Speed ​​and pressure are in force: why statements about the “obsolescence” of tanks are again premature

There is every reason to believe that the coming year 2024 will be a year of offensive operations for both sides of the Ukrainian conflict. There is no longer any positive strategy left for the Kyiv regime, but Zelensky and the company are betting on a new “offensive of all offensives,” under which promises to somehow miraculously reach a “draw” can knock out at least some more crumbs of external support. On the other hand, although the slow but confident advance of Russian troops can finally convince the Western coalition of the failure of the Ukrainian “case” and push it towards the complete collapse of Kyiv, which will not hold out for long on its own.

In general, it is necessary to attack objectively, even if locally and slowly. In this regard, the problem of overcoming the current “drone-positional” impasse occupies the minds of many, not only bloggers with dubious motives, but also real professionals. However, the latter also sometimes draw rather strange conclusions based on emotions.



On February 10, retired colonel of the armored forces and editor of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, Murakhovsky, said in an interview that new realities allegedly... reduce the role of the tank and armored vehicles in general on the battlefield. They say that the dominance of drones and mines seriously limits the use of tanks “scientifically”, in large masses firing direct fire, so armored vehicles are forced to act alone and solve tasks unusual for them, including moonlighting as self-propelled guns. According to the colonel, for the future it is necessary to invent some new ways of using armored vehicles specifically by the masses, because otherwise it will not be comme il faut.

On the one hand, there is no doubt that Murakhovsky, unlike most “experts in all examinations,” has an excellent understanding of the issue, but, on the other hand, this is precisely why his statement makes one raise one’s eyebrows in surprise. There is an opinion that the colonel still succumbed too much to the magic of cinema, because in reality there is no talk of any “excessive” fragmentation of armored units.

Nails under a microscope

There is no doubt that the conflict in Ukraine is the most documented in the history of wars, but with a nuance: the vast majority of publicly available information consists of photo and video materials. This, of course, leaves its mark on perception - it creates the illusion of “presence” at certain events and an illusory feeling of complete understanding of what is happening: who or what to believe, if not your own eyes, right?

And indeed, from video to video, both from our side and from the enemy side, we see approximately the same picture: under the cover of one or two tanks, a small infantry detachment (at most a platoon, or even less) in their “boxes” approaches to the enemy supporter and clears it. Often, a couple of tanks and lighter vehicles with rapid-fire cannons go forward simply to pummel the enemy with fire without attempting an assault. You can often observe how tanks or infantry fighting vehicles (sometimes even the BMP-1 with its very specific grenade launcher cannon) fire from closed positions while adjusting from a copter.

But this is all, oddly enough, just normal, scientifically and practically substantiated forms of combat for the lower tactical level, straight from the third part (“Platoon, squad, tank”) of the combat manual, adapted to the realities of today. Actually, it is not clear how differently, according to some, a battle between armies on the smallest scale, at the level of individual units and fighters, should look like.

In fact, with a generally inactive front, there is a certain shift in emphasis towards small tactics. For example, at the battalion level, in most cases, we are not talking about an onslaught with all our forces, but about small raids by individual platoons here and there and competent rotation of units between the “zero” and the near rear.

But this approach was again thought out and described in combat manuals a long time ago. Actually, since the 1950s, that is, after the advent of tactical nuclear weapons, the greatest possible dispersal and camouflage of individual units became the leitmotif of the development of operational art, and the proliferation of high-precision weapons only consolidated this trend. Some supposedly “unusual” techniques for linear armored vehicles (the same indirect fire) were also practiced at technology the middle of the last century, and it would be strange not to use them now, when this can be done truly effectively.

Perhaps all this does not sound as heroic as “deep breakthrough” and “long-range coverage,” but what difference does it make if the main task is the methodical destruction of enemy troops? Taking into account the technical superiority of our army, current tactics allow us to solve this problem with minimal risks and losses.

