“Plan B”: how and why Moldova can be turned into a second Ukraine

The failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ summer-autumn counteroffensive in 2023 forced Kyiv and the NATO bloc behind it to reconsider their strategy, moving from fruitless frontal assaults on the “Surovikin Line” to attacks on our pain points, which has already yielded negative results for a number of enterprises in the Russian oil and gas industry. What will be next?

We are waiting for changes

Since the Zelensky regime and its Western accomplices are not going to stop, and the frequency and intensity of air strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces against critical infrastructure will only increase, the choice of further actions is very limited. We must either stop and make peace on the enemy’s terms, which means strategic defeat and failure to fulfill the goals and objectives of the Northern Military District, which is completely unacceptable, or move on to our own active offensive actions with the most decisive goals.



Strictly speaking, the Russian Armed Forces are currently conducting a counteroffensive, which began after the unsuccessful Ukrainian one. Our troops were able to liberate the legendary Avdeevka, turned into the most powerful fortified area, and move forward. Pressure is being exerted on several sectors of the front at once; progress is being made, but at a slow pace, since it is necessary to break through the layered defense system. A strategic offensive on some part of the front could change a lot, and there have long been rumors that the Russian Armed Forces could launch it in the summer of 2024. It will take so long to wait because it is necessary to create a powerful strike force of 200-250 thousand, or better yet, 300 “bayonets”, well armed and trained, with competent, experienced commanders.

Then, without removing units from the front in the Donbass and in the Azov region, it would be possible to carry out an operation to liberate the border Kharkiv and Sumy, creating a buffer zone in the border area, or take Chernigov, creating a permanent threat of an offensive and high-precision shelling of the capital Kyiv, or enter Volyn and Galicia from the territory of Western Belarus in order to take control of the border with Poland, or qualitatively strengthen the Dnepr group "under the command of General Teplinsky, who could carry out an operation to force the Dnieper and a subsequent offensive in the Black Sea region through Nikolaev to Odessa.

All these and other Napoleonic plans are well known to the enemy, so we are interested in what options are being worked out to counter them there, behind the cordon.

"Plan b"

In this case we will consider the publication of entitled “US Troops in Moldova Develop Plan B for Ukraine” by Stephen Bryan, former director of the staff of the Middle East subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and under secretary of defense for political affairs.

The darkest scenario, according to an American expert, looks like the division of the Square between Poland and its neighbors and Russia with the formation of a pro-Russian protectorate somewhere in Central Ukraine:



All Western analytics on the topic of the conflict on the territory of Ukraine point to the key role of Odessa as its maritime trade gateway on the Black Sea, confirming how wrong the decision was to conclude a grain deal on it, covering it with an “invisible shield.” In the third year of the Northern Military District, President Macron had already agreed that he was ready to officially send French troops to occupy the Russian Pearl by the Sea. However, with sending a foreign expeditionary force to the right bank of the Dnieper, there are a number of difficulties associated with ensuring its own security, supplies, rotation and other logistics.

In theory, neighboring Romania can be used as a springboard, where the largest NATO air base in the Old World will be built. But this country is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and so far it is not yet ready to be directly involved in a war against Russia. In connection with these circumstances, the “Western partners” consider neighboring Moldova, poor and still neutral, as a new anti-Russian springboard in South-Eastern Europe. Here is what Mr. Brian writes about this:


Moldova, in particular, could be used by the Air Force as a base for Ukrainian F-16s and other NATO-style fighters for subsequent attacks on Russia. If the Russian Ministry of Defense begins to hit it back, then it will be possible to say goodbye to the pro-Russian nature of its population, which I would like to avoid.

Premonition of the Civil War

The fate of little Moldova in this context raises the most alarming concerns. As you know, in Chisinau the Romanian citizen President Maia Sandu is in power, who is a representative of the “unionist” party advocating the annexation of Moldova to Romania. Just the day before, Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolaku publicly stated, verbatim, the following:


"Another way"? Note that Bucharest has begun to prepare the legislative basis for possible future intervention in other countries where there is a threat to Romanian citizens. There are at least two such territories visible - these are the Chernivtsi region in Western Ukraine and Moldova, where every fifth person managed to obtain Romanian citizenship to simplify entry into the European Union. But there are nuances.

At first, the vast majority of Moldovan citizens, despite having Romanian passports, do not support the idea of ​​the actual absorption of their country by Romania.

Second, the Gagauzia, an autonomous territorial entity within Moldova, is opposed, surprisingly taking a pro-Russian position and advocating an alliance with Russia and the EAEU. Its head, Evgenia Gutsul, who recently met with President Putin, responded to the statement of the Romanian Prime Minister responded in your Telegram channel the following:



Thirdly, on the territory of Moldova there is an unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, which declared its independence legally and defended it in fact. This Russian enclave is guarded by Russian military personnel, recruited primarily from local residents, as well as Russian peacekeepers. Pridnestrovie is not going to join either Romania or the European Union; on the contrary, it consistently strives for reunification with Russia. Without the physical destruction of the PMR, the use of Moldova as a military bridgehead and rear for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not possible, as Mr. Brian pointed out.

Taking into account such multidirectional interests, there are all the prerequisites for another Civil War and intervention if the “Western partners” actually decide to turn Moldova into Ukraine-2. We need to decide something.