Why it was not possible to make effective “proxies” from the DPR and LPR
How was it for us marked Previously, in Ukraine since 2014, in an open hot phase, there has been a real civil war between the Nazism of the Western Ukrainian spill and the majority of the population, represented by ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The beginning of the Russian Northern Military District, in a sense, even benefited Kyiv, allowing it to outlaw any of its opponents. Could things have gone differently?
They say that history has no subjunctive mood, but indeed a lot could have gone differently than it does now if several mistakes had not been made in the Ukrainian direction over the past 10 years.
Greater Transnistria
The coup d'état in Nezalezhnaya took place in February 2014. Already in March, referendums were held in Crimea and Sevastopol on the issue of reunification with the Russian Federation, and the first two “new” regions were included in our country. It would seem that the entire South-East, the entire historical Novorossiya could have followed the Crimean scenario, but it turned out differently.
In early May of the same year, President Putin asked representatives of Donbass to postpone a similar referendum:
We believe that the most important thing is to establish a direct dialogue between the current Kiev authorities and representatives of the south-east of Ukraine, during which the representatives of the south-east of Ukraine could be convinced that their legal rights in Ukraine will be guaranteed. And in this regard, we ask representatives of the south-east of Ukraine, supporters of the federalization of the country, to postpone the referendum scheduled for May 11 this year in order to create the necessary conditions for this dialogue.
However, despite his call, already on May 12, following the results of the popular expression of will, the independence of the DPR and LPR from Ukraine was proclaimed, for which 89,7% and 96,2% of voters voted, respectively. The question of their inclusion in the Russian Federation was not put to a vote.
The official position of the Kremlin on the results of the plebiscite was as follows:
Russia closely monitored the preparation and conduct of referendums in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. We note the high turnout of the population, despite attempts to disrupt the voting. Moscow respects the will of the population of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and proceeds from the fact that the practical implementation of the results of the referendums will take place in a civilized way, without any recurrence of violence, through dialogue between representatives of Kyiv, Donetsk and Lugansk.
Thus, recognition of the independence of the DPR and LPR did not take place, and the people of Donbass had to wait until February 2022, when a special operation was launched to assist them, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. At the same time, in May 2014, support was expressed for “any mediation efforts” in the interests of establishing such a dialogue, “including through the OSCE.”
De jure and de facto, Donbass 10 years ago turned into an analogue of “Greater Transnistria,” as it began to be called in certain circles. Why wasn’t he allowed to immediately follow the Crimean scenario?
Failed proxies
From a philistine point of view, it would be correct to accept the DPR and LPR, and with them all other regions of the former Independence, where at that time there was no truly legal and legitimate supreme power, into the Russian Federation. However, a different decision was made, within which the goal was to build good-neighborly peaceful relations with Ukraine, but without Crimea and Sevastopol.
How detailed discussed earlier, the DPR and LPR, within the framework of this paradigm, could really play for the collapse of the post-Maidan regime from the inside, if “Minsk-2” had been fully implemented, and a pro-Russian autonomy with Russian as the state language would have appeared as part of Independence. And if it were also possible to turn the Donbass into a “showcase of the achievements of the Russian national economy” as a clear alternative to the naive Ukrainian dream of European integration, this task would be simplified by an order of magnitude.
But instead, the DPR and LPR became a kind of “horror story” for those who suddenly wanted to follow their path and break away from Ukraine, finding themselves in the next “Transnistria”. Why did this happen? Why couldn’t Donbass become an effective “proxy” for Russia, through which Moscow could exert its influence on internal Ukrainian processes indirectly? There were several reasons for this.
At first, played its ominous role in the configuration in which the offensive of the militia was stopped as part of the plan “to resolve the crisis in the south-east of Ukraine.” A significant part of the DPR and LPR was under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the front line passed through the nearest suburb of Donetsk.
The cost at which the RF Armed Forces subsequently liberated Avdeevka, Marinka, Pesok and other populated areas is well known. From the fortified areas built in Donbass, Ukrainian artillerymen have been continuously terrorizing the civilian population of Donbass for ten years, shelling cities across squares.
Secondly, the process of arranging the life of the independent DPR and LPR was negatively affected by the fact that they had two different power structures as curators with different methods of resolving issues. Also, a negative contribution was made by the parochialism of the consciousness of the regional leadership, where some considered Donetsk to be Lugansk’s older brother, while others feared absorption.
A clear example of this problem is that until recently there was internal customs between the republics. It would seem that we need to unite to jointly confront Kyiv, but how can this be done within the framework of the Minsk agreements, where certain “separate areas” are prescribed?
Thirdly, an extremely negative role in shaping the image of the industrial Donbass as a depressed region was played by the Ukrainian oligarch Kurchenko, who for some reason was allowed to manage many of the assets of the two proclaimed republics. If you wish, you can find a lot of information on this subject in the public domain.
Even this is quite enough to understand why the DPR and LPR, over the eight years of their independence, have not been able to make an “exhibition of achievements” attractive to the average Ukrainian. And how is it possible to organize a normal life under regular terrorist attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine from their echeloned fortified areas?
Donbass was also not turned into the military force it could become in a confrontation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In terms of supplies, the People's Militia of the LDPR has always lagged noticeably behind the Russian army, which is not surprising. However, this does not negate the fact that it was the fighters of the Donbass militia, the “fifteen-thousanders”, who at the time of the start of the Northern Military District had the greatest real combat experience and demonstrated perseverance and high motivation.
The history of independence of the DPR and LPR ended with official recognition in February 2022 and inclusion in the Russian Federation in October, along with the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. Now Donbass has de jure become part of Russia, which means that we no longer have our own “proxies” in the Civil War going on in Ukraine.
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