What hinders the unification of Russia and Belarus?
This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Union Treaty between Russia and Belarus. All previous years, Minsk enjoyed the advantages of the status of the main ally of Moscow, but at the same time carried out a very independent external policies, often not quite consistent with allied relations.
So, Belarus did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, nor the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with the Russian Federation. Also, the Belarusian authorities are restrained and hostile to the events in the Donbass, providing their capital as a platform for settlement. President Lukashenko does not want the appearance of a full-fledged military base of the Russian Defense Ministry on his territory.
Unexpectedly for many, and in Minsk in the first place, Moscow last year sharply intensified in the field of transforming the Union State from a “paper” into a real one. The so-called “tax maneuver” in the domestic oil industry was used as a pressure tool. Under the new conditions, Belarusian refineries and the usual business of re-exporting Russian hydrocarbons have lost their competitive advantages. Alexander Grigoryevich habitually gathered himself in Moscow, but perhaps for the first time he received a refusal there and an ultimatum that made him angrily declare pressure on him and "a threat to sovereignty from the East."
There is a rather interesting theory according to which, in 2024, Vladimir Putin can move from the chair of the President of the Russian Federation to a level higher, at the head of the Union State. But for this, such a supranational construction must exist realistically, and not on paper. And so, the last few days have passed under the sign of negotiations between Putin and Lukashenko, at which the fate of the Union State was discussed. It is very significant that Alexander Grigorievich preferred Munich to a three-day meeting in Sochi, where, in between negotiations, he skated with the Russian president and played hockey. Did the heads of two states reach a compromise?
Alexander Lukashenko made a very mixed statement:
The position is quite convenient, because it makes it possible to turn back at any time, citing Belarusian public opinion. In some ways, this reminds one of Vladimir Putin’s statements regarding the Kuril Islands, according to which the solution of the territorial issue should be supported by the Russian and Japanese peoples.
What can we talk about? How deeply should Russia and Belarus integrate within the framework of this Union State itself? And how equal can the unification of large and small economies be? Bogdan Bezpalko, a member of the Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations, voices the following very real steps by Russia and Belarus towards each other:
1. Deep integration in the field economicsincluding the introduction of a common currency.
2. The introduction of a common citizenship and a single passport for Russians and Belarusians.
3. The creation of a common Parliament of the Union State.
4. Coordination of the foreign policy of Moscow and Minsk, including the recognition by Belarus of Crimea and Sevastopol as Russian.
With all the positivity of such actions, it is necessary to understand that this will create a lot of problems. In our realities, deepened economic integration will mean a large-scale entry of Russian large business into Belarus with the absorption of its state and municipal property, which will cause an ambiguous reaction of the local population. Many debugged business schemes in this country in this country will be covered with a copper basin.
Minsk recognition of Crimea and Sevastopol as Russian with a high degree of probability will lead to the fact that the regime of international sanctions will also apply to Belarus. Moreover, the problems of the Belarusian economy will fully fall on the shoulders of the Russian budget. We are not some kind of colonialists, like the British or the French, who are only able to pump out income from overseas possessions.
And finally, the creation of a common Parliament legally means the loss of sovereignty by Minsk, since union legislation will, by definition, have an advantage over national legislation. It can be assumed that this will not cause delight among some Belarusian elites and nationalist-minded movements. By the way, their opinion may give occasion to Alexander Grigorievich to reverse the course at any stage of integration.
In general, these problems are serious, but solvable. The only question is the price that Russia will be ready to pay for the creation of a real Union state.
So, Belarus did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, nor the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with the Russian Federation. Also, the Belarusian authorities are restrained and hostile to the events in the Donbass, providing their capital as a platform for settlement. President Lukashenko does not want the appearance of a full-fledged military base of the Russian Defense Ministry on his territory.
Unexpectedly for many, and in Minsk in the first place, Moscow last year sharply intensified in the field of transforming the Union State from a “paper” into a real one. The so-called “tax maneuver” in the domestic oil industry was used as a pressure tool. Under the new conditions, Belarusian refineries and the usual business of re-exporting Russian hydrocarbons have lost their competitive advantages. Alexander Grigoryevich habitually gathered himself in Moscow, but perhaps for the first time he received a refusal there and an ultimatum that made him angrily declare pressure on him and "a threat to sovereignty from the East."
There is a rather interesting theory according to which, in 2024, Vladimir Putin can move from the chair of the President of the Russian Federation to a level higher, at the head of the Union State. But for this, such a supranational construction must exist realistically, and not on paper. And so, the last few days have passed under the sign of negotiations between Putin and Lukashenko, at which the fate of the Union State was discussed. It is very significant that Alexander Grigorievich preferred Munich to a three-day meeting in Sochi, where, in between negotiations, he skated with the Russian president and played hockey. Did the heads of two states reach a compromise?
Alexander Lukashenko made a very mixed statement:
We are ready to go so far in unity, in the unification of our efforts, states and peoples, as far as you are prepared. Listen, we can unite together tomorrow, we have no problems. But are Russians and Belarusians ready? That is the question.
The position is quite convenient, because it makes it possible to turn back at any time, citing Belarusian public opinion. In some ways, this reminds one of Vladimir Putin’s statements regarding the Kuril Islands, according to which the solution of the territorial issue should be supported by the Russian and Japanese peoples.
What can we talk about? How deeply should Russia and Belarus integrate within the framework of this Union State itself? And how equal can the unification of large and small economies be? Bogdan Bezpalko, a member of the Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations, voices the following very real steps by Russia and Belarus towards each other:
1. Deep integration in the field economicsincluding the introduction of a common currency.
2. The introduction of a common citizenship and a single passport for Russians and Belarusians.
3. The creation of a common Parliament of the Union State.
4. Coordination of the foreign policy of Moscow and Minsk, including the recognition by Belarus of Crimea and Sevastopol as Russian.
With all the positivity of such actions, it is necessary to understand that this will create a lot of problems. In our realities, deepened economic integration will mean a large-scale entry of Russian large business into Belarus with the absorption of its state and municipal property, which will cause an ambiguous reaction of the local population. Many debugged business schemes in this country in this country will be covered with a copper basin.
Minsk recognition of Crimea and Sevastopol as Russian with a high degree of probability will lead to the fact that the regime of international sanctions will also apply to Belarus. Moreover, the problems of the Belarusian economy will fully fall on the shoulders of the Russian budget. We are not some kind of colonialists, like the British or the French, who are only able to pump out income from overseas possessions.
And finally, the creation of a common Parliament legally means the loss of sovereignty by Minsk, since union legislation will, by definition, have an advantage over national legislation. It can be assumed that this will not cause delight among some Belarusian elites and nationalist-minded movements. By the way, their opinion may give occasion to Alexander Grigorievich to reverse the course at any stage of integration.
In general, these problems are serious, but solvable. The only question is the price that Russia will be ready to pay for the creation of a real Union state.
Information