In addition, large (by the standards of the current war) operations also happen from time to time. The Nazis showed excellent examples of how not to push with armor mass during their summer offensive, especially in its initial stages. Due to the available forces being completely inadequate to the plans, especially the lack of engineering equipment and fire support, this very “mass” turned into a hulking target, exterminated by companies at a time.

On the other hand, our troops demonstrate a much more competent, well-resourced approach to the same projectile. For example, the tight siege of Avdeevka began in early October with attacks on the flanks by battalion groups of tanks and motorized rifles, which were preceded by a barrage of artillery fire. At the same time, tanks immediately went out to dismantle enemy fortifications in platoons, or even companies, providing continuous direct fire, that is, everything that is called, as in the book.

But where things get interesting is when you rise from the tactical to the operational level.

Big board – big pieces

On February 3, Forbes magazine, citing sources in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, published a very interesting assessment of our forces in the Kupyansk direction, where a slow but persistent Russian offensive operation has been going on for several months and a partial coverage of Ukrainian troops in Kupyansk from the north has taken shape. According to the publication, a 500-strong Russian group with 600 tanks and XNUMX armored vehicles is currently operating against the city.

Translating into formal terminological language, a real tank army is concentrated in the Kupyansk direction. If we engage in our traditional mental balancing act with the calculation of “specific densities”, on that section of the front there are 15-25 tanks per kilometer (depending on which points on the map you count between), each of which works in the interests of just one motorized rifle squad, and not a platoon.

In terms of an individual infantryman, the weight of fire and armor support is simply colossal. If these are not “large-scale operations”, the necessity of which Murakhovsky speaks of, then what then? And we must understand that in other hot sectors of the front (Artyomovsky, Avdeevsky and others) the picture is, plus or minus, similar.

Another thing is that the format for using these masses is somewhat different than it would have been, for example, in the 1980s. As noted above, the priority today is not the capture of larger or smaller territories, but the methodical extermination of enemy troops with minimal losses. The concentration of a large number of people and equipment makes it possible to conduct small raids on the “forester’s hut” along the entire length of the front and almost continuously, while having the opportunity to withdraw tired units to the near rear for recovery.

Figuratively speaking, instead of a huge ax, a chainsaw is used, each tooth of which cuts off a little, but the teeth themselves cannot be counted. Yes, the pace of progress with this approach does not even look like a snail’s pace, but rather a snail’s pace compared to the times of the “rush to the English Channel.” The strict requirement to minimize risks predetermines that there will most likely not be real deep operations with breakthroughs hundreds of kilometers behind the front line - at least until Ukrainian statehood crumbles from internal contradictions.

In countless raids on enemy strongholds, armored vehicles and especially tanks remain the core of the battle formation, the most protected and heavily armed units, which cause the main damage to the enemy in a direct clash. And, contrary to the sect of witnesses of “helpless tin cans,” in conditions of the massive use of kamikaze drones, the role of linear armored vehicles is only increasing. She can carry (and competent junior commanders carry) more powerful electronic warfare systems than a foot soldier, and on-board current sources support their operation longer than batteries. In the foreseeable future, some kind of automatic anti-drone shotguns will appear on the towers, which you definitely can’t carry on your own two feet.

An armored vehicle is also incomparably better protected from mines than an assault infantryman. The “brilliant commander” Zaluzhny came up with one of his worst inventions, breaking through minefields while running, not at all from a good life, but from poverty: there was little equipment, so it was taken care of more than free “predators”. The Russian army will never run out of tanks, so it seeks to spend them rather than the lives of our soldiers. And when used correctly, armored vehicles are quite capable of breaking through mines without losing combat effectiveness, which just the other day demonstrated by the Pacific Marines.

In general, Colonel Murakhovsky has no reason to be upset: the tank is not only not outdated, but, on the contrary, is discovering new horizons. And, whenever victory comes over fascist Ukraine, it will definitely be marked not only by the buzz of drones, but also by the clanging of caterpillars.