
            1. +4
              April 27 2019 17: 23
              Neither you nor I have worked archives. We use the internet. And in its open spaces you can find anything. Biography of Tukhachevsky and his actions in the battles of the Civil, does not give reason to consider him a genius of military affairs. A man who lost to Pilsudski (more precisely to General Weygand) could hardly resist Bock or Roundshedt ...
              But this is just my opinion ....
              The very thesis that the purges in the Red Army somehow influenced Hitler’s decision to attack the USSR, I don’t consider at all. For his complete absurdity.
              1. +1
                April 27 2019 19: 02
                I am a historian and I work in archives, and I also work with literature, which is based strictly on archival documents. Tukhachevsky's military operations during the Civil War were quite successful. And the Zlatoust operation is brilliant and very interesting. It is a pity that they do not remember about her now. One can argue for a long time about the "Miracle on the Vistula", but Tukhachevsky is not alone in it.
                1. The comment was deleted.
                2. 0
                  April 27 2019 19: 40
                  I did not know that you are a historian. Archivist always has an advantage ....
                  Now your nickname has become clear
    4. +2
      April 27 2019 17: 37
      And how do you assess the nonsense that he carried about the role of tank troops. After all, it is necessary to think of the idea to build a hundred thousand tanks .. In time, Joseph Vissarionovich nullified it.
      1. +2
        April 27 2019 17: 56
        The military wants to have everything and more. Stalin, as the head of state, saw the whole picture. It is difficult for me to justify ALL the decisions of Stalin, but the fact that he was a great man is beyond doubt. Tukhachevsky was just a soldier. And not the smartest, as it seems to me.
        1. 0
          April 27 2019 19: 09
          1. "More and more" - Tukhachevsky tried to assess the maximum production capabilities of the industry, which could be involved in the production of military products when they were fully loaded during the first year of the war (these are not peacetime tanks!). The figures used by Tukhachevsky in his calculations were based on the revised indicators of the five-year plan. If it is necessary to accuse someone of being utopian, then the State Planning Commission. 2 In addition, Tukhachevsky just proposed a way to quickly arm the army with minimal military costs, to avoid a bias towards the defense industry to the detriment of civilian industry . The idea was to parallel production in civilian factories, so that, for example, a tractor plant stamped armor for tanks in parallel, etc.
          1. +2
            April 27 2019 19: 44
            It seemed to me that Tukhachevsky demanded exactly 100 thousand tanks. And did not evaluate the production capacity. When did he justify it? Then there were tractor plants?
            And the production of tanks is more profitable to deploy not in tractor, but in locomotive plants. Because it is still the main producer of the Uralvagonzavod.
            1. +3
              April 27 2019 19: 53
              I looked at the note by Tukhachevsky. Production by 1932 of 100 thousand tanks and the annual production of 140 thousand tanks. But besides this, there are also 245 divisions, that is, to bring the army to 11 million people. This is generally utopia.
              It seems to me that the production of military products is not tied to peaceful production. Nowhere in the world. Otherwise, how to explain the presence of as many as 400 tanks of the American army and a million cars.
              1. 0
                April 27 2019 21: 06
                sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit&id=44752;tab=img
                - letter from Tukhachevsky dated June 19, 1930. Look at least the first 12 pages. There he explains his calculations in detail. And 11 million people are not Tukhachevsky's number. These are Tukhachevsky's figures as processed by Shaposhnikov, who, to put it mildly, distorted everything and presented it in the form of "madman's notes" (Mikhail Nikolayevich deduced the figure of 5,8 million people)
                1. 0
                  April 27 2019 21: 29
                  I wanted to remove my comment, but it was too late.
                  I like just such a discussion. When can I get new information. Honestly, I did not really delve into this issue. Now looking through the sources. I have already read the letter to Stalin from June 1930. It is written chaotically and is not entirely clear. And I found on the Internet a facsimile with the notes of Stalin in the margins. But these are all letters after the fact. Now I want to find the letter itself from 1927. What exactly did Tukhachevsky offer?
                  Samuelson says that Tukhachevsky offered an army of 1-2 million people. In a letter from Tukhachevsky from 1930 it says about an army of 5 million. That is also very much for that time. But even in this letter to Stalin, I do not see that Tukhachevsky was a realist. The fact is that it was planned to release only 250 tanks in 1927. It also says about the uselessness of light machine guns, the refusal to purchase radio stations. In general, we must still read more carefully and comprehend.
                  In any case, the source is needed - a note by Tukhachevsky to the Headquarters of the Red Army from 1927. Isserson's notes also do not give much.
                  1. +1
                    April 28 2019 06: 52
                    istmat.info/node/30279
                    - I mean this note, which Shaposhnikov misinterpreted. Without it, you do not quite understand what the letter of June 19 is about. And the fact that emotions slip through this letter (dated June 19) is natural, Shaposhnikov's calculations are very astronomical. An army of 5 million is real for that time, the Red Army at the end of the civil one was just 5 million. Stalin generally took the figure of 8 million (letter to Tukhachevsky dated May 7, 1932). "There was a production of only 250 tanks in 1927" - I'm not talking about the end of the 20s, but about the revised figures at the end of the first five-year plan, i.e. for 1932/33 and how Tukhachevsky used them in his calculations.
                    1. 0
                      April 28 2019 07: 15
                      Samuelson correctly writes that Tukhachevsky offered an army of 1-2 million - this is peacetime, remember, "I do not consider it possible to produce any serious increases in the size of the peacetime army ...". 5 million is a mobilized army. Yes, and also: "it also says about the uselessness of light machine guns, the refusal to purchase radio stations" - this describes a specific situation in the mid-20s, when there were no allocations, Tukhachevsky describes how he tried to save it at this time, in accordance with resources. Usually this quote is taken out of the context of the letter.
                    2. +1
                      April 28 2019 08: 36
                      This is a 1930 letter. I already read it. This letter is an explanation. The note itself in the General Staff of the Red Army was written in 1927. So the original and the beginning of the discussion refers specifically to 1927. I want to find him. According to the results of this note, Tukhachevsky was sent down to command the Leningrad District. So the roots of the problem must be sought in 1927.
                      In 1930, Tukhachevsky describes mobilization opportunities, but not only. He proposes to orientate the development of the industry in a five-year plan. That is, it does not go into its own business. And he complains that the Headquarters of the Red Army was pushed aside from the State Planning Committee. How not to remember Hitler "my generals do not understand anything in economics."
                      His figures for the production of tanks, aircraft, the deployment of divisions are taken from the ceiling. They were not achieved even during the Total tension of the entire country. For all the years of the war, about 100 thousand tanks were built. This is the ultimate tension of the wartime economy. According to Tukhachevsky's letter, 50 thousand were to be built in 4 years, this is 200 thousand tanks. Real events showed the fallacy of his calculations. So Stalin's remark that he could "ruin the country's economy" is absolutely correct.
                      It is possible to write about the mechanization of the army in 1927. But this is all projection, "playing in tsifiri". There is no economic base, collectivization, industrialization has not yet been carried out, there are no tractors, no electricity, no steel. There are only figures from the State Planning Committee, and on the basis of bare figures it is proposed to mechanize the army and orient civilian factories to the production of military products.
                      Sorry, but this just indicates the complete incompetence of Tukhachevsky. His design figures were not achieved in reality. The real numbers are as follows - the number of the Red Army at the end of the war - it seems 12 million people, 6 thousand tanks. This is with the almost complete collapse of the civilian sector. For all the time of the war, God forbid if 200 steam locomotives were released.
                      1. 0
                        April 28 2019 13: 40
                        https://bbb.livejournal.com/700505.html
                        - about finding a note. And Tukhachevsky was sent to the LVO not for this reason. Everything was much more complicated there. Sorry, I don't want to argue anymore. I am trying to prove that "his figures for the production of tanks, aircraft, the deployment of divisions" are not taken from the ceiling. What did he take as a basis. That Snitko from the military section of the State Planning Commission had similar numbers. What then should be blamed for the utopianism of the State Planning Committee. You write about Stalin's remark, but forget, after 2 years Stalin actually admitted that Tukhachevsky was right. In general, what's the use of chewing everything again? For yourself, you have already painted Tukhachevsky with black paints.
                      2. 0
                        April 28 2019 14: 13
                        I am grateful to you for the information. I already wrote that I was not familiar with this issue in detail. Tukhachevsky’s letter, Stalin’s answer two years later, I read all this. He imposed on the actual production of armored vehicles during the war. Snitko, Gosplan - reality showed their fallacy. During the war years, the production of cars, tractors, steam locomotives, wagons was curtailed. All resources are devoted to the production of tanks and aircraft. With huge supplies of Lend-Lease (aluminum, copper, black products, molybdenum, high-octane gasoline), the figures of Tukhachevsky, Snitko and the entire Gosplan were not reached. And this is after two and a half five-year plans. What can we say about 1927 or 1930? The maximum number of tanks (wartime economics) in 1944 - 33274
                        What did Tukhachevsky write about the production of cars? For the whole Union in 1941 there were 700 thousand cars (half not on the move). And did the State Plan plan to produce 140 thousand a year already in 1932?
                        Sorry, but so far I do not see confirmation of Tukhachevsky's plans in reality. Stalin was right "the adoption of this plan means ruining both the economy and the army"
                        In any case, for me personally, the discussion was useful. I did not critically take Tukhachevsky's 100 thousand tanks on faith. This was not the case. Another pebble in the garden of the reunists. But Tukhachevsky's personality did not become "whiter and fluffier" for me.
                      3. +1
                        April 28 2019 14: 39
                        I looked at your link. The letter itself, dated December 1927, is nowhere to be found. But there is a facsimile of a letter from Tukhachevsky dated December 30, 1930, where he accuses the Headquarters of the Red Army and Voroshilov of distorting his note. And that's what it says

