GTU, caliber 152 mm and digital communication: what tanks are needed in the NWO zone

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The story of the Russian tank "Alyosha", which came out alone against an entire armored group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, received a further logical continuation. His entire heroic crew was more than deservedly awarded by the decision of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Shoigu to state awards, and the country learned the names, or rather, the call signs of their new Heroes. What other conclusions can be drawn from that tank battle in the Zaporozhye direction?

Three cheerful friends


So, the type of tank became known, which actively maneuvered and hit enemy armored vehicles with direct fire. This is the T-80, the so-called “jet tank” or “flying tank”, equipped not with a diesel engine, but with a powerful gas turbine plant that can quickly start up and warm up in just a few minutes, giving out an unusually high speed for a heavy armored vehicle. Let's remember this fact.



The call sign of the T-80 was "Alyosha", but the crew itself nicknamed it "Santa Claus", since the tank was received on New Year's Eve 2023. IN interview, given to the publication "Moskovsky Komsomolets", the commander of the combat vehicle speaks of his "eighty" as follows:

You know, it’s like he’s alive, and he understands everything that you need to work hard, but do it, sometimes even with the last of your strength. I remember that somehow we were “stuck”, they thought - that’s it, he won’t get there, but he took it and drove. We didn't even know how.

That is, a Russian tank equipped with dynamic armor was able to survive a hit by an anti-tank missile of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, apparently, an American one, saved the lives of its crew and, after repairs, returned to service, where it performed real miracles. This says a lot about the reliability and survivability of domestic armored vehicles.

The crew of "Alyosha" or "Santa Claus" deserves a separate discussion. The commander of the tank with the call sign "Weasel" in military specialty is not a tanker at all, but a career intelligence officer with real combat experience. After retiring 12 years ago, in June 2022 he volunteered to fight in the BARS, served for two months, received a shell shock and went for treatment. In September last year, Laska, as a reservist, returned to the NVO zone again as part of a partial mobilization. About whether it was difficult to become a tanker from a scout, the commander answered the MK journalists as follows:

If you understand what you are doing and why, then it is not difficult. Everything can be learned.

The call sign of the operator-gunner, who shot through the forest belt through, hitting the enemy’s armored vehicles, “Lech”. At the front, he also ended up on mobilization; he once served in the tank troops for a year. In civilian life he worked as a welder. The only regular tank officer in the heroic crew is the driver with the call sign "Monolith". He is the commander of a tank company, but was forced to take the place of a mechanic driver, since the former driver of Alyosha was wounded.

From the Lasky interview, it turned out that the tankers did not know that they were opposed by a whole armored group, since the enemy "jammers" left them without communication, and the commander of the Russian tank was forced to make all decisions during the battle on his own. Thus, the conclusions of Andrey “Murza” Morozov, a signalman of the “Prizrak” armored personnel carrier, that “Alyosha” had no connection, confirmed.

Conclusions


At first, all Russian armored vehicles must be urgently equipped with secure communications, even if they are built on Chinese-made civilian digital radio stations. If the tank commander had known that the T-80 was facing such a numerically superior enemy, he would hardly have gone on a completely suicidal attack in the style of "kamikaze", as one of the observer-operators of the UAV with the command post emotionally and obscenely described it. Only the highest professionalism and combat success of the crew, the outstanding tactical and technical characteristics of the T-80, as well as the obvious unpreparedness of the Ukrainian military for such a non-standard move by Alyosha, allowed our tank to emerge from the battle with an entire armored group as a winner with a dry score.

Secondly, the example of the crew of the "eighties" clearly demonstrates that even in a very short time it is possible to retrain military personnel from one military specialty to another. The key to success here is to send reservists to active military units and attach them to soldiers and officers who have been at war for a long time, who will train them for exactly what they really need.

Thirdly, "Alyosha" showed that "reactive tanks" can be very useful because of their speed characteristics. In reality, in the NMD zone, tanks are used either for firing from protected positions, having an advantage over self-propelled guns due to more powerful armor, or as mobile firing points on the “fire-and-leave” principle. Recall that back in April of this year, we reasoned It is not a topic of whether the special operation can give a second chance to the T-95 or the Black Eagle tanks, built on the basis of the T-80U and equipped with a super-powerful 152 mm caliber gun.

