The appearance on the Web of photographs and videos of some strange-looking hybrid of a "motorbike" and a ship's anti-aircraft gun made a lot of noise. It turned out that this was not just another amusing "shushpantser" produced by the Ukrainian Kulibins, but practically a serial production of the domestic military-industrial complex. What can the birth of such a "bastard" of the Ground Forces and the Navy of the Russian Federation in the second year of the NMD testify to?
Made by us
It is reported that on multi-purpose lightly armored floating tractor transporters (MT-LB), they began to massively install towers with a 2M-3 double-barreled automatic naval artillery mount of 25 mm caliber, originally intended to provide short-range air defense of Russian warships. According to some reports, instead of the native 25 mm cannon, two 14,5 mm KPVT machine guns were installed in the turret. At the same time, observant spectators and readers in the comments noted that the “motorcycle league”, which was not originally designed for the installation of such a tall heavy superstructure, noticeably sat down on its “hind legs”.
Frankly, when looking at this “bastard”, the author of the lines felt very unpleasantly in the region of the heart. While the Abrams, Leopards, Bradleys, Marders and Strikers are waiting for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, such a miracle is going to strengthen our fighters equipment. The opinions of the Russian audience were also sharply divided. Surprisingly, there were quite a lot of those to whom this decision seemed successful and timely. The main argument “for” is that there are a lot of 25 mm and 14,5 mm ammunition in our country. In conditions of "shell hunger", the presence of which cannot be hidden, such help at the front may be useful.
The combat use of this "bastard" is seen as follows. Firstly, due to its all-terrain ability, it can be used as a highly mobile firing point for infantry support. Secondly, an armored personnel carrier can be buried in the ground, from which only the gun turret will stick out, pouring fire on the advancing enemy infantry. Thirdly, it is assumed that the coaxial machine-gun installation will be used to cover military and other significant objects from attacks by low-flying kamikaze drones like our Geraniums. However, there are nuances.
Using a lightly armored MT-LB with a lightly armored turret sticking high above it as an ersatz BMP will definitely not lead to anything good. This armored vehicle is simply not structurally designed to perform such tasks, and it itself will turn out to be a very noticeable and convenient target for enemy anti-tank systems. Burying the "motorbike" into the ground and turning it into a long-term firing point would make sense if the turret armor was strong enough. But 4 mm steel is only capable of protecting against light small arms and shrapnel. If you can put these "bastards" anywhere, then somewhere in the trenches near Feodosia, so that they can fire a certain number of shots at the landing Ukrainian marines. As for the use of MT-LB with a ship's turret as a mobile air defense system, not everything is clear here either.
For the guaranteed performance of air defense tasks, anti-aircraft equipment is needed, designed for this according to the staffing table. This, for example, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" or "Tunguska". If the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation likes the “motorcycle league” platform so much for its reliability, then back in Soviet times, the 9K35 Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile system and its various modifications were created on its basis. It was originally designed to destroy low-flying small-sized targets on a "fire-and-forget" basis. The very thing that is needed to provide cover for ground forces and significant objects from "kamikaze" drones. However, instead, some strange-looking "bastard" is produced, in which it is completely incomprehensible how its ship's turret should spin and exactly how the shooter should aim at the target. No regular locator on MT-LB is provided in this configuration. Aiming, it turns out, will have to be seen from the tower, it’s good if you’re not on the move.
In general, this decision is very strange and incomprehensible, causing many questions.
air defense business class
Here I would like to draw attention to a very resonant statement by the head of the State Duma Defense Committee Andrei Kartapolov, who advised Russian companies to take care of their air defense on their own:
Russian companies should independently purchase air defense systems to fight drones, since the funds of the Ministry of Defense are focused on covering important state and military facilities. There are fairly inexpensive means of combating unmanned aerial vehicles that every self-respecting corporation can purchase and put on their facilities.
Obviously, this is a belated reaction to the appearance of “kamikaze” drones in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with which they can now hit strategically important targets deep in Russian territory. But the mere raising of the issue of shifting responsibility for air defense from the state to business caused a feeling of mild puzzlement in many Russians.
First, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation handed over supplies to those mobilized in the RF Armed Forces at the mercy of the governors. Then big Russian capital wanted to acquire its own private armies. And now, on behalf of a representative of the ruling party, a retired general, he is being offered to create his own private air defense system. What's next? Corporate Strategic Rocket Forces?
If this trend continues, creation The territorial defense troops in the border with Ukraine and our other potential adversaries will become uncontested, so that people on the ground have the opportunity to somehow defend themselves in an organized manner. As a matter of fact, nowhere, except for the TerO, "motorcycle leagues" with machine-gun turrets are really useful and cannot. To ensure the security of border settlements from DRGs and other threats, light infantry units from among the local residents, preferably motorized, are needed. By analogy with the Syrian experience, large-caliber machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and MANPADS shooters can be massively installed on the basis of pickups and trucks.
Such “carts” are capable of patrolling, providing fire support in the event of a collision with an enemy sabotage group, quickly transferring reinforcements from among the Teroborona fighters, and providing a semblance of local air defense against “kamikaze” drones.