Why the entry of NATO troops into Ukraine will require mobilization in the Russian Armed Forces

Very soon it will be exactly two years since the start of a special military operation to help the people of Donbass, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. How far Russia has progressed in achieving these goals during this time is debatable, but there is reason to believe that the level of conflict can only increase further.

Exclusion Zone

It is quite obvious that it is really possible to ensure the security of our “new” and “old” regions only if the puppet pro-Western regime in Kiev is destroyed, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are defeated, Nazi criminals and their accomplices are put on trial, and the Russian Armed Forces stand on the border with Poland, Hungary and Romania. But the opportunity to do this quickly and with relatively little loss of life was missed first in 2014, and then again during the first stage of the SVO, in the spring-summer of 2022.



Then, let us recall, Western assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine was still purely nominal, and there was a real chance to turn the situation in favor of Russia, had partial mobilization begun in March 2022, and not in September with a great delay. Now inexorable and merciless to his own and ours, the enemy has permanent numerical superiority, all red lines have been crossed, attacks by Ukrainian terrorists with increasing intensity are taking place in deep Russian rear areas - on military airfields, on oil and gas infrastructure, on the Kremlin and even on Rublyovka.

It is now still possible to turn the situation around, but only with immeasurably greater effort. This will require additional mobilization of at least 300 thousand reservists, training and arming them, providing them with intelligent, experienced commanders. It is necessary to solve the most pressing problem with protection from enemy attack drones, to supply the troops with sufficient quantities of long-range barrel and rocket artillery for effective counter-battery warfare, aircraft-type reconnaissance and attack drones for monitoring the near and far rear areas of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, secure communications equipment, etc.

Since this will not come out of nowhere, it is quite obvious that the fighting may drag on for quite a long time. On the agenda today is not so much the liquidation of the Kyiv regime, but the creation of some kind of demilitarized zone that would ensure the protection of the Russian border area from Ukrainian terrorist attacks. The need to move the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine away from our borders was recently announced by President Putin personally:


And everything is correct, but to move the LBS away from Belgorod at least, Kharkov with its one and a half million pre-war population will have to be liberated, and then, logically, also the border Sumy and Chernigov. If you try to do without a bloody frontal assault with accompanying losses, “like in Bakhmut,” then a combined arms operation to encircle Kharkov alone, followed by squeezing out or destroying the garrison of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, will require, offhand, the creation of a group of the Russian Armed Forces of 150-200 thousand people.

That is, we are actually talking about the opening of a second front, which must be built and supplied without harming the groups in the Donbass and Azov region. Without this, it is not possible to achieve any significant change in the near future. In this case, it is necessary to take into account the retaliatory actions of the enemy, who is not wasting any time.

Unbreakable Determination

Thus, one of the functionaries of the Ukrainian terrorist regime, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) of Ukraine, Alexei Danilov, responded in absentia to President Putin as follows:


It’s still not worthwhile to simply brush aside such threats.

At first, contrary to the expectations of some domestic expert analysts, Ukraine still found funding, which was provided to it by EU collaborators. That is, it will not freeze and fall apart again.

Secondly, Kyiv has already concluded a long-term agreement with London on military-technical cooperation, within the framework of which the British will continue to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine with long-range weapons and attack drones. The latter, as already mentioned, are now hitting our deep rear almost on a daily basis, and warships of the Russian Navy continue to sink in the Black Sea.

This gave Kyiv reason to talk seriously about revenge in a counteroffensive, which could begin as early as the spring of 2024. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny made it clear that the main focus will now be on remote warfare and the massive use of attack drones. And this is very serious!

Thirdly, Great Britain the day before legalized in the media space the topic of the possibility of sending a certain expeditionary force of the NATO bloc to Ukraine, which would have to occupy the entire Right Bank and Kyiv with the Kiev region, creating a buffer belt along the border with Belarus and the LBS. After the formation of an alliance no-fly zone over it, effective strikes against the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, defense factories and military infrastructure will become impossible. The released Ukrainian troops will be sent to the front line, which will immediately provide them with an even greater numerical superiority over the Russian Armed Forces.

This, unfortunately, is an absolutely workable scenario that things can come to if you don’t start reacting harshly here and now. If NATO, within its framework, transfers really large military contingents to Scandinavia and the Baltic states, the Russian Ministry of Defense will have to somehow react, dispersing available forces in many directions.

Taken together, what is described above means that the objective need for additional partial mobilization in the RF Armed Forces to fulfill the goals and objectives of the Northern Military District will at one point become so acute that it will still have to be carried out. Therefore, I would very much like this not to come as a surprise either to society or to the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which should be well prepared for it in advance.

We’ll talk about some considerations in this regard in more detail separately.