                        So, we have all the conditions necessary for the mass production of tanks, and in my note on the reconstruction of the Red Army, I did not exaggerate, but downplayed our production capabilities of tanks.
                        a) in 1932 - 40 thousand for mobilization and 000 of annual production; and b) in 100, these figures could increase one and a half times.

                        https://deruluft.livejournal.com/116276.html
                        Summary: Tukhachevsky really offered to have 100 thousand tanks of annual production. It really was mobilization planning. And these were absolutely unrealistic monstrous figures for the country's economy.
                      4. -1
                        April 28 2019 19: 23
                        sorry, but you are taking phrases out of context. They are not talking about tanks, but about tractors as a possible "raw material" for tanks.
                  2. -1
                    April 29 2019 07: 35
                    Refusal to purchase radio stations

                    - for this he should not even be allowed close to command. In general, there was some kind of sabotage in the Red Army. All attempts to at least minimize the army radio met fierce resistance from the command. What causes this?
                    1. 0
                      April 29 2019 18: 15
                      Refusal to purchase radio stations

                      - this the specific situation of the mid-20s, when there were no appropriations, Tukhachevsky describes how he tried to save money at that time, in accordance with the resources. The quote is unceremoniously taken out of context! And in the 30s. Tukhachevsky just demanded the introduction and improvement of communications. For example, here is a fragment of his speech at the Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (1935):

                      It seems to me that at the present stage we cannot be satisfied with our method of hidden management. True, the draft of the new instruction published in 1934 is somewhat better than the old projects, but nevertheless it binds the use of radio hand and foot. It says that it is allowed only with encirclement, a raid on the headquarters, etc. use radio without encoding (...). It often happens that their troops do not understand where to go, but what about the enemy. (....) This applies to when you can or cannot use the radio. A walkie-talkie can be used, then this alone will tell the enemy a lot. Since the radio works, then the question is about cipher methods. We encrypt and decrypt so much time that the radio loses all meaning. One commander of the rifle regiment frankly told me that he was afraid to use the radio, because if you use the radio according to the instructions, then it will be late with control, and if you use it without a cipher or with conditional encryption, they’ll beat him, this commander, around the neck , and therefore the radio is set aside. This is one of the serious points. I'm not talking about aviation, about armored forces, where the excesses with encryption are even more serious. Consequently, the instruction for covert management should be revised.

                      http://istmat.info/node/33258
              2. 0
                April 27 2019 21: 10
                A letter from Tukhachevsky to Stalin dated June 19, 1930 on page 6 explicitly states that these are not peacetime tanks. As for the factories - it was planned to build them by the end of the five-year period, I repeat that Tukhachevsky relied on the revised indicators of the State Planning Commission.
              3. +1
                April 27 2019 21: 25
                It seems to me that the production of military products is not tied to peaceful production. Nowhere in the world.

                Let me take a rather large quote from L. Samuelson:

                Following this, Tukhachevsky proposed linking the potential volume of aircraft production with the volume of automobile engine production. Of course, Tukhachevsky was not alone in his assessment of the military-economic potential lurking in the automotive and aviation industries, which had achieved great success over the previous two decades. In principle, a similar type of calculation was used to assess the country's military potential around the world. (...) Tukhachevsky referred to statistics for Great Britain, France, and Germany in 1918 and the beginning of the 20s, which indicated the existence of certain proportions between the development of these industries. He suggested that the ratio between the number of aircraft and cars produced should be 1: 3, and between aircraft engines and cars - 1: 2. Based on these relationships, as well as “revised tasks of the optimal plan”,

                We are talking about revised indicators for the five-year period

                which set the production level of 350000 cars for the Soviet Union by 1932/33, Tukhachevsky received approximately 122500 aircraft and 175000 aircraft engines, respectively, as indicators of “potential production”. In a similar way, he studied aircraft production figures and the number of aircraft in service for some foreign countries. The corresponding percentage for England, Germany and France during the First World War was from 18 to 32%. “This will allow,” concluded Tukhachevsky, with the production of 122500 aircraft per year, 36750 were operational, and in round figures from 35 to 40 thousand aircraft. ” These are again potential indicators, i.e. calculation of maximum production capacity.
                1. 0
                  April 27 2019 21: 37
                  I have already read this letter. The fact is that Samuelson is hardly well versed in these matters. I do not see data that the production of peacetime engines was associated with the production of aircraft or tank engines. Ford factories did not produce engines for tanks. Germany (the birthplace of Diesel) did not produce diesel engines for tanks.
                  A tank is not only an engine. This is armored hire (this is in the letter of Tukhachevsky), these are tank guns, shells (Stalin's note), fuel, trained crews, repair bases. Therefore, in the US Army in 1941 there were as many as 400 tanks. And in the summer of 1941, Britain had only 200 matilds in the metropolis. These were the last Matilda.
                  So just this point I consider as minus Tukhachevsky.
                  1. 0
                    April 27 2019 21: 39
                    By the way, the letter to Stalin says that it is possible to use armored tractors, and not tanks, in the second and third lines
      2. +1
        April 27 2019 18: 57
        More details about the notorious "one hundred thousand tanks a year". 1. In fact, the figures used by M.N. Tukhachevsky, were based on the revised indicators of the five-year plan (in 1932/33 it was planned to produce 197 thousand tractors and 350 thousand cars). And the production of tractors was linked (not only in the USSR, but also in European countries) with the production of tanks (the proportion is 1 tank produced for 2 tractors), cars - with the production of aircraft. 2. And we must not forget that Tukhachevsky tried to evaluate marginal production capabilities of industry, which could be involved in the production of military products when they were fully loaded during the first year of the war (not in peacetime, and not every year, as many people mistakenly think). It was believed that in 1932-33. The USSR will reach such a production capacity. Those. 100 thousand tanks is the maximum production capacity in units of products. By the way, the head of the Military Section of the Defense Sector of the State Planning Committee N.M. Snitko (March 1930). More details can be found in L. Samuelson's work "The Red Colossus".
    5. 0
      April 28 2019 09: 08
      Stalin’s admirers still envy or are afraid of him.

      It is a pity that such an intelligent person has no more options in his thoughts. Or does not want to see and acknowledge? Then yes, any arguments are like pea on the wall.
  3. +1
    April 27 2019 14: 43
    And on April 22 was the Lenin DR. Nobody even remembered ... Only Stalin is that, Stalin is that.

