What unites Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping?
US President Donald Trump in his traditional address to Congress on the Situation in the Country promised to reconsider the approach to America’s participation in wars.
- said Trump.
Observers and political figures from Russia, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Venezuela will obviously react to this statement by the American leader with evil humor, the degree of irritation of which will undoubtedly depend on which economicThe material and humanitarian damage caused to these countries as a result of the ongoing undeclared US wars against their foreign opponents.
We note, however, that the words of Donald Trump are addressed to the American audience - politicians and voters, and not to the foreign political opponents of the White House at all, and appeal to the classical values of American isolationism. I am a supporter of America’s isolationist policy, Trump says, and I’m acting, and I’m going to act as an isolationist.
Trump's recognition explains a lot in the fate of the INF Treaty, against the background of the complete destruction of which the current Oval Office resident turns to America.
Compared to another strategic international agreement, the ABM Treaty, from which the United States unilaterally withdrew many years ago, wishing to create missile defense against attacks by single missiles from Iran, the DPRK, etc., the suspension by the Americans of their participation in the INF Treaty is logically justified cannot, because if in a certain region Washington considers it necessary to deploy a larger number of medium and shorter range missiles, it is always easy to do this by increasing the number of missile launchers for sea and air bases IAOD, which are not subject to any restrictions. Perhaps such a solution would not have cost more than the actual restoration of the ground-based component of the INF, or would have been much cheaper at all.
Here it is worth recalling that it is for the American isolationists that an approach is characteristic: no agreement is better than a bad agreement. It was this justification, by the way, that Donald Trump cited about a year ago, announcing the US withdrawal from a nuclear deal with Iran. Since it is impossible to find other reasonable explanations for American policy regarding the INF Treaty, the isolationist thesis remains the only suitable one: no deal is better than an unsatisfactory deal. That is, it makes no sense to preserve the INF Treaty if China cannot be attracted to it.
Meanwhile, such an approach, “all or nothing,” in international relations, is quite rational if the strongest side proceeds from the tacit assumption that the opponent, or opponents, in any case fail to create really serious problems.
An example of a refusal to conclude an agreement, if it was not possible to reach its acceptable parameters, are the negotiations of the USA, Great Britain and Japan in 1934 on the limitation of naval weapons. Tokyo set its condition for participation in the negotiations to recognize its right to parity in naval tonnage with the United States and Great Britain, while Washington sought to limit the Japanese to 60%, at best 70% of the American tonnage. Although the American side refused to negotiate a new maritime agreement, and Japan officially denounced the Washington agreement a few weeks later, freeing itself from its limitations, neither by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, nor did the Japanese navy achieve parity with the American. and overall, it was rather easily overwhelmed by the latter.
The concept of American isolationism also implies an extremely negative attitude towards the participation of US troops in operations outside the American zone of interests (in the views of isolationists it is traditionally limited to the Western Hemisphere, according to the Monroe Doctrine), which, in fact, Donald Trump adheres to quite consistently during his presidential term - from statements about the withdrawal of US troops from Syria to threats of withdrawal from NATO and reduce the level of military presence in South Korea and Japan.
Of course, isolationism in the second decade of the 1920st century is not equal, and cannot be in all manifestations similar to the isolationist policy of America in the 1930th century, or in the XNUMXs and XNUMXs. US foreign military bases are too large a set of tangible assets for Washington to allow itself to completely distance itself from protecting its interests and active politics in the regions where American bases are located.
Trump's isolationism is rather good news for Moscow and Beijing, than bad. A course on the values of classical isolationism shows that Donald Trump is no less a revisionist and nationalist than Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. And this means that in approaching international affairs, the new Big Three unites much more than divides.
Also, in the spirit of American isolationism, the rhetoric of military confrontation with strong opponents is and will be used for domestic use in the United States and as an element of the international political game, but not as a real scenario. For the United States to take part in real hostilities abroad, it will take something like World War II or World War II without American participation in the first two to three years.
