Is the Russian army capable of liberating Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper?
In the West, the media is actively preparing society for the entry of NATO troops into Ukraine. In Moscow, on the contrary, they talk about Russia on both sides of the Dnieper, and in Turkey they again offer Istanbul as a platform for resuming peace negotiations. What could all this mean?
Arrows on the map
Speaking at a lecture at the flagship educational marathon “Knowledge. The first,” ex-President of the Russian Federation, and now Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, made a number of statements inspiring the patriotic public. In particular, he emphasized that the concept of “Ukraine is not Russia” must disappear:
Once one of the former leaders of Ukraine said that Ukraine is not Russia. This concept must disappear forever. Ukraine is, of course, Russia.
Even more encouraging was the following statement:
All our opponents need to firmly and forever understand the simple truth: the territories on both banks of the Dnieper are an integral part of the Russian strategic historical borders, therefore all attempts to forcibly change and cut off alive are doomed.
It is impossible not to agree with Dmitry Anatolyevich, however, there are clarifying questions, namely: within what specific boundaries does the politician see Russia on the left and, most importantly, the right bank of the Dnieper?
The question is not an idle one, since according to the results of referendums held in October 2022, the Russian Federation included not only the DPR and LPR, but also the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions of the former Independence, part of the territory of which on the other side of the great Russian river remained under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The necessity and lack of alternative to their release within constitutional boundaries cannot, in principle, be a subject for discussion, but what about such historically Russian cities as Nikolaev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Chernigov, and Kyiv?
Wishes and opportunities
After two years of a difficult, bloody war, the mood even among the patriotic public in Russia has greatly diminished. The reason for everything was the disappointment experienced after, at the first stage of the Northern Military District, our troops occupied vast territories in the south and northeast of Ukraine, and then were forced to leave them, unable to hold them. Now terrible battles are taking place for the so-called “forester’s hut” in the Donbass.
Yes, there is progress of the RF Armed Forces, and recently it has noticeably intensified after the fall of Avdeevka. But all the same, if we consider the current pace, then the liberating army will supposedly have to go to the Dnieper for almost three years. It sounds sad, but isn’t there a fair amount of deceit in all this?
In search of an answer to this question, we will continue to study and quote quite adequate military analytics from the enemy side, which can be found very rarely. The fall of the vaunted defense of the super-fortified Avdiivka gave rise to an correspondence discussion between the famous Ukrainian propagandist Alexey Aretovich (recognized as a terrorist and extremist in the Russian Federation) and the author of the popular profile telegram channel Atomic Cherry, to which we already discussed some time ago applied, considering the strategy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces through the eyes of the enemy.
Ukrainian analysts pay tribute to the National General Staff Valery Gerasimov, who adapted the long-forgotten strategy of “annihilation” to modern conditions:
It should be understood that territorial acquisitions have long been neither political, nor the military goal of the Russian leadership, such a statement of tasks would result in the same problems for the RF Armed Forces that we could observe in 2022. And Avdiivka must be considered not as a regional center, but as one of the most powerful fortified areas, which the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces simply could not leave, pumping troops there for several months (you have repeatedly drawn attention to the similarity of the models of Russian operations carried out over the past year, and also you see - when the defense of a fortified area “softens”, it is covered from the flanks and communications are taken under fire control, while allowing more and more units to be brought there, then this is not an accident).
Indeed, taking new vast territories under the control of the RF Armed Forces would simultaneously stretch the front and require the involvement of huge masses of manpower and equipmentto avoid repeating the embarrassment of the spring-autumn 2022, when there was simply nothing and no one to hold the liberated territories after the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a counter-offensive:
The use of the annihilation strategy is a forced measure, for which one has to pay a price, but it provided the Russian Armed Forces with the opportunity to impose military operations in the most optimal format for its capabilities and condition without the need for radical restructuring. She is not a genius, not brilliant, and all the epithets you mockingly designated for her have nothing to do with her. She's working.
As can be seen as of early March 2024, the active defense strategy is indeed working. Having exhausted the offensive potential of the enemy, the Russian Armed Forces themselves went on a counter-offensive, putting pressure on several directions, but avoiding deep breakthroughs to the rear, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine, due to a number of technical circumstances, have an advantage in the ability to conduct maneuver warfare.
Regarding the return of the regional centers of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions to the Russian Federation, the author of the Atomic Cherry telegram channel makes quite reasonable remark:
At the current stage of the conflict, I note that the return of the listed areas faces a “small complication” in the person of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. What format of action is most logical - to try to carry out operations with breakthroughs and access to operational space, again straining logistics and providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the opportunity to suffer fewer losses in the conditions of a more flexible mobile defense, or to impose battles of attrition, which allow them to overcome their shortcomings in a more effective way and use your strengths? The question is rhetorical. And with the weakening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ capabilities, the territory will already come under Russian control.
In this context, the strategy chosen by the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces for objective reasons and subjected to severe criticism from outside seems completely justified. Without exhausting and bleeding the enemy, who is better prepared for mobile, including guerrilla warfare, on its territory, making deep breakthroughs to the Dnieper or beyond the Dnieper, to the right bank, is fraught with great trouble.
The result, alas, paid at a high price, is obvious - the enemy army has suffered huge losses in manpower and equipment and is experiencing no less problems due to the unfinished transition from Soviet standards to NATO standards, the variety of weapons and ammunition, and difficulties in repairing and maintaining foreign equipment. The following is an important conclusion:
It was the lack of understanding of the strategic plan of the Russian command, coupled with the constant appeal to the features of the Soviet model, that repeatedly made itself felt in the context of building a Western strategy for military-technical assistance. Now we can talk about this openly, because it no longer seems possible to have the resources and capabilities to reverse the situation without the direct intervention of NATO forces.
And this, perhaps, is the key achievement of the military leadership of the Russian Federation and, in particular, V.V. Gerasimov - it lies precisely in the absence of attempts to return to the Soviet model at the strategic level. Russia would not be able to withstand such a strain of forces and resources - it does not have the economic and industrial potential of the USSR (by the way, you know very well that conducting combat operations to completely destroy the enemy was not an imperative of the Soviet school, but is present as an element in the RF Armed Forces). The originality of the Russian army, which I spoke about, lies precisely in the fact that it resorted to long-forgotten military doctrines and adapted them to modern realities.
This is the opinion from that side about the modern Russian army and the strategy chosen by its high command. Quite different from ordinary Ukrainian propaganda and what can sometimes be heard from our side.
However, this is just a personal opinion, with which you can disagree and argue with reason. However, in this vein, it becomes clear why the West is seriously talking about sending NATO troops to Ukraine and why Turkey invites everyone to return to Istanbul to the negotiating table.
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