    Once, it was estimated that 2/3 of the naval commanders before Kuznetsov were sent to the other world, 2 were random, and they left the game for other work, the rest by their death until the 39th. (7/2/3 like)
    According to the Air Force - like 5 out of 7 were transported before the 41st, the 2nd died their deaths ... The latter were shot after the start of the VO.

    Then they seemed to understand that it was somehow irrational to shoot aviators, and the fined were sent to the Far East, with a decrease ...

    And they didn’t find anything concrete about the conspiracy ... neither after the war from the Germans, nor Khrushchev about "fighters against the regime"
    I read that Abwehr deliberately threw something, but what exactly nobody knows ...
  4. +3
    April 27 2019 18: 03
    You belittle the role of Voroshilov. After all, it was under his leadership that the first counterattack against the Germans near Soltsy was organized. July 41. Manstein received such a blow to the teeth that he draped 40 km. Lost secret documents regarding Germany’s use of toxic substances. I signed up when he made excuses for this episode in his memoirs. But Voroshilov was replaced by Zhukov during the defense of Leningrad, not because of the inability of Kliment Efremich to organize the defense of Leningrad, but Stalin simply needed Voroshilov’s talents to negotiate with the British. After all, he led them before the war. I strongly doubt the talents of George Konstantinich. Stalin’s phrase was remembered .. He sent it somewhere and said:

    Go, we can do without you

    We must look under what circumstances he said this ..
    1. +2
      April 27 2019 18: 38
      I treat Kliment Efremovich with the deepest respect. However, you yourself involuntarily emphasize that in that war the diplomat's available talents somewhat outweighed his value as a commander. And his contribution to the partisan movement was also very great!
      In general, I’m very pleased with the deep and, for the most part, correct discussion on the article. Always would be!
      Thank you all!
  5. +5
    April 27 2019 19: 55
    Planned and sanctioned by Stalin, the mass repressions of the executioners from the NKVD against the command staff of the Red Army weakened it to such a state that the USSR almost lost the war.

    And what repressions led to the loss of France, England, Poland, to the surrender of Czechoslovakia, to the defeat of the Benelux countries, to Yugoslavia?
  6. +1
    April 28 2019 01: 15
    Tell me, please, gentlemen, do you have staff officers among you? Who graduated from military schools, possibly academies? Those who commanded a platoon, company, battalion, regiment? Drew cards? Did you understand them?
    I am not asking this for nothing. My grandfather was arrested in 1937 (Party member since 1919, career soldier since 1918). He spent two years in prison, did not confess to "espionage." (Those who confessed were condemned and sent to camps.) In 1939 he was released, without shoulder straps, without awards, non-partisan, and immediately sent to the Finnish campaign. His grandfather, an engineer and sapper by training, was shocked by the commanders and their decisions during the campaign. Complete military illiteracy. The regiments were commanded by twenty-year-old boys without military education. It was then, during the most shameful war for us, that Stalin realized who remained in the command ranks of the Red Army. And immediately they began to shoot those who zealously imprisoned, and began to release the commanders from the prisons. It was from prisons, not camps. Together with my grandfather, they arrested all his regimental commanders, their deputies, battalion commanders, etc. Only a few people were released who did not break down during interrogations and did not sign a confession. Agree, not everyone would have survived. And there were very few of them.
    What am I leading to? Many mistakenly believe that the war was won by Stalin and the Front Commanders. And there is a debate about who was smarter or dumber from the High Command of the Red Army. This is mistake. No matter how brilliant the front commander is, without sensible commanders of divisions and brigades, he is nobody. Like no one is a division commander without sensible regiments, and a regiment commander without battalions and company commanders. Think about the quality of communication between the Front and the regiments at the beginning of the war. The commanders did not know what the divisions were and where they were. Think about the quality of aerial reconnaissance. And you will understand that future Marshals did not decide anything. Company, battalion commanders, regiment commanders fought as best they could. Without aviation, without artillery, without reserves, etc. And who were these commanders from the regiment and below at the beginning of the war?
    Before the war, the Red Army repressed:
    - Five Marshals of the Soviet Union - three were shot;
    - Two army commissars of the first rank - both shot;
    - two flagships of the fleet of 1st rank - both;
    - two flagships of the fleet of 2st rank - both;
    - Six flagships of the 1st rank - all six;
    - Fifth flagships of the 2nd rank - nine;
    - Four commanders of the 1st rank - two;
    - twelve commanders of the 2nd rank - twelve;
    - fifteen commissars of the 2nd rank - fifteen;
    - 67 corps commanders - sixty;
    - 28 corps commissioners - twenty-five;
    - 199 division commanders - 136;
    - 97 division commissioners - 79;
    - 397 brigade commanders - 221;
    - 36 brigade commissars - 34.
    And many thousands of commanders rank lower.
    Here, the main problem of our failures at the beginning of the war. Grandfather told how at the front headquarters in 1941 he was the only person who could draw on the maps the position and movement of troops. Imagine!
    So, at the gatherings of regiment commanders held in the summer of 1940, out of 225 regiment commanders, none had an academic education, only 25 graduated from military schools and 200 from junior lieutenant courses! In 1940, the prewar year, more than 70 percent of regiment commanders, 60 percent of military commissars and chiefs of political units of the formations worked in these positions for about a year. This means that all their predecessors (and sometimes not one at a time in these positions) were repressed.
    And do not pour mud here on Tukhachevsky and Blucher. My grandfather served with Blucher in the Far East, and spoke of him as a very talented and thoughtful commander. As, however, about Stalin, he never let me say a bad word about him. And he talked about repression, this was the time, which means it was necessary.
    In total, in 1937 and 1938 about 44 thousand commanding officers were dismissed from the army and the navy, including more than 35 thousand from the ground forces, about three thousand from the navy and more than 5 thousand from the air force. Almost the entire top and senior command staff and political workers of this level were shot after arrest, and many died in custody.
    There were such rampant arrests that one of the documents written after the 1937th Party Congress says "No exact data on the number of those arrested in 1938 XNUMX was found in the armed forces."
    Now imagine this crazy figure. 44 thousand commanders !!! Not a soldier, sergeants or foremen. And military personnel, commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, with education, seniority, experience, including combat. And there are none. At once.
    If now 44 thousand commanders are dismissed from our modern army of the Russian Federation (to be imprisoned and many are shot), then believe me, even Poland will capture us.
    And let's not throw in someone's archival notes telling about the notes. Moreover, dated to the 20s and 30s. What the war would be, really not even the Germans knew.
    And Stalin did not win the war. Namely "Brothers and Sisters". Our people won it. True, at an exorbitantly high price.
    1. +1
      April 28 2019 08: 12
      Your emotions are overwhelmed by facts. There were repressions; the level of commanders did not always correspond to the ideal. The people really won the war. But how do you belittle the role of the confront and elevate the divisional commander? And the figures you quoted have long been called into question.
      Much after the war, being in disgrace, Zhukov said "We forget that we fought with the best army in the world." No commander (whether he was three times Napoleon) will be able to hold back the enemy with a thin front.
      You just ask yourself a question, what was the fighting efficiency of the Red Army in 1937? There is a version (I cannot find the minutes of the Politburo meeting, there are just memoirs, but these are not documents) that Tukhachevsky said that "we do not have two combat-ready divisions." After that, the army had to be purged.
    2. 0
      April 28 2019 08: 23
      And Stalin did not win the war. Namely, "Brothers and Sisters.

