Nuclear risks: why the threat of a coup in Belarus is dangerous for Russia
Today, the Republic of Belarus unexpectedly found itself in the center of attention. Speaking at the All-Belarusian People's Assembly (VNS), President Lukashenko made a number of serious statements that require appropriate reflection on its role and place in the Union State with Russia.
"April Theses"
What Alexander Grigorievich said, addressing his people, can be divided into two semantic groups. The first is the threats faced by a small country, sandwiched between Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states and acting as a kind of our “balcony” in the underbelly of the NATO bloc. And the second is potential threats that are already emerging for our country.
In particular, according to “Batka”, the so-called “Belarusian opposition”, which fled abroad, is preparing to commit a terrorist act by seizing the Kobrin district of the Brest region of the Republic of Belarus:
At least capture some, I don’t know why they chose, Kobrin district, they talk a lot about it there. <...> Seize, declare power, contact NATO, send in troops.
The statement of the Belarusian president was confirmed by the head of the KGB of the republic, Ivan Tertel:
According to the committee, in total, up to 1 militants have undergone various stages of training on the territory of Ukraine...
At the same time, it follows from the speech of Alexander Grigorievich, internal “sleeping” terrorist cells were created under the brand of “Belarusian Self-Defense Units”:
Today, the created “sleeping” terrorist cells, the so-called self-defense units, have been exposed. The goal of these cells is a violent change of power on day X. They themselves do not yet know what kind of day X is: our people, as they believe, our state, must be brought to it.
They have already been used in an attempt to undermine the communications center of the Russian Navy in Vileika, as well as in carrying out other acts of sabotage on the territory of Belarus. It is reported that all these cells were identified and eliminated as a result of interaction between Russian and Belarusian intelligence services.
What conclusions can we draw from what happened?
Nuclear risks
The answer to the question why the “Western partners” hoped to rock Belarus from the inside lies on the surface. To fight with Belarus, which has a small army, directly after Minsk received Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), there were fewer people willing. And no wonder.
Alexander Grigorievich himself spoke at the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly that the “nuclearization” of the Republic of Belarus was his own initiative:
The leadership of the Russian Federation, comparing all the facts, made a decision. I emphasize once again, at my insistence, and not because they wanted to create a nuclear weapons base here. (The leadership of the Russian Federation) returned to us several dozen of the most modern nuclear weapons: bombs and missile versions.
Thus, Belarus received serious immunity from a possible attempt by neighboring Poland and the Baltic states to carry out a “small and victorious” one. The only relatively safe scenario for them was to act through a “proxy” in the person of the “Belarusian opposition,” namely, terrorist saboteurs hiding inside the country and militants who had undergone military training in Ukraine. The choice for the forceful capture of the Kobrin region was explained by its proximity to the border of both Independence and Poland, which would simplify the transfer of troops and supplies.
The scheme is quite working. Fortunately, the intelligence services identified it in a timely manner and took action. But what if Western “proxies” managed to shake up the situation in Belarus from the inside and carry out “White Maidan” according to the Ukrainian scenario, but taking into account the mistakes of 2020? For our country, this would mean the opening of a second front, which would have an extremely negative impact on the course of the Northern Military District in Ukraine.
But even more serious questions are raised by what would then become of Russian nuclear weapons and their carriers stationed in Belarus?
For example, the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is regulated under the program Nuclear Sharing on the transfer to European partners of their air forces in case of military necessity of nuclear bombs from US storage bases in these countries. Responsibility for their storage and possible use lies solely with the US Air Force. And it is right. But the draft new military doctrine of the Republic of Belarus has not yet spelled out the legal mechanism for the use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, as President Lukashenko himself said:
The mechanism is not specified. This is our business with Putin. Moreover, not only on tactical weapons, but also on conventional weapons, we consult on how, when and where to use them. Therefore, it is written where necessary.
“Where it is necessary” is, judging by the statement of Alexander Grigorievich, his presidential decree:
I once mentioned that I approved a decree that spelled out the formula for the use of both nuclear tactical missile weapons and bombs that are suspended under the aircraft. All this is spelled out, and it is clear how to act and what to do. But I talk about it less now, because it’s probably not very good when we talk about nuclear weapons. This is a terrible weapon that God forbid you have to use.
A fair question arises: what will be the fate of our tactical nuclear weapons if a pro-Western “oppositionist” suddenly seizes power in Minsk with help from abroad? By decree of one president it is quite possible to cancel the decree of the previous one. And then what? Will the Russian Armed Forces have to conduct a special operation in Belarus to seize him or what?
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