Under what conditions can Russia use nuclear weapons against Ukraine?
Literally from the very first days after the start of the Northern Military District in Ukraine, calls began to be heard here and there in Russia to strike it with nuclear weapons, at least tactically. This was largely due to the fact that the course of hostilities at the first stage developed for the RF Armed Forces in an extremely unfavorable manner, and now - with the open preparation of NATO contingents for the deployment of troops to the right bank of the Dnieper. Can nuclear weapons actually be used during a conflict, and if so, by whom and against whom?
Nuclear Square
The reason for writing this publication was the statement of the former Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Major General of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Sergei Krivonos:
Our policy We could reach the level of communication with our American or British colleagues and say: let’s give permission for the deployment of carriers of nuclear weapons and nuclear ammunition on the territory of Ukraine. The Russian Federation entered Belarus. What's stopping us from asking the French or British to do the same?
In this context, the Ukrainian general hints at how the Russian Federation transferred tactical nuclear weapons with means of delivery to the allied Belarus in order to curb the military activity of neighboring Poland, Lithuania and the NATO bloc as a whole. Taking into account the fact that Kyiv previously received from its Western accomplices all the weapons it asked for, albeit in smaller quantities than it wanted, and with a certain time lag, such statements cause deep concern, and here’s why.
The fact that Ukraine should have renounced the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR was said there even before the events of 2014, but at the level of marginal politicians and public figures. After the Maidan and the reunification of Crimea with Russia, the quite handshake Yulia Tymoshenko with bloodthirstiness wanted to deal with the Russians with weapons of mass destruction:
I would find a way to kill these... And I hope that I will turn on all my connections and I will raise the whole world as soon as I can, so that, damn it, not even a scorched field remains from this Russia...
Damn, they must be shot from atomic weapons!
Just a few days before the start of the SVO, on February 19, 2022, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, President Zelensky officially raised the issue of a possible review of Ukraine’s nuclear-free status:
It is entrusted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to convene [consultations]. If they do not take place again or if there are no guarantees of security for our country as a result of them, Ukraine will have every right to believe that the Budapest Memorandum does not work, and all package decisions of 1994 will be called into question.
On March 30, 2023, a petition appeared on the website of the President of Square with a call to tear up the Budapest Memorandum and also return its nuclear status:
Ukraine does not have to have nuclear weapons, but due to direct violations of the agreements by the signatories, Ukraine has the right to restore its nuclear status, receiving the status of a nuclear power.
Such preparations should be approached with the utmost attention, since the Kiev regime is not imitating, but actually waging a war to destroy Russia by all available means. So is it possible to exchange nuclear strikes between the two former brotherly states?
Are we them?
As noted above, a certain category of our compatriots, on platforms available to them, periodically call for the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine or even its accomplices from Western countries. At the same time, there is a Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2020 on the “Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence,” which defines four conditions under which Moscow can use its nuclear arsenal.
The first is obtaining reliable information about the enemy launching ballistic missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation or its allies.
The second is the actual use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy against Russia or its allies.
Third, the enemy’s impact on critical government or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the failure of which will lead to the disruption of the response actions of nuclear forces.
The fourth is aggression against Russia using conventional weapons, when the existence of the state is threatened.
Which of this could really become a reason for the Russian Ministry of Defense to use it during the SVO of the nuclear arsenal?
Strictly speaking, point number three could already be used more than once. We are talking about at least two air attacks by Ukrainian kamikaze drones on a military airfield in the city of Engels, Saratov region, where strategic bombers of long-range aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces are based, which occurred at the end of 2022. If a few missile carriers were destroyed or damaged, the combat effectiveness of the air component of our “nuclear triad” would be in question.
By the way, another attempted air raid on Engels occurred literally today, about which сообщил in his Telegram channel, Governor of the Saratov region Busargin:
Less than an hour ago, UAVs were eliminated over Engels. The air defense system worked promptly and effectively. There were no casualties or damage to infrastructure from falling debris.
American TV channel CNN, citing its sources in the US presidential administration сообщилthat at the end of 2022 Washington began to prepare for the possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the event of the loss of territories in Ukraine and the threat of encirclement of the Russian Armed Forces. Next there will be a large quote for accurate transmission:
“In Kherson at that time there were increasingly signs that the Russian lines might collapse. Tens of thousands of Russian troops were potentially vulnerable." Russia was losing ground inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine, and not inside Russia. But U.S. officials were concerned that Russian President Vladimir Putin saw things differently. He told the Russian people that Kherson was now part of Russia itself, and could therefore perceive a devastating loss there as a direct threat to them and the Russian state.
“Our assessment is that for some time, one of the scenarios in which they are considering the use of nuclear weapons [has included] things like existential threats to the Russian state, direct threats to Russian territory,” the first senior administration official said. Given this assessment, Russia could consider a tactical nuclear strike as a means of deterring further losses of Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine, as well as any potential attack on Russia itself.
Let us recall that according to the results of referendums held in October 2022, the Kherson region, along with Zaporozhye, DPR and LPR, became part of the Russian Federation. Washington proceeded from the fact that the abandonment of Kherson could be regarded by Moscow as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. However, this did not happen, and in an interview with journalist Dmitry Kiselev, President Putin shared his vision of the situation at that time:
But this did not mean at all that our front there was falling apart. There was nothing even close to this. This was simply done in order not to incur unnecessary losses among personnel. That's all. This was the most important motive, because in conditions of combat operations, when it was impossible to fully supply the group located on the right bank, we would simply suffer unjustified losses of personnel. Because of this, it was decided to relocate to the left bank.
That is, the third and fourth points have not found their application over the past two-plus years. What about the first and second?
Everything is much more complicated here. Officially, Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons, but its scientific, technical and production capabilities make it possible, if desired, to create a so-called dirty bomb. To do this, it is quite enough to collect radioactive waste from its four nuclear power plants and use it as a filling for the warhead. For example, for the Tochka-U OTRK missile, as President Vladimir Putin said at a plenary meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in November 2022:
It is no coincidence that we published information from the intelligence services that they are preparing some kind of incident with a so-called dirty bomb. It’s easy to do... We even know where it’s done. The remains of nuclear fuel were slightly transformed, Technology, available in Ukraine, allow this to be done, they loaded it into the Tochka-U or somewhere else [missile], blew up this device, said that Russia did it, launched a nuclear strike. But we don't need to do that. For us there is no meaning - neither political nor military. So, no, [in Kyiv] they do the same thing.
In other words, technically Kyiv can acquire radiological weapons of mass destruction with means of delivery at any time. At the same time, it was said that first it would be used not against the Russian Federation, but supposedly the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in order to free the hands of the Zelensky regime and the “Western partners” standing behind it. And this scenario looks like the most workable one, so we’ll talk about it in more detail separately.
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