      My grandfather said that without com. Stalin's "Brothers and Sisters" would be crazy. And I argue that the myths about Comrade. Stalin allowed "aliens" to destroy the USSR and seize power in the Kremlin.
    3. +1
      April 28 2019 10: 04
      Emotionally. But it was so. There was a terrible struggle with ideology. And people. Different. The selfish interests of some (not the majority) led to what happened. Or is it wrong now? In my family, my nephew knocked on my uncle. Because of the property. And the prosecutor saved whoever he could from the tower. Not everything is clear in history. The tribe disappeared into the war. The grandfather was saved thanks to the prosecutor. There is not even a cemetery left from the homeland, although the name is not Khatyn. Thanks to the other "brothers" who are jumping. Another hero of the Soviet Union for partisanship. There was everything. There is a lot of foam from the cattle that sell the homeland that raised them. Alas. Here I found a reference on the repression, I can give a link.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. 0
        April 28 2019 10: 52
        There were repressions throughout the formation of the USSR. And even after the war. But in the pre-war years, it really was a choice between life and death. But for some reason they got hung up on the repressions of 1937. And before? Wailing goes only for the "innocently killed faithful Leninists." The fact that these Leninists flooded the country with blood is somehow forgotten. I consider Stalin a great man, if only because he was not afraid to cleanse the country of these ghouls. Yes, he was a cruel and tough man. But there was also a man. Sholokhov is credited with the phrase "there was a cult, but there was also a personality."
        It is interesting for me to clarify the issue of a note by Tukhachevsky. But only. I have great doubts about military talents. The fact that the repression weakened the Red Army is also not obvious. The reason for the liquidation of the top of the Red Army must not be sought in any letters, likes and dislikes. It's all about the political situation of that time. There is a fairly convincing version that the reason was the events in Spain. January 1937, it turns out that sending a couple of divisions to Spain is impossible. In April, the Comintern ruled on the merciless struggle against Trotskyism. In May 1937, a Trotskyist uprising breaks out in Catalonia. In June, arrests of command personnel begin. Tukhachevsky was fairly close to Trotsky and opposed Stalin's line of rapprochement with Germany. And he climbed into the planning and politics of the state. It can now be liberalized and dismissed (although this is debatable). At that time, either a bullet in the back of the head or an ice ax on a blunt head ... By the way, the ice ax was in the hands of the Spaniard.
        1. +1
          April 29 2019 07: 50
          For the Spaniards, Trotsky became a fiend of hell. The fifth column, about which Franco used to say, is precisely the Trotskyists. Stalin concluded after the failure in Spain, but apparently not everything was in time.
  7. +1
    April 28 2019 07: 28
    In the ideology and propaganda of the Soviet communists, there were great military leaders of both pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. And among the enemies of the communists, all "great people, heroes, the best, most hard-working, gene pool and flower of the nation" are anti-Soviet and Russophobic. Including their delusional and unsubstantiated assertion that all those who were dismissed and repressed in the upper echelons of the army in the late 30s in the USSR were such great military men that they would have easily defeated the Hitlerite coalition that attacked the USSR. And what is natural, if they were fired and repressed EXACTLY by the Soviet communists, then for the enemies of the communists this a priori means that all these military men were "innocent victims."
  8. 0
    April 28 2019 10: 21
    TopWar_1517468851_0_33eb2_26efe835_xl.jpeg
    This is a link to help on the repressed. Extremely interesting about "tens of millions"
    1. 0
      April 28 2019 18: 24
      https://topcor.ru/uploads/posts/2019-04/1556464947_topwar_1517468851_0_33eb2_26efe835_xl.jpeg

      This is a link to help on the repressed. Extremely interesting about "tens of millions"
  9. 0
    April 28 2019 14: 13
    It's high time to open this abscess with a scalpel, rinse it with clean water and carefully study it, make it widely public. Both in our country and throughout the world. If we take a broader view, then all the lies about "Stalinist" repressions must be dissected, studied and betrayed to an even wider public in the country and around the world.
  10. 0
    April 28 2019 14: 29
    On February 1, 1954, at the request of N. S. Khrushchev, a certificate was compiled for him on the repressed on counter-revolutionary charges from 1921 to February 1, 1954. This document was signed by Attorney General R. Rudenko, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs S. Kruglov and USSR Minister of Justice K. Gorshenin.
    The certificate indicates: during this period, 3777380 people were sentenced by the OGPU Board, the NKVD Troika, the Special Conference, the Military Collegium, the courts and military tribunals, including 642 to capital punishment, to imprisonment in camps and prisons of 980 years and below - 25 people, to exile and expulsion - 2 people Of the total number of repressed, only 369 were convicted by the courts, military tribunals. Special Collegium and Military Collegium. The fate of the remaining about 220 people was decided out of court - by the OGPU Board, the NKVD troika and the Special Conference.
    1. 0
      April 29 2019 08: 39
      https://topcor.ru/uploads/posts/2019-04/1556464947_topwar_1517468851_0_33eb2_26efe835_xl.jpeg
  11. +1
    April 28 2019 14: 31
    In just one year 1938, 38 thousand 702 people were nominated for higher positions in the army - from commanders of district troops to commanders of battalions and divisions. Forced to appoint small-level commanders immediately to very important positions So, for example, captain F N. Matykin, former commander battalion, was immediately appointed commander of the infantry division; Captain I. N. Neskubo, the head of the regiment’s school, was immediately appointed commander of the rifle division, Major K. M Gusev, squadron commander, was given the rank of division commander, and he was immediately appointed commander of the Air Force of the Belarusian Military District; senior lieutenant And And The End received the military rank of colonel and was appointed deputy. Air Force commander of the Leningrad Military District, and by the beginning of the war he was already a general — he commanded the Air Force of the Western Front. On the first day of the war, seeing the huge losses of our aircraft from the bombing of the Germans, Kopets could not stand the shock and shot himself.
    By the middle of 1938, the army had accumulated so many "temporary acting posts" that the People's Commissar of Defense was forced to issue an order "On the elimination of vridstvo". With this order, the People's Commissar allowed to approve in office all "temporary executors" who had worked in this place for at least two months.
    For 1937 1938 all (except Budyonny) commanders of the district troops, 100% of the deputy commanders of the district troops and chiefs of staff of the districts, 88,4% of the corps commanders and 100% of their assistants and deputies were replaced; 98,5% were replaced by division and brigade commanders, 79% by regiment commanders, 88% by regiment chiefs of staff, 87% by battalion and division commanders, and the composition of regional military commanders was changed by 100%; district military commissars - by 99%.
    By the beginning of the war, the Red Army and the Navy arrived with the main body of the army, which Lenin and Frunze had hoped to rely on when deploying the army in case of war, were almost destroyed. In general, during the Stalinist repressions, more senior and senior commanding officers were exterminated than we lost it in all four years of the war.
    1. +1
      14 May 2019 14: 45
      You’ll listen to Vanya less than a liberal bastard. During the period described by you, 54 thousand commanders were arrested and shot from the army. These included those dismissed for various misconduct - from drunkenness and immorality to betrayal. Also included here were those dismissed for their length of service due to illness and simply commissary. And for you probably not news that Stalin was forming new divisions at an accelerated pace. And military schools could not cope. And naturally, the divisions formed earlier were shared by the command staff. Yes. I do not argue. They shot generals .. senior officers. But for eating ... Here I recently came across a protocol of interrogation of Meretskov ... He and his friend Pavlov talked under a shot glass for more than one shot. But Stalin spared Meretskov and dug that land to improve. Although he had worked out how to plan for a post at the General Staff before the war at least a couple of shootings. Think Vanya and don’t listen to anyone ... and don’t believe anyone on this issue
  12. The comment was deleted.
    1. +2
      April 28 2019 15: 49
      3,7 million in 33 years? .... Note. Now about 600 thousand people are sitting in the penitentiary system of the Russian Federation with a country's population of 120 million. About 1 million are sitting in the USA with a population of about 300 million. By the way, the States are confidently taking first place in the world in terms of the number of prisoners per 100 thousand people.
      So under Stalin they judged about 100 thousand a year? .... The era of mercy ....
      1. +2
        April 28 2019 16: 09
        USSR population
        1926 - 147 million
        1959 - 209 million
        Godless Stalin in 30 years raised the country's population by 30 million people, despite the war
        --------
        The size of the Russian Federation
        1991 - 148 million
        2019 - 146 million (the minimum was in 2007 142 million)
        Free Democrats were able to reduce the country's population by 2 million in 28 years. And without a war.
        ---------
        No comments
  13. -1
    April 28 2019 16: 01
    And even more so they forgot (and never read) such a long time ago as the message of Patriarch Tikhon to the Council of People's Commissars on October 26, 1918. Calling for the mercy and release of the innocent, the firm patriarch warned them: “all righteous blood that you spill will be exacted from you (Luke 11:51) and you yourself who take the sword will perish from the sword (Matthew, 26:52).

