What prevents the transition of the Russian army to a large-scale offensive

If you look at what is happening at the moment in the NVO zone in Ukraine, it becomes obvious that the front has practically stopped. Local offensive operations from the Russian side are carried out only near Artemovsk by the forces of PMC "Wagner" and near Ugledar by a mix of marines and other "specialists". Because of this, it seems that our army is allegedly incapable of conducting decisive large-scale operations. But is it really so?

Toughie

To understand the essence of the problem, many factors must be taken into account. Yes, on the one hand, the Russian army has a number of serious problems, which we will discuss later. On the other hand, she has to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions.

Donbass is a unique region of its kind, exceptionally convenient for defense. Here, one settlement smoothly passes into another, so operations with the environment and taking the city into classic pincers are extremely difficult. Having bypassed one settlement, the troops simply run into another, previously turned into a fortified area. In fact, it is possible to knock out the enemy from there without unacceptable losses only if they demolish it almost to the ground with large-caliber artillery.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that this is happening in settlements where there are still civilians who, by the way, have become our fellow citizens. And if we add to the above the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine for some reason have the opportunity to freely supply their group in the Donbass and rotate when Russian attack aircraft complain about “shell hunger”, then the picture emerges quite depressing.

"Shell Hunger"

On the Internet, you can find a video in which Yevgeny Prigozhin recruits a special contingent from places of detention into his PMC. At the same time, the “music producer” somehow mentioned that now only the “Wagnerites”, the LDNR militia and representatives of the semi-criminal groups of Donbass are fighting. From this emotional speech, the wrong impression may be created that the rest of the Russian army is allegedly not capable of fighting as it should be.

This is wrong. The events of recent weeks have confirmed that the success of the "musicians" is largely determined not only by their training and discipline, but also by the banal availability of artillery shells. As soon as the "producer" Prigozhin was closed off the supply channel, the pace of the offensive immediately slowed down. In itself, this situation is frankly vile, but at the same time indicative. There are shells - there is an offensive, no shells - there is no offensive. By the way, why don't they?

The fact that a “shell hunger” is planned in the NWO zone told back in November 2022. Even then, there were rumors on the Internet about the shortage of 122 mm shells. There is no special conspiracy in this. Back in 2013, a representative of the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) of the Russian Ministry of Defense рассказал Izvestia that Minister Shoigu decided to transfer all the D-30 howitzers in the brigades of the Ground Forces to storage bases, replacing them with a towed version of the Msta self-propelled howitzer or Akatsiya self-propelled gun mounts of 152 mm caliber:


For this reason, the need to continue the production of 122 mm ammunition simply disappeared. In the course of the SVO, the stocks of shells available in the warehouses were actively spent, but then they also showed the bottom. This forced an increase in the production of ammunition, which Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov commented in January 2023 as follows:


The only question is whether the daily consumption of ammunition corresponds to the volume of their replenishment. For the production of gunpowder in large quantities, raw materials such as ordinary cotton are required, but it does not grow in Russia. But it is grown in Central Asia, where American diplomats have frequented with the clear goal of inciting former Soviet republics against Moscow.

Exploration

The other side of the projectile scarcity problem is how exactly they are spent. It is necessary to hit precisely on the enemy, without generously fertilizing the Ukrainian fields with Russian iron. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this respect are an order of magnitude superior to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, since they have direct access to the gigantic intelligence network of the entire NATO bloc and satellites of the United States.

Surprisingly, according to Yevgeny Prigozhin, his PMC also has its own small satellite constellation:


Those who are unlucky with the “producer” have so far had to be content with a few specialized reconnaissance UAVs, as well as impromptu spotter drones like the Chinese Maviks.

As some former “people's militiamen” of Donbass say, if there is a quadcopter, there is an offensive; if there is no quadcopter, there is no offensive. And you can't argue with that.

communication

The third component of a successful offensive is the availability of secure digital communications between units. It must exclude the possibility of the enemy to listen to our negotiations and at the same time effectively control the troops, coordinating their actions. The importance of competent interaction between disparate forces in the Donbass can be judged from the following commentary by Alexander Khodakovsky, the founding father of the Vostok battalion:


60% losses from friendly fire is famously. Or here is another story from Khodakovsky:


For the second year now, volunteer organizations have been trying to solve problems with communication and coordination between units and subdivisions of the former People's Militia of the LDNR by purchasing Chinese radio stations Lira with the collected people's money. No comments. You can read a lot about this from the well-known Andrei "Murza" Morozov, who serves in the LPR and is directly involved in digitalization.

It turns out that these three problems are currently the key ones that impede the development of a large-scale offensive. They belong to the category of solvable, and they can be closed fairly quickly. With a centralized approach, it is possible to quickly purchase and implement communications everywhere, where it is objectively lacking. You can buy specialized reconnaissance UAVs from Iran or China, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will then not so easily land by means of electronic warfare, like the Maviks. It is possible to agree on the supply of shells from the DPRK on an industrial scale.

And you can not only run into a layered defense in the Donbass, but also start advancing in the Russian border area, creating a “security belt” in the Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv regions, which has not been prepared, at least 50 kilometers inland. This will allow to disperse the attention of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in many areas, preventing the creation of a single powerful shock fist in the Zaporozhye region. If the Kremlin does not want a repeat of the next terrorist raid of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions, this is simply have сделать.