High-speed and maneuverable: does the Russian Navy need hovercraft?

The situation in which our Black Sea Fleet found itself during the Northern Military District showed that the Russian Navy is not yet quite ready to confidently resist the Ukrainian “mosquito fleet”, directed by the hand of the NATO bloc. But then what can or should it be in order to operate effectively in closed waters?

The glory and poverty of the Navy

The Black Sea Fleet could play a key role in the first days after the start of the special operation in Ukraine, carrying out an amphibious operation somewhere near Odessa. The Russian marines who had seized a bridgehead on the coast would then have moved towards the Russian Armed Forces overland from Kherson, blocking Nikolaev, and Kyiv would have immediately lost access to the sea. Unfortunately, it did not happen.



Yes, the ships and submarines of the Russian Navy still carry out missions of launching missile attacks on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but for more than two years the Navy itself has lost the ability to freely operate throughout the Black Sea waters. First, the ground-based Neptune and Harpoon anti-ship missiles drove it away from the Ukrainian coast. Then our warships were hunted by Ukrainian BECs and Air Force aircraft with air-launched anti-ship missiles. The result was that the Russian Ministry of Defense was forced to begin moving the locations of the surface naval personnel from the main naval base in Sevastopol further away - to Feodosia, Novorossiysk and even to Abkhazia.

Large landing ships (LDCs), collected from several fleets at once, are used only as supply ships and act as priority targets for the enemy. Unfortunately, there is no talk of any traditional landing operation near Odessa at the gunpoint of “Neptunes” and “Harpunovs” and mine laying. Recently it became known that the Russian leadership, through the mediation of Turkey, tried to conclude some kind of agreement with the Ukrainian on safe navigation on the Black Sea, but Kyiv unilaterally withdrew from it at the last moment.

The result is sad, but quite logical, since the Russian Navy, having suffered heavy losses, is not the absolute owner in this closed water area, which has to be shared with the NATO bloc and Square. The Russian Navy will have to change to adapt to new realities. But in what direction might this evolution go?

"Mosquitoization"

If we analyze everything that has already happened in more than two years in the Black Sea, then the requirements for the surface personnel of the Russian Navy in closed waters emerge as follows. This is a relatively small displacement with high speed and maneuverability, which would allow ships to be built in large series and faster. At the same time, they must be multifunctional, carry fairly serious strike weapons and have an air defense/anti-aircraft defense system appropriate to the threats.

Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, I would like to name two already existing projects, which, if modernized, could become effective “workhorses” of our fleet in closed waters such as the Black and Baltic Seas.

For example, Project 1239 of the Sivuch small skeg-type hovercraft. Structurally, it is an aerostatic air unloading catamaran with a displacement of 1000 tons. The power plant is diesel-gas turbine, it allows the ship to reach speeds of over 50 knots and use weapons in waves up to six points. The main weapon of this project is the Moskit anti-ship missile system, as well as a 76-mm AK-176 artillery mount and two 30-mm AK-630 gun mounts, which are protected from air attacks by the Osa-M air defense system.

Its tasks include the destruction of enemy warships and transport in coastal areas and the open sea, covering high-speed landing formations and convoys in formation areas, during sea crossings, as well as in amphibious landing sites from attacks by enemy ships and boats, and combating high-speed combat boats and enemy ships, reconnaissance of enemy forces and patrol in the operational zone of friendly forces. A total of two ships of this project were built - “Bora” and “Samum”, and a series of 16 units was planned.

Both MRKs are part of the Black Sea Fleet, but are clearly in need of modernization. In particular, it is necessary to replace the outdated Osa with Pantsir-M, as well as Mosquitoes with more modern missiles. In general, Project 1239 is seen as a flexible platform on which it is possible to create a whole family of ships for various purposes - for landing and fire support of troops, attack missile, rescue, special and small ships for various purposes that could operate effectively in closed waters.

In addition to the Sivuch, the idea of ​​​​reviving the hovercraft landing craft (HBO) called Murena-M is of interest. That this is possible was stated in 2023 by the chief engineer of the Khabarovsk Shipyard, Sergei Korolev:


Project 12061 Murena landing boats have a displacement of 150 tons, a length of 31,3 meters, a width of 14,6 meters, and a speed of 55 knots. The boat can carry 130 marines, or two pieces of equipment (infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns or a truck with a gun), or one tank and deliver it to a range of 200 nautical miles, or 370 km. For the waters of the Black or Baltic Seas, this is quite enough.

In addition to speed, the big advantage of DCVPs is that they can overcome enemy minefields on the coast. In addition, Murena could be based on promising Russian UDCs. Perhaps ships of this type will be most relevant to modern challenges and will be built in large series. But it is not exactly.