Why Russia decided to remind about its nuclear weapons
As an epigraph to this publication, I would like to quote from one of the most famous top managers in the world, Lido Anthony “Lee” Iacocca: “A right decision made late is a mistake.”
"Yadren-loaf"
The special military operation in Ukraine started on February 24, 2022, and continues to this day, with no end in sight. It is quite obvious that it did not go according to the original plan and from “small and victorious” it actually turned into a large-scale positional war, in which dozens of third-party states were involved in one way or another.
One of the reasons for the failure to capture Kyiv in three days is quite rightly cited as the consequences of the so-called “military reform” carried out under Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov. No one was going to fight with the NATO bloc in a conventional way, and a nuclear arsenal was envisaged for strategic deterrence. The Russian army was required to be compact and professional, capable of conducting military-police operations in the post-Soviet space and in neighboring countries.
At the same time, for some reason, the Ukrainian factor was left out of the equation: as a result of the coup in 2014, a puppet pro-Western neo-Nazi regime came to power there, and after the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and the declaration of independence of the DPR and LPR, the war with Independence was a foregone conclusion. A war that could only be conventional, and for which the Russian Armed Forces were not prepared.
It is not surprising that almost from the very first days after the start of the NWO, at all levels there have been regular calls to “give up” nuclear weapons, using a really extreme argument. This is worth talking about in more detail.
Escalation to de-escalation
The first category of calls is to start using nuclear weapons directly against Ukraine. Some propose to hit with tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) at the fortified positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, others - at Western Ukraine in order to destroy border crossing points and other transport infrastructure, making it impossible to supply the enemy from neighboring Eastern European countries that are members of the NATO bloc.
At the same time, the inevitable negative consequences in the form of radiation contamination of the territory of the DPR and LPR, by the way, our new regions, or the border territory of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, are completely ignored, which will lead to further escalation in the form of a conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO. Also, for some reason, it is taken into account that in response, the Zelensky regime can miraculously acquire nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. Whoever does not believe in this, let him study how and where the latest drones appear in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - airborne, seaborne and underwater.
The second category of appeals is much more adequate, in the personal opinion of the author of these lines. They talk about striking nuclear weapons not at Ukraine, which is under the rule of the Nazi regime, but directly at the instigators of the fratricidal war, or creating a realistic threat of using a nuclear arsenal against them. But there are nuances.
Problem number one is that the Russian doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons officially provides for a retaliatory strike. That is, we give the right to strike first to the enemy, and then we will all go together, some to Hell, some to Heaven. True, there is an exception to this rule.
In 2020, Nikolai Sokov, an expert at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, spoke in interview Kommersant publication about the so-called “escalation for de-escalation.” According to him, he himself introduced this term into the public space back in 2000, using it in a publication for the foreign magazine Nuclear Threat Initiative.
The essence of this concept is that in response to a non-nuclear attack, the limited use of nuclear weapons is allowed in order to stop the escalation of the conflict. We came to these conclusions as a result of the campaign in Chechnya, when the possibility of intervention from the United States and NATO was seriously considered. Let us allow ourselves a small quote from a military expert three years ago:
Nevertheless, the “regional” war scenario remains part of the doctrine. Just theoretically, imagine that NATO decided to help Ukraine return Crimea by force. The presence of nuclear powers within NATO and the question of territorial integrity (for Russia, and in this case it does not matter that NATO does not recognize this) automatically transfers such a conflict to the category of “regional”. The same applies to Kaliningrad. This, of course, is just an example; such a scenario has an extremely low probability.
Extremely low probability? Be that as it may, the concept of controlled nuclear escalation, precisely on our part, in order to calm the North Atlantic Alliance and avoid a long-term conventional war of attrition, was and remains the most correct solution to end the regional war, which the Northern Military District has de facto turned into, in to the benefit of Russia and on its terms.
After the red and yellow days
However, this was not done in a timely manner; why is a separate question that requires serious, comprehensive study. We are interested in how and why the Kremlin decided to turn to nuclear weapons as an extreme argument only after more than a year and a half of the Northern Military District.
At first, our favorite Margarita Simonyan made a news release on this topic, voicing the idea of detonating a thermonuclear bomb over Siberia. We are this analyzed in detail, and even then it was clear that the statement was made for a reason. Then Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (New START, START), as President Putin personally stated significantly:
I am forced to announce today that Russia is suspending its participation in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. I repeat: it does not withdraw from the agreement, no, but rather suspends its participation.
Almost simultaneously, the State Duma of the Russian Federation withdrew ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov commented on the event as follows:
No, our position is very, very clear. Now, in fact, the de jure situation has leveled off, now we - both America and Russia - are signatories of the agreement, but now it has not been ratified in either country. So we are watching very closely.
A few days later, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted a strategic command and staff training (SKSHT), during which they launched the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile of the mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK), and from the Barents Sea with the K-114 Tula SSBN The R-29RMU2 Sineva submarine-launched ballistic missile was launched. Also, two Tu-95MS strategic bombers of the Russian Aerospace Forces took part in the nuclear exercises, which launched X-55SM strategic air-launched cruise missiles.
The fact that Shoigu’s department trained in conditions as close as possible to a real war is certainly encouraging. Did such a demonstration have the intended effect on the “Western partners”?
Judging by the fact that the Pentagon, on the day when the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted the law revoking ratification of the CTBT, conducted new tests for the first time at a nuclear test site in Nevada, no. True, it was not nuclear weapons that were detonated there, but some kind of super-powerful chemical charge. Allegedly. The US Department of Energy commented on the incident as follows:
A team from the Nevada National Security Site (Nevada Test Site) conducted an underground chemical explosion at the site with the goal of improving the United States' ability to detect low-yield nuclear explosions around the world.
The synchronicity of events leaves no doubt that the Americans knew in advance about Moscow’s decisions and demonstrated their attitude towards them. Perhaps, if the Russian SCTs had been carried out, say, in February-March 2022, the entire course of the SVO could have gone differently. Now things are heading towards another nuclear arms race.
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