    But then it seemed funny, impossible! Where was it then to imagine that History nevertheless sometimes knows retribution, some voluptuous late justice, but it chooses strange forms for it and unexpected performers.
    And if the young Tukhachevsky, when he triumphantly returned from the suppression of the ruined Tambov peasants, was not found at the station another Marusya Spiridonova to shoot him in the forehead with a bullet, this was done by a half-educated Georgian seminarian 16 years later.
    And if the curses of the women and children who were shot in the Crimean spring of 1921, as Voloshin told us, could not cut through the chest of Bela Kun, this was done by his comrade in the Third International ”(Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago). Incidentally, this passage shows that Solzhenitsyn was not a liberal, but a Christian. Meanwhile, Christians are not visible either in the author's material or in the comments.
  14. +1
    April 28 2019 16: 10
    You are a little confused. We are talking about people "... sentenced by the Collegium of the OGPU, troikas of the NKVD, a Special Meeting, the Military Collegium, courts and military tribunals ...". These are sentences for espionage, sabotage, sabotage, etc. That is, political prisoners. Not criminal. And there were about 10 million prisoners in total.
    Here it must be understood that 30% of political prisoners of the total are, indeed, a lot. Moreover, under Stalin there were not so many murders. In 1940, with a population of 193 million. in the USSR there were 6549 murders, and in 2005 in Russia with a population of 145 million people. almost 5 times more murders - 30800 (plus traffic accidents - 17 thousand).
    1. +1
      April 28 2019 16: 16
      Do not confuse. This is the total number of prisoners. Convicted by the courts of threes, deuces and others .... 600 with something thousand death sentences. But the camps and prisons took 200 thousand more than was sent according to sentences. Apparently, not all death sentences were executed.
      I do not condone the Great Terror. He was. But its scale is exaggerated.
      According to my grandfather, two were tried in their village. One overslept a fire or smoked, burned a shed with grain. Got 25 years. The second wrote a letter to Stalin. I served 10 years. I do not know any other repressed.
      1. 0
        April 28 2019 16: 23
        You are apparently using this data.
        https://bagaev-alex.livejournal.com/226757.html
        They are not as terrible as they seem. Of course a prison or camp is terrible. Do not bring the Lord. But there is no need to talk about some exceptional phenomenon.
        1. 0
          April 28 2019 17: 16
          These http://www.hrono.ru/statii/2001/zemskov.php
          1. 0
            April 28 2019 17: 19
            These are the same. Zemskov is the most authoritative. But 3,7 million in 30 years is not so scary. There was just a surge in 37-38 years. It was at this time that mass repression took place.
            1. 0
              April 28 2019 17: 44
              3,7 million criminals, thieves, rapists ... Or 3,7 million engineers, scientists, writers, artists, officers, managers, economists, etc. Is there a difference? Destroyed talents of the Russian land.
              1. +1
                April 28 2019 19: 07
                You have not looked closely at the link. 3,7 million in total. The percentage of political was maximum 30% after the war. Then this category included traitors, Bandera. There were also innocent victims. Of the police, there were many not "the salt of the Russian land", but political criminals. Like the former corps commanders and commanders.
        2. +2
          April 28 2019 17: 37
          And the conversation is not about horror, if you remember. And about the failures at the beginning of the war. To plant and destroy almost the entire commanding staff of the army before the war - this is sabotage and betrayal. Zhukov wrote about this in his memoirs, which were then mercilessly "corrected". A career officer and an officer with junior commander courses are two huge differences. Both had enough courage and heroism, but there was no experience or education. It is no coincidence that the statistics that in the units commanded by career pre-war officers, much less personnel died. And these are people, fathers, someone's children, grandchildren. These are irreplaceable and, most importantly, unnecessary losses of our country.
          Zhukov, by the way, commanded a regiment for nine whole years. Who understands - will understand. The company and regiment - this is the basis of the army. The commanders of these units are both commanders and business executives. Zhukov forged his military leadership skills precisely in these positions.
          1. 0
            April 28 2019 19: 18
            Do you think that failure is connected with repression? There is no direct connection. Already wrote here. The French army was not inferior to the German in anything. Not in numbers, nor in weapons, nor in quality. And there was no repression. All commanders had experience of the First World War. And the officers went through all the steps. How do you explain this?
            Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Tymoshenko, the mass of people who passed the Civil and not subjected to repression. And the number 225 regiment commander was taken from Simonov from the ceiling. Documents indicate that the bulk of regiment commanders were military personnel.

            From publication to publication, the story of 225 illiterate regiment commanders, launched into circulation by the notorious V. A. Anfilov, wanders:

            The last inspection conducted by the infantry inspector, - said the head of the combat training department, Lieutenant General V. Kurdyumov at a meeting in December of the fortieth year, - showed that out of 225 regiment commanders involved in the gathering, only 25 people graduated from military schools, the remaining 200 people “These are people who completed junior lieutenant courses and came from the reserve.”
            However, if you look at the shorthand record of the meeting of the top command and political staff of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, it turns out that Lieutenant General V.N. Kurdyumov, who spoke twice at it, did not say anything like that. If we take the official data of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army, it turns out that as of January 1, 1941, of the 1833 regiment commanders, 14% graduated from military academies, 60% from military schools and only 26% had accelerated military education
      2. 0
        April 28 2019 16: 29
        ... in total, from 1921 to February 1, 1954, 3 people were convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes.
        1. +1
          April 28 2019 21: 03
          Do you like to repeat the same phrase? We read Zemskov

          According to the nature of the crimes, the Gulag prisoners were distributed as follows (March 1, 1940): for counter-revolutionary activities - 28,7%, for especially dangerous crimes against the management system - 5,4%, for hooliganism, speculation and other crimes against management - 12,4%, theft - 9,7%, official and economic crimes - 8,9%, crimes against the person - 5,9%, theft of socialist property - 1,5%, other crimes - 27,5%. The total contingent of prisoners held in the ITL and the Gulag ITK was determined, according to centralized records as of March 1, 1940, at 1 people. Of this number, 668 thousand were kept in ITCs, including 200 thousand in industrial and agricultural ITCs and 352 thousand in “counterparty” ITCs

          We look further on statistics


          It seems that there is a percentage of political. This is also from Zemskov
  15. 0
    April 28 2019 22: 28
    All our power, that is, all who sit and devour the treasury, hate our country and people, and praise Trotsky and his clique. We, true Rusaks / Rusichs, honor the memory of Stalin. As long as we live this and honor it, our country lives, for he lived the same! And not as the bald Khrushchev introduced him. Remember this brothers!
  16. 0
    April 28 2019 22: 42
    The repression was invented by MI6 and slipped to us. Alas, we believed it. But after all, thousands of people came to STALIN every day with a request to solve their problems. And HE solved them on the same day. AND YOU WILL TRY TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO Putin ... And at the end of the forties there were more people in the country, and the country was also bigger, but he solved the questions of ordinary people at the same hour and I knew these people whom he helped. Such was the "tyrant"!
  17. 0
    April 29 2019 00: 27
    Read Zhukov. Can he be trusted? http://militera.lib.ru/bio/karpov/08.html
    1. 0
      April 29 2019 01: 10
      Believe memoirs with caution. Comparing with the real situation. Were there repressions? Of course they were. The obvious cannot be denied. Did the repression affect the combat effectiveness of the Red Army? Any withdrawal of command personnel is sensitive. But here the combat ability has decreased or increased is another question. The Red Army of the 30s was not a perfectly lubricated mechanism. On the Internet you will find a lot of information about the dismissal of negligent commanders from the army. For drunkenness, inability to work, moral decay. I assure you that their number far exceeds the number of political repressions. By 1939, discipline in the army strengthened.
      The lack of command was. In 1941, the completeness of the commanders was 70-75%. Especially in the lower link. This is not due to repression, but to the explosive growth of the army. The army increased from 1,5 million to 5 million people (I write from memory, so a slight inaccuracy is possible).
      The failures of the initial period are associated not with the quality of the commander (of course, ideally, it is better to have competent and experienced commanders), but with objective reasons. But real events show that quite often commanders took reasonable initiative and were not afraid to make decisions. But what could they do in that situation? The Field Charter of the Red Army indicated the front of the division defense of 6-7 km in the most important directions and up to 12 km in the minor. The commander even graduated from three academies and served in the army from a young age will not be able to keep the line at 40 km. The famous defense of Liepaja when the division defended at the front of 90 km !!! But General Dedaev was not repressed, he served in the army since 1914 and went through all the command steps.
      The Red Army went to the opponents of the most powerful army in the world. Which dared Poland in two weeks, France in a month and knocked out England.
      Once again, I can repeat it. Repression does not adorn our story. But in the crash of 1941, they are not a decisive factor.
      1. +2
        April 29 2019 02: 05
        On the Internet you will find a lot of information about the dismissal of negligent commanders from the army. For drunkenness, inability to work, moral decay. I assure you that their number far exceeds the number of political repressions.

