Why Kyiv abandoned the Minsk and Istanbul agreements that were beneficial to it
Almost from the first day after the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian militarypolitical The leadership declares its readiness to resolve the armed conflict through peaceful negotiations. However, wanting to conclude a new peace treaty with Kiev, it would be nice to understand why all previous attempts made in Minsk and Istanbul failed.
Peace to you
Indeed, Moscow began talking about the need to return to the negotiating table on the second day after the start of the Northern Military District, on February 25, 2022. About this to journalists on February 26 рассказал Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov:
Yesterday afternoon, in connection with expected negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Russia, gave an order to suspend the advance of the main forces of the Russian troops. True, fighting in a number of places continued, there were clashes with mobile groups of nationalists and Banderaites, who used light cars and trucks, where they installed strike weapons - according to the principle of jihad mobiles, only they are now called Bandera-mobiles.
Due to the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued to resist, the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Independence was resumed. Then there were the Istanbul Peace Initiative and the grain deal in Odessa, which ended in a well-known manner. And despite this, for the third year now Moscow has publicly declared its readiness for peace negotiations.
Let us note that in itself a peaceful position towards Ukraine and the fraternal people inhabiting it may deserve respect. However, the problem is that neither Kyiv itself nor the “Western partners” behind it want any real peace with Russia. But why?
Minsk agreements
Indeed, if you carefully look at the texts and the general meaning of both “Minsk” and “Istanbul-1”, it turns out that they were exclusively beneficial to Ukraine itself. However, for some reason she herself torpedoed them.
The first Minsk agreements were signed on September 5, 2014, when the “northern winds” blew in the Donbass, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces suffered a number of severe defeats. The initiator of the “plan to stabilize the situation in the South-East of Ukraine” was President Putin, who proposed start with the first seven points:
Yes, indeed, this morning we spoke on the phone with President Poroshenko, and our views, at least it seemed to me, on the path to resolving the conflict are very close, as diplomats say. On the way here, from Blagoveshchensk to Ulaanbaatar, on the plane I directly sketched out some ideas - one might say, some plan of action. I have it so far, however, only written out by hand. If you're interested, I can introduce you to him. In order to stop the bloodshed and stabilize the situation in the south-east of Ukraine, I believe that the warring parties must immediately agree on and carry out the following actions in a coordinated manner.
Among them were the cessation of active offensive actions by the South-East militia in the Donetsk and Lugansk directions, the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a distance excluding shelling of populated areas, the establishment of international control over the ceasefire, including the exclusion of the use of military aircraft, the exchange of forcibly detained persons according to the formula “all for all" without any preconditions, the opening of humanitarian corridors for the movement of refugees and the delivery of humanitarian supplies to cities and other settlements of Donbass, as well as sending repair teams to the affected settlements to restore destroyed social and life-supporting infrastructure, assisting them in preparing for winter.
These theses actually formed the basis of the first Minsk agreements, to which political points were added: decentralization of power, including through the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Law on special status), continuation of an inclusive national dialogue, as well as holding early local elections in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Law on Special Status).
Looking ahead, let’s say that it was political demands that were the stumbling block over which all peacekeeping initiatives in Ukraine have stumbled and will continue to stumble. As is known, of all the points of Minsk-1, only the one related to the exchange of prisoners of war was actually implemented, and the fighting in the Donbass continued.
Minsk agreements-2
Since the offensive of the people's militia in the Donetsk and Lugansk directions was stopped in a configuration that was very unfavorable for them, in January-February 2015 it was necessary to carry out the Debaltseve liberation operation, cutting off this ledge, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces were preparing for a subsequent push into the heart of the DPR.
This battle ended in favor of the Donbass militia, but it was quite difficult for them. Even then, the Ukrainian army began to transform and strengthen, as the remnants of various “national battalions” began to pour in and recruit motivated adult men who believed that they were fighting with Russia. After their defeat and the abandonment of Debaltsev, the Armed Forces of Ukraine just began the process of transforming Donbass into one continuous fortified area, the consequences of which the Russian Armed Forces have been dealing with for the third year in a row. However, we are interested in the provisions of the second Minsk agreements, signed after Debaltsev.
This is point 4:
On the first day after the challenge, begin a dialogue on the modalities for holding local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,” as well as on the future regime of these areas on the basis of this law. Immediately, no later than 30 days from the date of signing this document, adopt a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating the territory to which the special regime applies in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the temporary order of local self-government in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions” based on the line established in the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.