I promised a new approach, while still a presidential candidate. Great countries do not engage in endless wars
- said Trump.
Observers and political figures from Russia, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Venezuela will obviously react to this statement by the American leader with evil humor, the degree of irritation of which will undoubtedly depend on which economicThe material and humanitarian damage caused to these countries as a result of the ongoing undeclared US wars against their foreign opponents.
We note, however, that the words of Donald Trump are addressed to the American audience - politicians and voters, and not to the foreign political opponents of the White House at all, and appeal to the classical values of American isolationism. I am a supporter of America’s isolationist policy, Trump says, and I’m acting, and I’m going to act as an isolationist.
Trump's recognition explains a lot in the fate of the INF Treaty, against the background of the complete destruction of which the current Oval Office resident turns to America.
Compared to another strategic international agreement, the ABM Treaty, from which the United States unilaterally withdrew many years ago, wishing to create missile defense against attacks by single missiles from Iran, the DPRK, etc., the suspension by the Americans of their participation in the INF Treaty is logically justified cannot, because if in a certain region Washington considers it necessary to deploy a larger number of medium and shorter range missiles, it is always easy to do this by increasing the number of missile launchers for sea and air bases IAOD, which are not subject to any restrictions. Perhaps such a solution would not have cost more than the actual restoration of the ground-based component of the INF, or would have been much cheaper at all.
Here it is worth recalling that it is for the American isolationists that an approach is characteristic: no agreement is better than a bad agreement. It was this justification, by the way, that Donald Trump cited about a year ago, announcing the US withdrawal from a nuclear deal with Iran. Since it is impossible to find other reasonable explanations for American policy regarding the INF Treaty, the isolationist thesis remains the only suitable one: no deal is better than an unsatisfactory deal. That is, it makes no sense to preserve the INF Treaty if China cannot be attracted to it.
Meanwhile, such an approach, “all or nothing,” in international relations, is quite rational if the strongest side proceeds from the tacit assumption that the opponent, or opponents, in any case fail to create really serious problems.
An example of a refusal to conclude an agreement, if it was not possible to reach its acceptable parameters, are the negotiations of the USA, Great Britain and Japan in 1934 on the limitation of naval weapons. Tokyo set its condition for participation in the negotiations to recognize its right to parity in naval tonnage with the United States and Great Britain, while Washington sought to limit the Japanese to 60%, at best 70% of the American tonnage. Although the American side refused to negotiate a new maritime agreement, and Japan officially denounced the Washington agreement a few weeks later, freeing itself from its limitations, neither by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, nor did the Japanese navy achieve parity with the American. and overall, it was rather easily overwhelmed by the latter.
The concept of American isolationism also implies an extremely negative attitude towards the participation of US troops in operations outside the American zone of interests (in the views of isolationists it is traditionally limited to the Western Hemisphere, according to the Monroe Doctrine), which, in fact, Donald Trump adheres to quite consistently during his presidential term - from statements about the withdrawal of US troops from Syria to threats of withdrawal from NATO and reduce the level of military presence in South Korea and Japan.
Of course, isolationism in the second decade of the 1920st century is not equal, and cannot be in all manifestations similar to the isolationist policy of America in the 1930th century, or in the XNUMXs and XNUMXs. US foreign military bases are too large a set of tangible assets for Washington to allow itself to completely distance itself from protecting its interests and active politics in the regions where American bases are located.
Trump's isolationism is rather good news for Moscow and Beijing, than bad. A course on the values of classical isolationism shows that Donald Trump is no less a revisionist and nationalist than Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. And this means that in approaching international affairs, the new Big Three unites much more than divides.
Also, in the spirit of American isolationism, the rhetoric of military confrontation with strong opponents is and will be used for domestic use in the United States and as an element of the international political game, but not as a real scenario. For the United States to take part in real hostilities abroad, it will take something like World War II or World War II without American participation in the first two to three years.
Information