        Where did you find it? Nonsense! "Widespread drunkenness and corruption in the army." Aren't you funny yourself? You didn’t accidentally confuse our army with the Armed Forces of Ukraine? How do you imagine this general drunkenness with living commissars and political workers? Have you ever been to the Communist Party? With the smell of alcohol yesterday, the officers were afraid to go into service. They were afraid to divorce their wives - the end of a career.
        By 1939, the army was not strengthened, and there were practically no people left who could express their point of view. Read Zhukov’s speech at the party meeting. And he did not want to become a comcor. Because of which? And because all the comkors were planted and shot. And why should I not believe his memoirs, but believe you?
        Further. The so-called "explosive growth of the army". How do you imagine it? This is not a calf for a year to fatten for slaughter. Do you have any idea what "army growth" is? This is where it should grow from? Sowed and grown? A trained platoon commander is, firstly, the selection of an intelligent, healthy, physically strong and morally stable young man. Secondly, training at a military school. Minimum 3 years. After graduation, he is a young and green platoon with theory. And, thirdly, only after two years of service with exercises, live firing, he is already in the norm and position, and is able to manage the personnel. Five years minimum. And if we also count the "rejection", then out of five who entered the school, one does not reach a normal platoon officer. And where were the company commanders raised? And where did you find the regimental commanders with academic education? And where, please, tell us, since 1937 our country has taken 44 thousand commanders to replace the repressed ones? And for your growth of 3,5 million soldiers, where did the state find and train another 175 thousand officers?
        Here, you and the "quality of commanders". What did you command, and how many officers did you raise?
        1. 0
          April 29 2019 08: 32
          ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR
          On the fight against alcoholism in the Red Army
          No. 0219 December 28, 1938
          Recently, drunkenness in the army has taken on truly menacing proportions. Especially this evil is rooted in the midst of commanding personnel.

          According to far from incomplete data, in the Belarusian Special Military District alone over 9 months of 1938 there were more than 1300 ugly cases of drunkenness, in parts of the Ural military district over the same period - over 1000 cases and about the same unsightly picture in a number of other military districts .

          Here are a few examples of the most serious crimes committed when drunk by people, misunderstood dressed in military uniforms.

          On October 15, in Vladivostok, four lieutenants, drunk before losing their human appearance, stormed the restaurant, opened fire, and wounded two citizens.

          On September 18, two lieutenants of a railway regiment, under approximately the same circumstances in a restaurant, after fighting among themselves, shot themselves.

          The political officer of one of the units of the 3rd unit, a drunkard and a Buyan, fraudulently collected 425 rubles from the younger commanders, stole a watch and a revolver and deserted from the unit, and a few days later raped and killed a 13-year-old girl.

          On November 8, in Rechitsa, five drunken Red Army men stabbed and wounded three workers, and when they returned to the unit, they raped a passer-by citizen, after which they tried to kill her.

          On May 27, in Ashgabat, captain Balakirev met drunk in the park with an unknown woman, in the restaurant he blurted out a number of information not to be announced, and in the morning he was found sleeping on the porch of a strange house without a revolver, equipment and party card.

          Drunkenness has become a real scourge of the army. The notorious villains and drunks in front of their excessively calm chiefs, in the face of party and Komsomol organizations undermine the foundations of military discipline and decompose military units.

          A significant part of all accidents, catastrophes and all other emergencies is a direct result of drunkenness and unacceptable attitude to this evil on the part of responsible chiefs and commissioners.

          Many cases of postponement and cancellation of classes and non-fulfillment of the combat training plan are also the result of the decomposing effect of drunkenness.

          Finally, numerous examples suggest that drunkards are often made the prey of foreign intelligence, take the path of direct treason to their homeland and go to the camp of the enemies of the Soviet people.

          All these indisputable truths are well known to every thinking commander and political worker, and yet a real fight against drunkenness is not waged. Drunkenness is flourishing, it has become a common everyday occurrence, it has been reconciled with, it is not subjected to public condemnation.

          An incorrigible, unconcerned drunkard and loafer not only does not come under fire from Bolshevik criticism, not only is not expelled from a healthy comradely environment, which he compromises, but even sometimes enjoys the support of his comrades. They find some excuses for him, they patronize him, sympathize with him, surround him with the halo of “his boyfriend”.

          With such an attitude to drunkards, a drunk and unfit person is not only not ashamed of himself and his ugly deeds, but often flaunts them.

          Are there many cases when the commander’s public demanded that some incorrigible drunkard be removed from his environment?

          There are almost no such cases.

          This suggests that the stained honor of a soldier of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and the honor of the military unit to which we belong, few people bother. Many do not understand that every commander and political worker, as well as a Red Army soldier, is to a certain extent responsible for the behavior of his comrade in the service, that misbehavior alone casts a shadow over the entire comradely team and the entire military unit as a whole.

          There is no place for drunkards in the Red Army. The defense of the USSR with arms in hand is entrusted to the best people of the country, the patriots of their Fatherland, the honest, brave, persistent and sober sons of our country.

          I order:

          In all regiments, convene meetings of the command and command staff, at which to speak in full voice of all the drunken outrages, condemn drunkenness and drunkards as an unacceptable and shameful phenomenon.
          To mobilize against this evil, mobilize all party and Komsomol organizations, making it their duty to combat drunkenness, as one of the most important tasks.
          The same task should have before itself as one of the most important and comradely courts organized by the troops.
          Commanders and military commissars of military units apply the most severe disciplinary measures to malicious drunkards.
          In all performance appraisals, if the attestant is a drunkard, this must be indicated. Indicate also how well the certified boss successfully fights with drunkenness among his subordinates. Incorrigible drunkards present for dismissal from the army.
          Cases of crimes committed on the basis of drunkenness should be heard by visiting sessions of the military tribunals with the attention of the general army public (public prosecutor, newspaper).
          Military councils of districts systematically hear reports of commanders and commissars of military units on the implementation of this order.
          Read this order at a meeting of command and command staff and explain to the Red Army.

          People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
          Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
          1. 0
            April 29 2019 08: 40
            Apparently, he was the slave of the green serpent and the commander of the BVI troops, 1st rank commander I.P. Belov. In a personal letter to Voroshilov, he wrote on September 12, 1937: “When you accused me of being an alcoholic and demanded that I abstain for a year, I gave it to you and honestly fulfilled the promise. A year has passed. You told me: “Maybe we will resume the receipt.” I replied - let me wait ... You said: "Well, good." I understand that you have regained your confidence in this matter. From time to time, very rarely, on occasion, I allowed myself to drink like other normal people, but I never thought that I was deceiving you. ”
            1. 0
              April 29 2019 08: 56
              “The prevailing opinion is that as a result of the repressions of 1937-1938, young and inexperienced took the place of mature and experienced military leaders, and this led to grave defeats at the beginning of the war. In reality, the dead were replaced mainly by people of the same generation, but others with different experiences.

