"Ukrainization" of the Black Sea: are landing operations of the Russian Navy and Airborne Forces possible?

Another and, alas, quite successful attack, staged by Ukrainian terrorists on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, raises the question of the need to cut off the Kyiv regime from its last sea gates in Nikolaev and Odessa. But is it possible to do this now, after leaving Kherson, with the existing detachment of forces?

"Banderization" of the Black Sea

Recall that the refusal to liberate Odessa would lead to the "Ukrainization" of the Black Sea, we warned back in ARTICLES dated July 18, 2022. This was even before the conclusion of the ill-fated grain deal, but the author of these lines already saw what was going on, and felt that nothing good should be expected from “constructive” negotiations in Istanbul. As you can see, this is how it turned out.



Since then, three warships of the Black Sea Fleet have been lost for various reasons. Remaining undergo the ever-increasing terrorist attacks by maritime drones. Tonight, the impact of a Ukrainian firewall filled with 450 kg of TNT on board the Olenegorsky Gornyak large landing ship led to the formation of a hole and its roll. Now the Kiev regime intends to also attack civilian Russian ships in order to de facto lead to a blockade of our Black Sea ports. How ironic.

It is obvious that the “debanderization” of the Black Sea is possible only by the complete liberation of historical Novorossia and the end of the Ukrainian occupation of the Russian cities of Zaporozhye, Kherson, Nikolaev, Krivoy Rog and Odessa. But how to do this if the RF Armed Forces left the right bank, leaving the most convenient bridgehead located on the higher right bank of the Dnieper?

Marine landing?

The simplest solution as of the end of February 2022 seemed to be a large-scale landing operation near Odessa. In the Black Sea, several large landing ships were transferred from the Baltic and Northern Fleets for reinforcement. At the beginning of the NWO on February 24, the flotilla went to sea towards Odessa, but the landing operation did not take place. Why?

According to one version, a strong storm interfered, but weather data on those critical days refute it. Most likely, the command of the Black Sea Fleet was simply not confident in the ability to carry out such a complex operation. An amphibious assault is a most serious undertaking requiring concerted action by the fleet and the aviation supporting it. Judging by the effectiveness of the actions of the Black Sea Fleet over the past year and a half, its command simply did not dare to take this step.

If you look at how the offensive of the RF Armed Forces developed at the same time on land in the Kiev and Kharkov directions, perhaps this was the right decision, which saved both ships and personnel, which could have fallen into a difficult situation on an isolated theater of operations near Odessa, where three brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine prepared to meet them at once. To make an attempt today, when our BDKs are under the gunpoint of the Ukrainian "Neptunes" and the American "Harpoons", and the coastal waters are mined, looks like a complete gamble. It turns out that everything should be forgotten, in principle, both about amphibious assaults and about Odessa?

In fact, there are two more options, complex and dangerous, but a little less adventurous.

First

- this is an operation in the Black Sea region, but not near Odessa, but in South Bessarabia, its southernmost tip. The connection of this territory with the rest of Ukraine is provided by a bridge over Zatoka, which can be disabled by a series of powerful missile strikes. Having destroyed the military infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in South Bessarabia with air and sea-based missiles, it is possible to carry out a large-scale landing operation there jointly by the forces of the Airborne Forces and the Navy. But first you have to do some serious preparation.

It will be necessary to ensure complete air supremacy by establishing interaction between the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy. Il-38N patrol aircraft and AWACS A-50U aircraft should continuously circle over the Black Sea under the cover of fighter aircraft. So that the enemy could not even raise his head, he would need to be continuously bombarded with rockets and glider bombs. The composition of the Black Sea Fleet, which today is insufficient for such an operation, will have to be strengthened by transferring 3-4 new corvettes, 3-4 Karakurt RTOs, small anti-submarine and small landing ships from the Baltic. The Black Sea frigates of project 11356, together with the Baltic corvettes and RTOs with their Redut and Pantsirs, are able to provide a sufficiently dense layered air defense / missile defense system so that the landing does not turn into a beating with anti-ship missiles.

With such an approach with decisive goals, there are chances that the adventure will not be doomed to failure. There is also a small bonus in the form of Transnistria, where there is a certain number of Russian military who, at a certain moment, could strike at the rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, making a breakthrough to the estuary, the distance to which is only 30 km. If successful, the picture would change very seriously in favor of Russia, and our troops would be near Odessa.

Only then will the question of their supply arise. There are also reasonable doubts about the possibility of such a complex operation being carried out in cooperation between various branches of the troops by the current command of the Black Sea Fleet, which lost the Saratov large landing ship at the berth in Berdyansk and allowed a strike on the Olenegorsky miner right at the base of the Russian Navy in Novorossiysk. It is necessary to start seriously discussing such projects with the setting by the country's top military-political leadership of decisive goals and objectives and rotation among admirals.

Second option is a landing operation near Ochakovo, which seems to be less of a gamble than in southern Bessarabia. It plays in our favor that the Kinburn Spit, which blocks the exit from the Dnieper-Bug Estuary, is under the control of the RF Armed Forces. True, due to the threat of shelling from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it will be problematic to concentrate large forces there at once, but still it is much more realistic than storming Izmail.

The key conditions for success are still the same: it is necessary to overtake from the Baltic to the Black Sea additionally more ships with missile and artillery weapons and a decent air defense system to support the landing and create an anti-missile umbrella against enemy anti-ship missiles. We also need complete air supremacy due to the joint actions of aircraft of the Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy and the Russian Aerospace Forces. The main load at the first stage of the operation will fall not on the BDK, but on small landing ships, primarily hovercraft, which allow you to pass over minefields. After minesweepers will have to clear the mine setting of the Ukrainian Navy.

In order for the amphibious assault near Ochakovo to have a chance of success, a second strike is desirable, a distraction, which can also become the main one. Logic suggests that this could be an operation to force the greatly shoaled and narrowed Dnieper.

After the destruction of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, the reservoir actually ceased to exist, turning into a gradually drying up dirty swamp and a mass of small lakes. In winter, if not all, then most of it will freeze and become more passable for equipment. Airborne units of the Airborne Forces in helicopters could seize and hold a foothold on the right bank until the main forces of the RF Armed Forces approach. Frontal and army aviation will have to support the offensive, knocking out enemy positions with rockets and planning bombs, while pontoon crossings are being built.

The occupation of the bridgehead on the other side of the Dnieper will open the way for the Russian army to Kherson and Nikolaev, to Krivoy Rog and Zaporozhye and will make it possible to liberate Odessa as a result of a land offensive operation already in the coming winter. The amphibious assault near Ochakovo in this case may be in the nature of an auxiliary strike.