So, these tanks are really needed. During the assault on cities, an armored vehicle with a shortened 152 mm gun would be very useful for "folding" buildings turned by the enemy into a fortified area. In positional battles, a howitzer gun of this caliber would bring maximum benefit when firing from closed positions. In a collision with an enemy armored group, 152 mm shells would tear the Abrams, Challengers and Leclercs literally to pieces, and the gas turbine power plant would give the upgraded Eighties an advantage in speed and maneuverability.
16 comments
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  1. +1
    2 August 2023 11: 42
    It is necessary to decide on a gun - a heavy-duty 152mm caliber should apparently have high ballistics and, accordingly, a long barrel, a shortened one will have medium ballistics (or low), howubized (and even for firing from closed positions) will have a large elevation angle, 60-80 degrees . How do you want to cram everything into one "package"?
    Yes, and "torn to pieces" (as I understand it with an HE shell) will work if you get to the right place with homogeneous armor (stern, roof, side).
  2. -4
    2 August 2023 13: 34
    Of course, communication is important and a powerful gun is useful, but the main problem of our tanks is their lack of protection and it can be solved by increasing armor protection to the level of Abrams or Challenger and using active protection. And when a tank, having fired at the enemy, hides like a hare in a shelter or even shoots from closed positions like self-propelled guns and is not suitable for a dashing attack, this is not a tank, but a misunderstanding. Too strong and numerous anti-tank weapons now.
  3. 0
    2 August 2023 13: 37
    If you introduce a 152mm caliber into a tank turret to destroy occupied residential buildings, then you should pay attention to what these residential buildings are like.

    The same Polish city of Bialystok or Lublin mainly consists of low-rise buildings like our Khrushchevs. 152mm will be redundant there. Even if part of the house collapses, due to the low number of storeys, this will not lead to a great result.

    The same is true for Finnish cities. A weapon that burns these houses from the inside would be more useful here. Because of the small space, there is nowhere to hide there. Some kind of rocket-propelled flamethrowers were more useful.
  4. +3
    2 August 2023 13: 52
    Our guys are heroes, it’s a pity we are fighting with our hands tied, I can’t look at it, why not remove the divisions from the Far East? And hit the full Banderites, so as not to drop a million, but two am
    1. -1
      2 August 2023 15: 08
      The well-known commander of the DPR Khodakovsky visited the LBS. An acquaintance of Khodakovsky's comrade complained about the use of cluster munitions by Ukrainians, which are very difficult to hide from. A complaint was also made about the lack of counter-battery fire from the RF Armed Forces. According to the military, powerlessness in front of enemy artillery is a very difficult feeling.

      So here it is. We are missing a lot. And from the Far East, units are fighting with us, but conscripts with a minimum of weapons remained there.
    2. -3
      2 August 2023 19: 04
      Quote: Dmitry Volkov
      Our guys are heroes, it’s a pity we are fighting with our hands tied, I can’t look at it, why not remove the divisions from the Far East? And hit the full Banderites, so as not to drop a million, but two am

      And if Japan goes to recapture the islands? I suspect that the air defense was removed from the Far East
      1. +2
        3 August 2023 00: 47
        Quote: Mish
        And if Japan goes to conquer the islands?

        That will receive new Hiroshima from Nagasaki, they will not be pitied like Ukraine.
  5. -3
    2 August 2023 15: 36
    1. Buildings do not need to be stacked. People lived there and apartments belong to someone.
    2. It's best to hit 57mm with controlled lift. And the enemy will die and the whole houses will be.
    3. The army needs more modern tanks with modern communications and with KAZ against javelins and against UAVs.

    152 is not needed.
    1. +2
      2 August 2023 17: 44
      Osbenno needs a digital connection with ZAS so as not to yell by analogy to everyone!
    2. +1
      2 August 2023 19: 37
      Targets define weapons. In the NWO we see the use of deep shelters by the enemy (cellars under high-rise buildings, industrial underground structures, etc.), here even 152 mm are too small, powerful mortars under 300 mm are more suitable. For those who have settled in lighter shelters, the larger the caliber, the more successful the defeat, and 152 mm is already suitable. Mobility is becoming one of the main properties for successful actions, where today the tactics are unambiguous - working out on targets and quickly leaving with a change of position. The author is right, a 152 mm howitzer at a more protected and mobile tank base on the LBS and the nearest approaches, as reinforced armored tank weapons, is in great demand. Conclusion: tanks with a short-barreled 152 howitzer have such properties and their own niche in military operations in the Northern Military District, especially in urban areas, as they have an abundance of shelters, where the main battles take place more often.
  6. +1
    2 August 2023 17: 28
    GTU, caliber 152 mm and digital communication: what tanks are needed in the NWO zone

