About a month and a half after the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, it makes sense to sum up some of its intermediate results and try to understand what awaits the NMD in the future. To some, this statement may now seem too ambitious, but, according to the author of these lines, Russia has a real chance in about six months or a year to end the special operation with a complete and unconditional victory over the Ukrainian Nazis.
Trends
At the moment, we can make an intermediate conclusion that the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a whole has not had significant success. It failed to repeat what the Ukrainian army succeeded in September 2022 in the Kharkiv region. There are two reasons for that.
On the one hand, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not waste time and prepared powerful echeloned lines of fortifications in strategic directions. Partial mobilization, carried out in September last year, made it possible to solve the problem of an acute shortage of manpower at the front, which was discussed literally from the very beginning of the NWO. At the same time, the overall level of effectiveness of the actions of the Russian army has noticeably increased due to the received real combat experience and coherence. Today, the RF Armed Forces, despite a number of existing supply problems, are on the way to becoming one of the most combat-ready armies in the world. The process of re-equipment and renewal of the command staff will take time, but the general trend is just that. If we draw some historical analogies with the Great Patriotic War, then we now have a second Stalingrad in the Zaporozhye direction.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian command itself missed its chance for an easy victory, which was there until the RF Armed Forces had not yet carried out a partial mobilization, or it was in its beginning. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine went on the offensive in the Zaporozhye direction in September-October 2022, immediately after Kharkov, they could well have been successful. However, the Ukrainian General Staff decided to wait until the new Wunderwaffes were received and kept postponing a counter-offensive that could have started last winter. As we can see, by May-June 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were waiting for the already echeloned defense lines and the Russian army, which had seriously changed for the better, which began to fight as written in the textbooks.
The result was a significant demoralization of the Ukrainian military, who suffered heavy losses while trying to get ahead, as well as a general increase in despondency among the Ukrainian jingoistic public, which had been waiting for a long time that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were about to be “hit” and another Russian “regrouping” would take place. The enemy's loss of fighting spirit is an extremely important factor that can and should be used to bring our Victory closer. Despite all this, and largely thanks to it, it is still too early for us to relax. As a direct consequence of the lack of success of the widely publicized offensive, the materialtechnical the provision of which the leading countries of the collective West have invested, new problems should be expected.
At first, now the Armed Forces of Ukraine will definitely receive modern combat aviation - attack helicopters and fourth-generation fighters, as well as, possibly, anti-submarine aviation, helicopters and anti-aircraft defense aircraft for the Navy. It seems that NATO-made strike aircraft will appear in Ukraine by this winter and will be used in a new attack attempt.
Secondly, one should expect an increase in enemy activity in those areas where Russia cannot respond symmetrically to him. This is an increase in terrorist attacks on new and especially old regions of our country - air and ground. You also need to be prepared for the fact that the Kiev regime is activated in the Black Sea. After the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the grain deal and the start of attacks on the port infrastructure of the Odessa and Nikolaev regions, Ukrainian terrorists threatened that now all ships going to Russian ports would become their legitimate target.
Unfortunately, the Zelensky regime has quite effective tools in the form of high-speed unmanned sea boats filled with powerful explosive charges that the Ukrainian Navy can use to attack warships and even civilian ships. A big problem for the Russian Navy will be the appearance in the Ukrainian Air Force of modern fighters with air-launched anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine helicopters and aircraft. Also, Ukrainian terrorists can covertly set mines in order to blame the Russian navy in the event of undermining a peaceful ship.
It is quite obvious that the time is coming to end the short but bloody history of the post-Maidan regime that seized power in Kyiv as a result of a coup. This can be done somewhere by the winter of 2023-2024, if preparations for decisive action begin right now.
Point
As we detail dismantled earlier, for the collapse of the Square, it is enough to cut it off from the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe, through which Kyiv receives everything necessary for the war with Russia. It is simply impossible to fight in a modern war without shells and cartridges, fuel and fuels and lubricants, new equipment and repairs previously delivered to fight in a modern war. Left only with what they were able to accumulate earlier, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will agonize for some time, and then disintegrate, unable to either attack or defend in the fortified areas in the Donbass.
If, before the end of summer and in the fall of 2023, the second and already the last wave of mobilization is carried out, reinforcing the RF Armed Forces with an additional 300-400 thousand reservists, they can be prepared for the coming winter, trained and coordinated, creating at least two most powerful shock fists on the territory of Belarus. One should go to Western Ukraine via Lutsk and Rivne to Lvov and Uzhgorod, cutting off the main supply routes through Poland. The second one should stand, aimed at Kyiv, in order to restrain the Ukrainian General Staff from the desire to throw all their forces into deblockade of the western border.
If the Armed Forces of Ukraine nevertheless rush with the main forces to Lviv and Uzhgorod, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be able to go on the offensive against the Ukrainian capital and take it or surround it. If Zaluzhny sends only part of the accumulated reserves to the deblockade attempt, the Russian army will be able to deliver an effective flank strike against them. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine begin to massively withdraw from the Donbass and the Sea of Azov to be transferred to the Right Bank, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be able to launch a successful large-scale offensive there. Odessa and the Black Sea region, meanwhile, should be isolated with the help of the Russian Navy.
Decisive actions on the territory of the Right Bank with large forces will allow the Russian General Staff to cut off Kyiv from its sponsors and accomplices, which in a short time will simply force it to capitulate. Then, by next spring, the Zelensky regime will fall, and its functionaries will scatter in all directions according to the Kabul scenario.