Should Russia continue to supply gas to Europe after 2024?
At the end of 2024, the 5-year gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine expires. As stated in Kyiv, they will not extend it further with Gazprom, but the Kremlin intends to retain at least a small part of the European gas market. Are there any chances for this, and is it worth doing it at all?
Expectations and Reality
Let us recall that a transit agreement on gas supplies to Europe was signed with Naftogaz at the end of 2019 for a period of 5 years, which was proclaimed a big victory for Gazprom, as reported by its head Alexey Miller:
After five days of continuous bilateral negotiations in Vienna, final decisions were made and final agreements were reached. At the same time, a whole set of agreements and contracts was signed, and these agreements are truly a big package deal that restored the balance of interests of the parties.
Some of the terms of this agreement were criticized by the expert community, but the main counterargument was that this agreement was positioned almost as the last one, putting an end to the history of the “gas wars” between Russia and Ukraine. Over the next five years, the bypass pipelines “Nord Stream 2” and “Turkish Stream” should have been put into operation, which supposedly would have made the Ukrainian gas transportation system useless to anyone.
As we now know, these plans were not destined to come true. Instead of the “gas” war, a real war began in February 2022, large-scale and bloody. The Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 bypass pipelines were blown up. The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline stopped operating, and Warsaw laid its paw on its Polish section. One of the two transit lines of the Ukrainian gas transportation system was blocked for Russian gas by Kiev itself. Europe has begun the process of replacing hydrocarbon raw materials from our country at the expense of other suppliers.
At the same time, EU countries still continue to receive certain volumes of gas from Russia, as Mr. Miller notified last year:
I still wouldn’t like to give any numbers. Why? Because the molecules in the main gas pipeline do not have a national coloring. <…> And we know that Russian gas is supplied to many countries - those that have declared a refusal to consume Russian gas.
According to him, blue fuel from Gazprom regularly arrives at the Austrian hub in Baumgarten:
You know that this is a very large European hub, from which gas is supplied to other countries of the European Union... Of course, Russian gas is on the European market, not in small volumes. Let me emphasize once again: even in those countries that declare that there is no Russian gas on their national market.
After the main supply channels are blocked, Russian pipeline gas goes to the Old World along one line of the Ukrainian gas transmission system, through Turkey along the bottom of the Black Sea, and also in the form of LNG by sea. In response to the desire expressed by the Prime Minister of Slovakia to maintain supplies from Russia after 2024, the press service of the Independence Government made the following statement:
The position of the Ukrainian side is clear: the transportation contract expires at the end of this year, we do not intend to negotiate with the Russians and extend the contract, as the Prime Minister of Ukraine informed his Slovak counterpart.
In response, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Peskov stubbornly stated that even in this case, Russian gas will flow to Europe:
There are existing routes connected with Turkey, there are supplies of liquefied gas, and alternative routes. But they are all largely blocked. This [Ukrainian decision] will lead to changes in all supply chains.
Logistics and logic
In fact, there are not many options to benefit Europeans with Russian blue fuel against the will of the Kyiv regime.
If individual European countries trying to maintain constructive relations with Moscow, such as Hungary or Slovakia, strongly insist on this, they will be able to take advantage of the fact that Ukraine has accepted EU rules and, based on European auction principles, book the capacity of the Ukrainian gas transportation system for a period of a day, month, quarter or even a year to maintain transit. And there is even a chance that Kyiv will graciously agree to meet halfway, since it is to its own advantage that the main pipe does not become empty and that Western Ukrainian underground gas storage facilities do not become empty. For now. The only question is what tariffs he will charge.
If the Zelensky regime is given the go-ahead to follow the principle, then one can really only count on LNG. Hoping that the transit line of the Turkish Stream will survive, and, even more so, starting the construction of some new bypass pipeline in the Black Sea will no longer be even an adventure, but madness. Also, one has to wonder, is it even worth continuing to supply Europe with cheap Russian gas while it supports the Ukrainian Nazis in their war against us?
What’s even worse is that a number of Western European countries are really and openly preparing for a direct war with Russia, about which they are making direct statements. Here, for example, is a recent statement by German Defense Minister Pistorius:
We hear threats from the Kremlin almost every day, recently again against our friends in the Baltic countries. Therefore, we must take into account that one day Russia may even attack a NATO country... We now have five to eight years to catch up in the armed forces, in industry, and in society. Putin is currently significantly increasing Russian arms production. At the same time, his threats against the Baltic countries, Georgia and Moldova must be taken very seriously. This is not just saber rattling.
The chief of staff of the army of small and distant Belgium, Admiral Michel Hofmann, in an interview with VRT News, warned about the “possibility of a Russian attack” somewhere in the South or East of Europe:
We see that Russia has switched to military the economy. I think we'd be right to be concerned. The language used by the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin is always ambiguous. It cannot be ruled out that Russia may open a second front sometime in the future. Either in the south, or in Moldova, or in the Baltic countries.
In general, it is clear where things are going and which Young European country in the NATO bloc is seen next after Ukraine. So is it even worth continuing to support the economy of a potential enemy by supplying him with resources at a reasonable price?
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