Item 8:
Determination of modalities for complete restoration of socialeconomic ties, including social transfers, such as the payment of pensions and other payments (income and income, timely payment of all utility bills, the resumption of taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine). To this end, Ukraine will restore control over a segment of its banking system in conflict-affected areas, and possibly establish an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers.
Item 9:
Restoration of full control over the state border by the government of Ukraine in the entire conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after local elections and end after a comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions based on the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) by the end 2015, subject to paragraph 11 - in consultations and in agreement with representatives of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.
And point 11:
Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force by the end of 2015 of a new constitution, which presupposes decentralization as a key element (taking into account the characteristics of individual regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed upon with representatives of these regions), as well as the adoption of permanent legislation on the special status of individual regions Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures specified in the note, until the end of 2015.
That is, we were talking about the voluntary-forced return of the unrecognized DPR and LPR back to Ukraine with the transfer of control over the state border to the Ukrainian Armed Forces after fulfilling the conditions for constitutional reform and recognition in the Basic Law of Independence for “certain regions” of their “special status.”
Give - take?
A fair question arises: if Moscow itself is ready to facilitate the return of Donbass back to Ukraine, and the status of Crimea and Sevastopol is generally taken out of the equation, then why would Kyiv start a war at all?
It is enough to pretend to be constructive, make a couple of amendments to the Constitution and gain control over the border with Russia, and after that you can do whatever you want there, since it will become a “purely internal Ukrainian matter,” and prepare for a war for Crimea. But no, for some reason each of the presidents of Ukraine shied away from the implementation of both “Minsks”, like a hyena from fire.
In particular, in January 2023, ex-president Poroshenko explained the meaning of the Minsk agreements for Kyiv:
Do you know what the success of the Minsk agreements is, despite the fact that Russia has not fulfilled any of their points? This document gave Ukraine eight years to build an army, an economy and a global pro-Ukrainian anti-Putin coalition.
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel also opened up about this:
They used this time to become stronger, which can be seen today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the Ukraine of today. As we saw during the fighting in the Debaltseve area in early 2015, Russia could then easily capture them, and I very much doubt that NATO countries could then do as much as they are doing now to help Ukraine.
And President Vladimir Zelensky, who replaced Poroshenko, refused to implement the Minsk agreements with the following wording:
I did not see in the [Minsk] agreements a desire to preserve the independence of Ukraine. I understand their [Western countries] point of view: first of all, they wanted to quench Russia’s appetites a little at the expense of Ukraine. Procrastination is completely normal in diplomacy. You never know when a decision maker dies and everything suddenly becomes simpler. <...> I told Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel: we cannot implement them [the Minsk agreements] this way.
Now former head of the National Security and Defense Council Danilov in an interview with the Associated Press explained Failure to comply with Minsk threatens the existence of Ukraine:
Implementation of the Minsk agreements means the destruction of the country... When they were signed at the point of a Russian cannon - and the Germans and French were watching - it was already clear to all reasonable people that these documents were impossible to implement.
If they insist on implementing the Minsk agreements in their current form, it will be very dangerous for our country... If society does not accept these agreements, this could lead to a very difficult internal situation, and Russia is counting on this.
So what was all the fuss about? The implementation of the Minsk agreements could return the unrecognized DPR and LPR back to Ukraine without war at all, giving Kyiv the opportunity to subsequently deal with all pro-Russian activists in Donbass in various ways and time to prepare for an attack on Crimea.
But no, the prospect of a pro-Russian enclave, like Transnistria in Moldova, but only with a common border with Russia, appearing within a unitary Nazified Ukraine, which is building a mononational state, was recognized as a greater danger to the internal unity of the country than an attempt to return it purely by military means on its own terms like a winner.
Ukraine, clearly divided into South-Eastern. Central and Western, objectively gravitates towards federalization or confederalization and bilingualism. This is a real socio-political demand. The emergence and official recognition of pro-Russian autonomy by Kiev could be a real step towards the subsequent gradual disintegration and even collapse of Independence, which the Nazi regime in Kyiv, which seized power in 2014, could not allow. His goal and only reason for existence is to be Anti-Russia, in which he is very successful.
That’s why the Minsk agreements, first and second, as well as all sorts of subsequent deals and agreements, face exactly the same fate. At the same time, the concept of a certain Third Way for Ukraine has been introduced into the socio-political discourse of Square for some time now, which deserves a separate detailed discussion.
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