              So, let's say, the repressed Ya. B. Gamarnik, V. M. Primakov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. F. Fedko, I. Я. Yakir were born in 1893–1897, and in the same years, in 1894 -1897, G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, F.I. Tolbukhin were born. But the former, with the exception of Tukhachevsky alone, who had been fighting as a second lieutenant for several months, did not participate in the First World War, and the latter (except for the graduate school of ensigns Tolbukhin) began their military career on it.

              Further, the former appeared shortly after the revolution in the highest leadership positions (although they were then only 21 to 25 years old ...) - no doubt, for “ideological”, and not actually “military” reasons, - and the latter, slowly rising in office stairs, gained a real ability to manage troops. In order to appreciate this, we recall that at the age of 18 Suvorov began his military career as a non-commissioned officer (then corporal), and 16-year-old Kutuzov became an ensign, and only by the age of forty did they “rise to the rank of general”.

              Kozhinov V.V.
              For the most part, the repressive generals took office for ideological reasons (they joined the Bolsheviks on time). Therefore, then, I. S. Konev, being the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, at the meeting of the division’s chief of staff in the spring of 1937 (just before the purge), speaking of the priority of combat training over political, he threw the seditious phrase: “If the time comes tests, what will we fight with - with a rifle or with Marxism? ”
              1. 0
                April 29 2019 09: 00
                “... The poor military training of troops during the time of Uborevich and Yakir was due not only to the low qualifications of the commanders of the Red Army, but also to poor military education. The level of the latter can be judged, for example, by the collective portrait of the command staff of the 110th Rifle Regiment of the BVI, made by the commander K. P. Podlas in October 1936: “The younger ones are keeping familiar with the elders familiarly, dismissed, they put aside their legs, sitting takes orders, bickering ... A lot of ragged uniforms, dirty, unshaven, ragged boots, etc. ” (RGVA. F.37464. Op.1. D.12. L.92). “Unshaven, with dirty collars” then went the middle commanders of the 44th and 45th divisions of the KVO (RGVA. F.37928. Op.1. D.269. L.3; F.1417. Op.1. D. 285. L.16): this is how the “red officers” were brought up as early as the cadet years ... Here's how, for example, cadets of the United Belarusian Military School looked in August 1932: “a weak combatant is striking”; the uniforms “almost all summer were not erased” and “reached the color of oil”. Seeing the commander with rhombs in his buttonholes (that is, the old-modem general!), “The cadets were daily ... crumpled, one scratched his cheek and turned his head, not knowing what to do: get up or sit” (RGVA. F.31983. Op.2. D.13. L.151, 171, 164, 25).

                Unsightly looked at Yakir and Uborevich and the younger commander of the Red Army. Unstretched, unshaven, often in a torn gymnast, or even without insignia (!), In principle, he could not be demanding, he could not persistently work out with the fighters all the details of their training. With such a commander one could argue, he could be called a “bastard” and obscenities - a low level of discipline was another factor that caused the poor combat training of the Red Army in the mid-30s. However, the general atmosphere of the “proletarian state” did not contribute to the strengthening of discipline. In the Red Army they saw not so much a soldier as a citizen, "a comrade of such and such." "The platoon commander and foreman could criticize the fighter at the Komsomol meeting - what kind of military discipline could there be?"

                Pyhalov "The Great Blunder War"
                1. +2
                  April 29 2019 13: 58
                  And what do you call rampant drinking? In the 70s-80s and 90s, we, the officers, were read out every week by the Orders of the Minister of Defense on drunkenness, murders, suicides, looting, desertion, etc. cases throughout our Army. In addition, the Orders of the District Commander or Group of Forces are again about these cases. Always someone was running, they were always looking for someone, the guardhouse was full. What society is such an Army. And in those days it was probably the most powerful Army in the world. Many students and the army are represented by a society of robots with buttons. This is life. But with weapons. What is the danger of any violations in the army. Go, Bakhtiyar, serve. And you will immediately understand the role of junior and middle command link. In general, you will then speak of the army with warmth and love.
                  1. 0
                    April 29 2019 17: 28
                    This is not the first time you boast of epaulets. In my eyes this is neither a plus nor a minus. It's your job. How many stupid colonels I saw .... I could have planted an oak grove.
                    The order of the People's Commissar throughout the Red Army speaks of the massive nature of the phenomenon. Know that a good master on the site is no less difficult to find than a good platoon commander. A good team leader worth its weight in gold. Have you ever seen a simple turner with a personal brand? The director of the plant tiptoed around him and blew off dust particles.
                    I just brought the order of the People's Commissar. Even in that link that you yourself cited, they ask Zhukov whether he drinks? It was a mass phenomenon. As well as the untidy look of fighters and familiarity. The 1936 army and the 1941 army were very different.
                    Do you advise me to serve? I do not advise you to go to the geological party at the age of 21 after graduation, where half of the workers are in the settlement. Immediately to the position of deputy head of the party. It is quite possible not to return from the route.
                    There is no evidence that repressed commanders would fight better. The attack on the USSR was not dictated by repressions, but by the military-political situation in the world. Another thing is that Hitler was bred like a sucker. Perhaps the commanders could have acted better somewhere, but on the whole, the defeat in the Frontier Battle is connected with the general unfavorable situation at the front. Extension of battle formations, poor communications, reconnaissance, material and technical supply. And there are plenty of other purely military factors that you must understand better than me. And do not blame everything on repression.
  18. +1
    April 29 2019 01: 12
    Gentlemen, did any of you sit in the trenches, ride tanks, work out an offensive, switch to defense, dig in, etc.? Or are you learning military science on the internet?
    I myself am a hereditary military, from the Suvorov Military School. And do you really think that in a modern war the company commander is waiting for instructions from the division commander on firing, choosing a position, goals, and so on? Not. He makes the decision himself. Based on your knowledge and experience.
    How was Wertmach’s army different from all the other armies in Europe before World War II? It was based on new principles. This is independence and initiative in making decisions of the middle command level, platoon - battalion.
    Soviet commanders, mostly youngsters after training or "fast-growing" commanders of regiments, divisions and corps, were afraid to make any independent decisions. They waited for directives, orders from higher echelons, without taking any proactive actions. The fate of their convicted and shot predecessors taught me. Better to die beautifully as a hero than to be shot in disgrace. That's the whole alignment.
    Imagine a combat situation requires a retreat, a new defensive position, with the creation of a second echelon, and inflict serious damage on the enemy. From the defense. Firstly, you need to know and be able to. And secondly, there is no derogation in all Directives and Military Regulations. In Orders only the offensive and defeat of the enemy. And these inexperienced commanders ruined the soldiers. Tens and hundreds of thousands.
    1. 0
      April 29 2019 17: 33
      I did not immediately answer yesterday. Do you even know the orders of the first days of the war? Only on the Western Front Pavlov, Kuznetsov and Golubev on the third day of the war gave the order to retreat. And without authorization from above. On their own initiative. Read what happened on the Western and North-Western fronts. And now there is basic literature on documents and orders. Both for and against.
      Your comments give yellow press 90s.
      1. +1
        April 29 2019 22: 22
        My comments sound like common sense, experience and personal knowledge. As now "historians" like to pull out a quote and build an opus and sensation on it.
        Pavlov gave an independent order to retreat. So? A month after the outbreak of the war, Pavlov was shot on behalf of Stalin. Why was this shooting needed? Explain, please.
        And these are the memories of Pavlov’s wife:

        ... the general fell victim to Stalin’s anger because, together with P. Alliluyev, brother of Stalin’s wife, and the head of the Artillery Directorate, G. Kulik, in the autumn of 1938, they handed the leader a petition of protest against reprisals in the Red Army. All signatories did not survive long. Before the war, Alliluyev and Kulik's wife died, during the war Pavlov and Kulik himself.
        1. +1
          April 30 2019 00: 40
          This is funny. Some kind of note. You call this "common sense". You just have a set of some gossip from the yellow press.
          If you have such a great experience in military affairs, then tell yourself why they shot Pavlov, Korobkov, Klimovsky, Grigoriev? Did they also write letters to Stalin? And why didn’t Kulik be shot? And they made Marshall.
          Do you have no logic? Have you read the protocols of Pavlov's interrogation? Tell your military "common sense" from the confrontation between Pavlov and Korobkov whether they deserved to be shot or not?
          I have a reason for the shooting of the command of the Western Front. You will not find it on the Internet, because this is my point of view. And I don’t want to be discussed by amateurs like you.
          Just try to find the differences in the War of 1812 and the War of 1941. By the way, the cause of the war is the same in both cases. But there are differences. One is very significant. And then, perhaps, you will understand the reason for the execution of Pavlov.
          By the way, according to some reports, the same fate awaited Kirponos. Therefore, he did not try to get out of the environment. Baghramyan left, but Kirponos did not. You can read about this story (death of Kirponos) by Mukhin "If not for the generals".
          1. +1
            April 30 2019 01: 00
            I know that I won’t get any clear answers. But I want to ask a couple of questions on specific divisions. 10 pp. Division. Almost complete, command personnel. She went to the designated defense area in advance. Retreated from the first hours. What is the reason?
            Its neighbor is a 125 page division. The completeness is complete, the staff is almost complete, the command is a cadre military, on June 19 occupied the defense zone, equipped the foreground. State artillery was supported by a fighter regiment. Defeated in 6 hours. Towards evening, the division headquarters was defeated and uncontrolled withdrawal began. What are the reasons?
            This is all the Baltic Military District. More precisely, the Northwest Front.
            So there are purely military issues for a military man. From civilian.
            1. 0
              3 May 2019 00: 42
              Bakhtiyar, you are a very strange person. We read about the most important front of the Second World War - the North-West (Leningrad), and there are hectic facts about these most important battles in every message. Generally speaking, there was repression in the army, which you called correct, deliberate and completely small. And the sentences - as a consequence of rampant drunkenness and corruption of the command staff. A small correct arrest, a short interrogation with a massacre, the correct sentence and a painless execution. Family - "CHSVN" for many years, without the right to live in big cities, work in their specialty, study in universities. So? I wish you such a life, fabulous and correct. And don't ask, but what are you for? It is enough that you are not Russian, but slander has been scribbled on you long ago.
              For your questions. Do you have any idea HOW defense is being built? Imagine you are a commander., Well, a division. Prewar. You have three rifle regiments from large units. artillery regiment, in principle, that's all. The rest are battalions, divisions. In peacetime, no one, Bakhtiyar, digs trenches. In advance. And does not sit in them. At the training camp, yes. And so everyone lives in barracks, equipment is in parks, weapons are in gun rooms, ammunition in warehouses. And on Sunday (22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX) the soldiers had a bathhouse, laundry, rest, and officers rested with families from the soldiers.
              And, behold, the war. At night. The bombing. Saboteurs. Loss of communication. Everyone is shocked. "Secret packages" are usually opened in red. You probably know what it is? So, in May 1941, all the old Plans in case of war were replaced with new ones. Do you understand? A month before the start of the war. And the troops still need to be prepared for the new Coverage Plans.
              Come back. You have three rifle regiments. How do you post them? Right. Two regiments in front, the third behind - on the second line of defense. How to teach. What is the width of the division’s defense strip? 8-12 km. True, the Directives allowed a strip of up to 20 km, but this is, rather, an exception. Moreover, defense is engaged with mandatory neighbors on the right and left, or absolute obstacles, such as the sea, the swamp.
              You write that 10 pp. Division prepared everything in advance. That is, in a calm environment, they dug trenches, put up engineering barriers, set up minefields, established communications, disguised themselves and conducted daily reconnaissance at a distance of 30 km. So what do you think? It takes a minimum of about a month to build a division’s defense. The division will only march to positions for only a few days, and battalions and support services set up their work for weeks. The division had this time. Not. How are the shelves arranged? All in the first echelon. Why? Because instead of 10 km, about 100 km were defended. Neighbors? Breaks of 20 km.
              Who ordered this? County Headquarters.
              Fadeev, commander of 10 pages of the division. Education - junior commander courses, shot courses, advanced training courses. All (To be treated by doctors after the course). For five years of peacetime he went from a battalion commander to a divisional commander. Why is this growth? Probably someone was planted correctly. And he was not in any staff position. When you have to deal with cards, theory, picking.
              After two weeks of fighting, no more than 500 people out of 12-15 thousand remained in the division. Here are the right wild-growing commanders.
              In September, the commander drank, for which he received 7 years of camps, with a delay. But why not drink it?
              Bakhtiyar, I have a request for you. Do not make yourself a great connoisseur. Jack of all trades. Scattered documents were read, and without knowing the theory, without experience, you climb to teach everyone. Who you are? Write about yourself. Student, blogger, 23 years old, I know everything. I’ll teach everyone. In general, I originally wrote about the memories of my grandfather. And about his views on this. And you climb with this archival nonsense, passing it off as truth.
              1. 0
                3 May 2019 07: 50
                I did not write that the repression was correct. I wrote that cleaning the army was necessary.
                And now specifically. Does it take a month to defend a division’s defense? You, really a connoisseur ... During the war, the enemy will give you a month?
                In peacetime, nobody digs trenches? The division commander received an order to occupy the defense on June 19. Three days before the start of the war. And he placed two regiments in the first line and the third in reserve. All according to the Charter. That's just the defense front was 40 km. Shelves occupied a strip of up to 12 km. Why? Yes, for the simple reason of lack of strength. The Germans surpassed the Red Army in terms of manpower. They had the initiative and could concert forces wherever it was convenient. At 125 pages, the division was advancing in the tank corps. For 10 pages of the division, the defense front is 80 km. Except how to set up barriers, nothing could be done.
                Northwest was not the main? Well then read the Barbarossa directive. Which direction was the main one? And in the front line of which two Panzer Groups were operating.
                Would you like for Western? Have you still not read the protocols of the interrogation of Pavlov and Korobkov? I asked to evaluate their actions BEFORE the war. From the point of view of the military. But you either didn’t read it, or you don’t understand anything. It is in military affairs.
                About my humble personality. For 60 years, by no means a blogger, I have been interested in military affairs and, in particular, in the history of World War II since childhood. And, if you do not know, then managing a team of people in civilian life is no less difficult than a platoon or regiment. And the responsibility for making decisions (although not counted in lives) but behind my decisions stood hundreds of thousands of dollars. I am sure (according to your comments) that you and the half did not read what I read. And, worst of all, you could not even comprehend what you read. You cannot give an intelligible answer to any specific question. Instead, cite the memories of Pavlov’s wife, published in some sort of yellow newspaper. I found this interview.
                We have long gone from the topic of repression. I simply argue that the impact of repression on the combat effectiveness of the Red Army was negligible. I affirm that the decision to attack the USSR did not depend on the presence or absence of repression. I affirm that local commanders made decisions without fear of consequences. I affirm that Pavlov, Korobkov, Klimovsky, Grigoriev committed a crime BEFORE the war and were shot for it.
                And most importantly, Stalin knew that the initial period of the war had already been lost on June 23 and made a decision on which the whole fate of the country depended. And to implement this decision, the Red Army had to stand to death. But you will not understand what the essence of this decision is (I am sure of this). Stalin had to make difficult decisions twice during the war. Just like not a military man. But the fate of the country depended on his decisions, and not on several divisions or thousands of lives of ordinary people. I’m not a judge to him. And none of those present here has any right to condemn the actions of the country's leader.
                It is easy to make decisions and advice - how to act Stalin or Putin, not knowing how difficult it is to make a decision personally. I will never forget how a foreigner reacted to my INCORRECT decision as a result of which the company lost $ 50. They gave me the best characteristic, transferred to independent work. Because a person who can make an independent decision is valued much higher than any specialist. The same is true in military affairs.
                Learn military affairs. This is advice from civilian.
  19. +1
    10 June 2019 06: 40
    Stalin just needs to determine his place in history, he doesn’t have to raise his personality to heaven, this has already been done by his entourage, and then he has poured mud on him. You can’t redistribute the story. Although Budyonny was responsible for the army, it’s just that in history you don’t have to be opportunistic.
  20. 0
    11 June 2019 08: 40
    Want to know the role of Stalin? Imagine Yeltsin in his place. Or even worse, Gorbachev.