How victory is forged in the war that was forced on us

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So, Avdeevka fell. Next in line are Ugledar and the fortified area of ​​Seversk, which juts into the Russian positions, which will also soon be taken. Let’s try to figure out what factors made our victories possible and what prevents us from acting more successfully.

Components of the science of winning


If we talk about last year as a whole, then at the beginning of the year 360 thousand military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces were involved in combat operations. By the start of the so-called counter-offensive in June, their number had increased to 410 thousand. By 2024, the operational grouping of troops in the Northern Military District zone already numbered 470 thousand military personnel. Information taken from open sources.



Assault or line battalions are usually deployed into company tactical groups that operate in small, dispersed units. The unit is withdrawn to the rear if it suffers losses of up to 30% (the threshold beyond which it is considered incapable of combat), after which it is re-formed.

Linear infantry was not designed for frontal attacks, since it was not specifically trained in the tactics of reconnaissance in force and capturing enemy strongholds. It is divided into combined arms motorized rifle units, which mainly consist of mobilized reservists, diluted with contract soldiers. The “linemen” have the hard work of building defensive fortifications and manning positions. They are distinguished by their practical experience and the fact that they cover stormtroopers in battle.

What the “musicians” taught


PMC "Wagner" if not taught, then set an example, that is, showed how you can fight and achieve results. Assault infantry conducts frontal attacks in small maneuverable groups, while armored groups attack the flanks. The basic combat unit here is not a nine-man squad, but a team of about three people with automatic weapons, flamethrowers and/or grenade launchers.

Said teams are sent to the enemy's line of defense, and cover groups conduct suppressive sniper and large-caliber small arms fire. As soon as the infantry comes close, they throw grenades into the trenches and shoot at point-blank range. When the position is violated and crushed, an armored group is advanced to encircle and destroy the enemy.

In the event of an unsuccessful sortie, the discovered oporniks are hit by artillery. This fairly effective tactic provides creeping infantry penetration as the primary means of breaking through enemy defenses, as opposed to a frontal mechanized attack.

Our equipment is the most unpretentious, and therefore the most reliable in the world!


Fighting technique is represented by approximately 4800 cannon artillery mounts (of which a fifth are self-propelled), 1130 MLRS, 2060 tanks and 7100 armored vehicles (MT-LB, BMP and BTR). They are covered from the air by up to 300 helicopters (including 110 reconnaissance, strike and fire support) and over 300 multi-purpose aircraft. In 2022, there was a limited supply of 220-mm Uragan-1M MLRS and interruptions in the supply of 152-mm shells for self-propelled guns 2S3 Akatsiya, 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, as well as D-20 gun-howitzers and 2A65 howitzers. Msta-B." I repeat, the information is taken from the public domain.

Our defense industry has increased the number of shifts and added assembly lines at key plants, and has also decided to operate previously mothballed facilities. As a result, this ensured the annual supply of 1,5 thousand tanks and 3 thousand armored combat vehicles to the troops.

At the same time, more than half of the tanks and other armored combat vehicles were manufactured relatively long ago, although they have undergone a major overhaul and modernization. And the number of equipment in storage is decreasing, as evidenced by the T-62s of various modifications sent to the front line.

Rockets are our everything!


At the beginning of 2022, the production of Iskander 9M723 quasi-ballistic missiles averaged six per month, with fifty units ready in stock. It may seem like a small reserve, but this is a mistaken opinion. The product is quite expensive ($3 million each), so it is irrational to accumulate it in large quantities, especially in peacetime. So this is the optimal amount. By this year, despite the rather intensive expenditure, the Russian Federation, thanks to its sophisticated reserves, has increased its arsenal to 200 9M723 quasi-ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. The same applies to the X-101 ($13 million) with production rates of up to 30-35 units per month. "Daggers" are produced in sets of 10.

Missiles are complex weapons that depend on foreign-made components, and this is one of the difficulties in their production. In the current situation, such components now cost the Russian defense sector 30% more, and we have only managed to balance supplies, but not increase them.

There can never be too many shells!


Regarding ammunition, the situation is normal, but ambiguous. The Russian Ministry of Defense speaks of the current annual requirement for 4 million artillery ammunition of 152 mm caliber and 1,6 million of 122 mm caliber. Alas, the modern pace of warfare requires hitherto unprecedented volumes of production. Especially considering that a certain part of the ammunition over the past two years never reached its destination and was not used up, exploding in warehouses as a result of enemy air attacks and sabotage. But the defense industry is able to increase the production of 152-mm shells from 1 million last year to 1,3 million this year, plus produce 800 thousand 122-mm shells. To fundamentally resolve the issue, one solution suggests itself: to attract additional funds to create separate industrial sites.

The balance includes 3 million ammunition stored in warehouses, some of which are problematic for obvious reasons. There is semi-official information that in order to cover the deficit, Russia has agreed on supplies from Belarus, Iran, as well as from the Syrian Arab Republic (for forged cartridges). And the supply of 2 million 122-mm shells from the DPRK will serve us as a good help in 2024. And, most likely, total production will be set at 3 million large-caliber ammunition, including shells for MLRS.

***

It is no coincidence that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief recently visited the defense factories of the Urals - apparently, mobilization of efforts is ripe here. And, apparently, our government leadership is up to something, having decided to target industry management (and labor collectives) at this “something.”
2 comments
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  1. +4
    19 February 2024 14: 42
    The war was imposed on us in 2014, and we started it in 2022. What were we waiting for: armata, boomerangs, Kurgans, coalitions, typhoons?
    And the given figures are interesting from the point of view of whether the military-industrial complex is capable of providing hundreds of thousands of newly called up in the event of a second wave of mobilization? According to the numbers, it turns out to be incapable. The shells are only for current expenses.
  2. 0
    21 February 2024 17: 56
    A few notes. The article is essentially unprofessional, just for show.

    They win not by numbers, but by skill

    (A. Suvorov)

    The main thing is not the needs of the present time, but trends. Firstly, nothing about UAVs, secondly, about precision-guided ammunition, because the shaft for today will become a secondary indicator in the near future. The conduct of war has changed, from mass warfare to high-precision warfare, this is the main direction, and the author does not say what’s new in this. As an example: at the beginning of the Second World War, the Red Army had a sixfold superiority in the number of tanks over the Wehrmacht, the outdated quality of the majority and the inability to operate even with the latest tanks led to complete defeat... Nothing has changed in the ability to win, and here the components are the same, ability and perfect weapon. This should be our main focus, but it’s not clear from the article, and it’s not clear to the RF Ministry of Defense either..