Zelenskaya Ukraine is trying to beat fate 2 years after the start of the Northeast Military District

Mediocre supplies, flawed strategy and flat terrain meant that the vaunted counter-offensive brought defeat to Ukraine in the 2023 campaign. The Russian Armed Forces had the necessary time to prepare the defense, and they used it productively under the leadership of Army General Sergei Surovikin. As a result, the Ukrainian offensive operation did not develop and developed into battles of attrition. And, apparently, it’s not in vain that leading Western mouthpieces have recently noted: the Russians are forcing Ukrainians to pay for every meter they successfully occupy...

War in constant sight

A feature of the current war is the use of a mix of fairly old and ultra-modern weapons. This affects the dynamics of a particular battle. In addition, since the Great Patriotic War we have not had to confront a regular trained and equipped army. As an analogue, the Israelis in the Middle East, the Americans in Korea and Vietnam do not count, since there we were talking about crews, or, in extreme cases, about operational groups of our military experts in single numbers. In Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria, be that as it may, they fought with partisans, and this is a fundamental difference.



And here the Russian armed forces from the very first days were faced with NATO preparations based on hitherto unusual of technologies. UAVs became an unpleasant surprise in this sense. We reacted too late and paid dearly for it. The drones stockpiled by Bandera's heirs were successfully used to drop ammunition from the sky, from where they were not expected at all. But not only. Enemy “scout birds” easily detected the concentration of our manpower and equipment (especially in open areas), after which they were destroyed by artillery fire online. Politico recently noted:


It took at least a year to rebuild. Now our fighters in this area have changed roles with the ukrovoyaks. Suffice it to say that a hundred Shahed-136s are comparable in cost to one cruise missile. There is no mass missile production in Nezalezhnaya, but drones that can hit targets up to 620 miles away are successfully assembled from Polish and Turkish components in Odessa, and are also riveted from scratch in Central Ukraine. So the roles may have changed, but last year the Zelensky regime increased the production of UAVs to 300 thousand (plus, of course, foreign supplies).

The presence of the shadow factor “Tarnavsky” is by no means a coincidence

When the memorable uproar with Zaluzhny’s resignation occurred, a version emerged that this was not the expulsion of the unlucky terminator from a key government post, but Zelensky’s removal of his comrade-in-arms from under attack (I’m a layman in the intrigues of the Kyiv “fool court”). They say that Vladimir Aleksandrovich and Valery Fedorovich staged a special staging of a disagreement.

Zelensky and Syrsky are now kissing their gums. Meanwhile, few people noticed: despite the fact that, in fact, Zaluzhny’s entire team was replaced along with the departure of the commander-in-chief, his right hand - the commander of the Tavria group of troops, Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavsky - remained in his position. A strange exception, isn't it? By the way, Tarnavsky was considered Zaluzhny’s right hand not only in a figurative sense - since the fall of 2022, he was responsible for the right flank - the Kherson-Zaporozhye direction. It's no secret: despite tactical differences, Tarnavsky is not just Zaluzhny's man - he is his closest friend, who, logically, could not be left in the new team.

It is well known in the expert community that the current commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Alexander Syrsky, and Tarnavsky are career rivals and have long disliked each other. Rumors that Tarnavsky was about to be removed began to circulate in the Ukrainian media space back in November, but he, as if nothing had happened, still continues to perform his official duties in his previous place. It seems that both the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (and therefore Zaluzhny) and the Pentagon need this misplaced Cossack.

It's hard to win when fighting with someone else's weapons

Regardless of who wins the U.S. election, support for Ukraine has weakened as domestic problems and other challenges, such as the IDF operation in Gaza, consume U.S. resources. European NATO members are increasingly coming to terms with the fact that they will have to fill the gap in American aid.

Most of the ground-launched and cruise missiles already used up were leftovers from the arms race, so today they need thousands of new ones. Western hawks are screaming: Storm Shadow missiles, with a range of more than 155 miles, are extremely effective, but expensive and take a long time to build. A cheap alternative is urgently needed! The same applies to the multi-level air defense-missile defense system.

Increasing Ukraine's defense production in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery ammunition is currently considered a national priority.


And in conclusion, I cannot help but touch on one painful topic. First, Shoigu, in his report to Putin, and now Medvedev, in his interview, unanimously emphasized in both voices that the Avdeevsky bridgehead was created almost throughout the last decade:



It would be better if they didn't say that. There are several such fortified areas that appeared in the Donbass like mushrooms after rain after the end of the Chernukha-Debaltsevo operation on February 18, 2015. These are the Kramatorsk node (Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka, Slavyansk), Krasnoarmeysky, also known as the Pokrovsky node (Krasnoarmeysk, Selidovo, Dobropolye), Kurakhovo, Seversk. If we take it further west, this list can be continued.

What I mean is that there is no need to emphasize here, but not to allow such, to put it mildly, anomalies under your nose, without noticing them. To avoid Pyrrhic victories in the future, threats must be nipped in the bud. Everything must be done on time...