Russian Hindrances: Could Our EW “Drown” the NATO Frigate?
Last November, Norway lost one of its five Helge Ingstad frigates (F 313 Helge Ingstad) under stupid circumstances. At 4 hours 3 minutes on the morning of November 8, 2018, “without declaring war,” the warship was rammed into the starboard side by an ordinary civilian vessel, received severe injuries, and then sank near the coast.
The piquancy of the situation is that Helge was going home after the military exercises, where NATO was learning to repel the “Russian threat”. A particular cynicism is that Oslo did not see the nagging of his sailors in the incident, which allowed them to sink a warship out of the blue, but the “Russian trace”.
No kidding, Norwegian diplomats rolled out a claim to the Russian Ministry of Defense, according to which Helge put its side to the giant super tanker, allegedly because our military from the Kola Peninsula jammed electronic signals in the north of the neighboring peaceful Kingdom:
And the Norwegians claim to have relevant evidence. Is it possible to really do something similar on our part? And if so, then what?
Theoretically, you can interfere with the transmission of the signal from the American GPS system. Until the two thousandth year, a certain error was the norm for civilian receivers, and it was created artificially, thanks to the so-called selective method. The error could reach several tens of meters. This feature of the positioning system was canceled by the President of the United States on May 1, 2000. However, the "software hole" remained. A few years ago, enthusiasts from the University of Texas clearly demonstrated how a signal from a ground-based antenna can be transmitted to a marine vessel by replacing it with a satellite one.
We make a reservation that it is necessary to distinguish between signal substitution and its suppression. If the signal is jammed, then the GPS receiver simply shows its inaccessibility. If the signal is replaced, then the devices show a good connection, only the data goes wrong. Beauty? Yes, but it only works with simple civilian terminals. The military receiving antennas are much more complex, they allow you to determine the origin of the signal - is it a satellite or some kind of "ground station on the Kola Peninsula."
The Pentagon managed to develop a noise-immune system for controlling its UAVs back in 2013. The Americans claim that their GPS will be able to work even with the active counteraction of interference from directional radiation. However, on November 8, 2018, something obviously went wrong with the NATO military. The North Atlantic Alliance sailors trained on how to defeat Russia, and the contented went home. What happened later with Helge could not be called otherwise than a disgrace.
Believe that the Russian military deliberately drowned the Norwegian frigate, sending a tanker at him, can only those who have already believed in the Novichka and Skripale. But if for Oslo such a version is preferable to the nagging of their own naval officers, then let NATO be afraid of "Russian interference."
The piquancy of the situation is that Helge was going home after the military exercises, where NATO was learning to repel the “Russian threat”. A particular cynicism is that Oslo did not see the nagging of his sailors in the incident, which allowed them to sink a warship out of the blue, but the “Russian trace”.
No kidding, Norwegian diplomats rolled out a claim to the Russian Ministry of Defense, according to which Helge put its side to the giant super tanker, allegedly because our military from the Kola Peninsula jammed electronic signals in the north of the neighboring peaceful Kingdom:
Russian EW systems jammed GPS signals during NATO exercises.
And the Norwegians claim to have relevant evidence. Is it possible to really do something similar on our part? And if so, then what?
Theoretically, you can interfere with the transmission of the signal from the American GPS system. Until the two thousandth year, a certain error was the norm for civilian receivers, and it was created artificially, thanks to the so-called selective method. The error could reach several tens of meters. This feature of the positioning system was canceled by the President of the United States on May 1, 2000. However, the "software hole" remained. A few years ago, enthusiasts from the University of Texas clearly demonstrated how a signal from a ground-based antenna can be transmitted to a marine vessel by replacing it with a satellite one.
We make a reservation that it is necessary to distinguish between signal substitution and its suppression. If the signal is jammed, then the GPS receiver simply shows its inaccessibility. If the signal is replaced, then the devices show a good connection, only the data goes wrong. Beauty? Yes, but it only works with simple civilian terminals. The military receiving antennas are much more complex, they allow you to determine the origin of the signal - is it a satellite or some kind of "ground station on the Kola Peninsula."
The Pentagon managed to develop a noise-immune system for controlling its UAVs back in 2013. The Americans claim that their GPS will be able to work even with the active counteraction of interference from directional radiation. However, on November 8, 2018, something obviously went wrong with the NATO military. The North Atlantic Alliance sailors trained on how to defeat Russia, and the contented went home. What happened later with Helge could not be called otherwise than a disgrace.
Believe that the Russian military deliberately drowned the Norwegian frigate, sending a tanker at him, can only those who have already believed in the Novichka and Skripale. But if for Oslo such a version is preferable to the nagging of their own naval officers, then let NATO be afraid of "Russian interference."
Information