    avtr, "sturgeon urezh" - what for necessarily GTU? This is first.
    GTU - good in cold climates. Diesel is indispensable in hot weather and where there is a lot of sand. Ask the Yankees from Desert Storm about it, when they even pulled conzers on gun barrels ...
    GTU is already a different level and a different class:
    - training, maintenance, operation
    - "gluttony"
    - issue price
    And secondly, caliber 152 is an immediate increase in body weight. Is it needed everywhere?
    1. +1
      2 August 2023 19: 14
      And where do we have a hot climate with sand?
      1. +2
        2 August 2023 19: 46
        All Africa, Arabia, Asia. In general, the tropics and around them. This is if the export option, for everyone.
  7. -1
    2 August 2023 20: 04
    ideally, you need missiles that destroy enemy armored vehicles and accurate long-range artillery. and no tanks needed
  8. -1
    4 August 2023 10: 56
    Excellent article
    So in 1996, I read this from the collection "Military Thought" for 1938, the topic was also discussed there - what kind of tank is needed, and the conclusion was made - the most mobile, armored with impenetrable armor and with a maximum caliber gun. So that there would be superiority over enemy tanks in all respects, when our tanks collide with the Polish T7P, the French Somua or the German T-III ... I was still studying then, it was interesting to read the primary sources.
    Of course, I'm not on "you" either with the author or with military art. I'm an amateur with four stars thirty years ago, and that's it.
    But my meager mind remembers that the battle is fought not by a "tank" and not by "tanks", but by "tank units and formations", moreover, "in cooperation with other units and BRANDS of the troops." It is not so important what properties the SAM TANK has, what armor it has, the caliber of the gun and armor penetration, mobility and power reserve, maneuverability, ammunition load, how invisible it is, etc. (most importantly, by the way, visibility and means of communication) - what matters is how many tanks there are and how exactly they are organized, how exactly the organization of the tank unit levels out its "shortcomings" and enhances its "merits", and, most importantly, how many of these units are connected in CONNECTIONS, and do the commanders of these units and formations know how to use them (not to command them, but to USE)?
    Finally, are there units and formations of other branches of the armed forces so that the tank units strengthen them and which will consolidate the success of the tank units while they develop it - motorized rifle, artillery and engineering, and it is units and formations, and not individual riflemen and "groups" .
    I remind you that "units" are not battalions and not "battalion tactical groups", "units" are a divisional link, and "formations" are a corps and army link. Let me also remind you that there is no actual regimental link in the Russian Federation, and the brigade is actually a battalion, because. brigades are built as a control center for battalion tactical groups, and not for fighting to achieve a brigade mission as part of a division / corps. That's right, information from the second year ...
    That is, the question is not in the properties of tanks, but in the presence of troops that can be used massively and achieve results with a deep advance (tens and hundreds of kilometers), and avoid significant losses.
    Yes, the massing of troops leads to a qualitative reduction in losses, this is an axiom of the practical Soviet military art of 1944-45. Massaging also reduces the requirements for a single tank. A tank company of 2023 will not hold back a separate tank brigade of 1945, a tank battalion of 2023 will not be able to cause any harm to a tank brigade from the tank corps of 1945, because corps reinforcements will not allow tanks (even T-80s with gas turbines) to reach the battlefield and...everything.
    As long as there is no mass of tank units and formations, the qualities of the tank itself do not matter. A hundred tanks on a front of 400 kilometers, especially smeared in the role of NPP, are just a hundred traveling pillboxes, senselessly expensive, unable to shoot otherwise than direct fire. A hundred tanks gathered in one group on a front of 400 km are candidates for encirclement.
    And also a very simple axiom, accessible even to my meager mind - tanks are not designed to fight tanks, in the sense of "tank-to-tank", they are designed in such a way as to have the POSSIBILITY to conduct such a battle - in case there is no other way to achieve targets or there is no way to evade such a fight. But such a battle is not their function, such a battle is the suicide of tank units. This was done many times by various "outstanding commanders" such as Zhukov or Rotmistrov and simply led to an exchange "tank-to-tank" or worse (usually much worse). An axiom of military affairs is that ANOTHER weapon is used against the enemy's weapons. The shooter is suppressed by a machine gun, an enemy machine gun is destroyed in defense by a mortar, in an offensive by a tank, and artillery is working on all this, and all this is covered by aircraft. And although the attack aircraft pilot has a gun, no one sends another plane into the sky so that its pilot shoots an enemy pilot with his gun - he is shot down by an air defense system. A joke, exaggerated, but conveys the meaning.
    Comparison of the properties of tanks is a comparison of the ability of tanks to perform the same tasks. But a tank-to-tank collision in a positional war is nonsense.
    And so far there is no talk of maneuver warfare - awards are issued per kilometer per year. The task of "advancing towards Victory" is not set, is it?
    1. +1
      4 August 2023 23: 30
      Replica. Today we are dealing with NWO with LIMITED FORCES AND MEANS. There is no proposed mass character that you need, without the necessary broad mobilization, small forces are pulling the rubber called SVO, it seems even without the desire to win quickly. Both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and ours tried to attack with concentrated tank battalions, but they were completely defeated. Your statement is reminiscent of the times of the SA of the USSR, then there were no massive Javelins, strike UAVs, remote mining with active mines, anti-tank helicopters and other anti-tank arsenal .. Tank corps and armies are no longer available today (Serdyukovism brought them into brigades), everything is smeared with a thin layer on throughout the 1000 km front. So the role of fire support remained for the tanks, and even then, after a few shots, a hasty retreat to the shelter, because they can be caught by various anti-tank weapons. Such an unsightly picture of tactics and strategy, and the current state of the RF Armed Forces ...