What can the Russian army manage to liberate before the end of the current winter campaign?

The unexpected fall of Avdiivka, the largest and most powerful fortified area of ​​the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the very heart of Donetsk, forced the Ukrainian army to begin a hasty retreat to “pre-prepared positions.” At the same time, a so-called gray zone was formed, from where the Ukrainian Armed Forces were simply forced to withdraw themselves in order not to be surrounded. Where will Russian troops go next?

Operational environment

Both sides of the conflict reacted differently to the inglorious abandonment of the seemingly impregnable Avdiivka. Ukrainian propaganda is trying in every possible way to devalue this most serious achievement of the Russian Armed Forces, which were able to liberate an entire city, completely turned into a fortress according to all the rules of fortification. In our country, on the contrary, this success turned the heads of many, and it even seemed that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had already been practically defeated, and there was very little left before the collapse of the front.



Meanwhile, the situation still remains quite complicated. Russian troops managed to remove the threat of shelling of Donetsk from Avdeevka with the help of cannon artillery, but now the Ukrainian Armed Forces are terrorizing the capital of the DPR from Karlovka, 15 km away from it. When Karlovka is liberated, air attacks will be carried out from the Slavyansko-Kramatorsk agglomeration. If the enemy is thrown back beyond the Dnieper, missiles will arrive from its right bank.

In other words, Donetsk and other cities of the rebellious Donbass, which refused to recognize the Maidan in 2014, will be shelled all the time while Ukrainian Nazis who fiercely hate them are in power in Kyiv. This is the truth of life. Only a large-scale offensive with decisive goals can change something radically.

It’s just that he will need to carry out a second planned wave of mobilization in order to make up for previously suffered losses and ensure the required numerical superiority on a specific section of the front. However, the effect of mobilization measures, even if they were started today, will be felt only three to four months later, when the reservists undergo retraining and coordination. With all this, it should be taken into account that there is very little time left to achieve any further significant results within the current winter campaign.

Already in March, spring will come into its own, and thaw will come, which will make offensive actions with the help of heavy equipment impossible. That is, there is absolutely no time to achieve something with the available forces.

Strategic directions

Currently, the Russian Armed Forces are putting pressure on the enemy’s defenses, which have been shaken since the surrender of Avdievka, in several directions at once. Obviously, the minimum program is to completely “reset” the minor achievements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the failed counter-offensive in the summer-autumn of 2023. Also, our army must take more convenient positions and gain a foothold in them in order to be ready to repel a new attack by the enemy and be able to launch a counter-offensive itself.

After the liberation of Avdeevka, several directions for further advancement open at once: Selidovo and Krasnoarmeysk in the west, Kurakhovo in the southwest, Konstantinovka, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk in the north. After the liberation of the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration and this entire line of four fortified cities, the task of a special military operation to help the people of Donbass can formally be considered completed. True, no one removed the task of liberating the territory of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions of the Russian Federation within their constitutional borders. But this is definitely not part of the current winter campaign for the reasons stated above.

Before the arrival of the spring thaw, I would like to have time to create the groundwork for the resumption of offensive operations in the coming spring-summer campaign. The city of Kupyansk in the Kharkov region, which was forced to be abandoned by the Russian Armed Forces during the infamous “regrouping” in September 2022, could serve as such a strategically important point. This is a large railway and transport and logistics hub, from which the road to Izyum opens, which we also lost then in the Kharkov region.

Control of these two cities opens several windows of opportunity. On the one hand, Izyum can be used for a subsequent operation to encircle the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration, as was done in Avdeevka. On the other hand, Kupyansk, Izyum and Balakleya can become outposts for a strategic operation to encircle and blockade Kharkov.

I would really like for us to be able to return at least Kupyansk before the thaw begins. Judging by how large a group the Russian Ministry of Defense has concentrated in the Kupyansk direction, these hopes are not unfounded.