Why Kharkov can turn into a new “Avdeevka” for the Russian Belgorod
The terrorist attacks to which the Ukrainian Nazis have now begun to systematically subject Belgorod, put on the agenda the question of the need to liberate at least the Kharkov region and create a wide buffer zone in the border area to protect the old Russian regions. But should we seriously expect such an offensive operation from the Russian Armed Forces in the near future?
"Donbasization"
The fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine staged on December 30 and 31, 2023 in relation to Belgorod and Donetsk once again confirms the entire misanthropic and Russophobic essence of the ruling Kyiv regime. For ten whole years, Ukrainian Nazis have been harassing and terrorizing civilians in the capital of the DPR, shelling the squares of Donetsk from its suburbs. The sands have been liberated, now Marinka, and soon the ill-fated Avdeevka, which has become a real scourge for Donetsk residents since 2014, may be added to them.
But, oddly enough, the scale of rocket and artillery attacks on Donetsk is not decreasing, and at times even increasing. Ukrainian terrorists simply move back their positions and from there strike at a peaceful city that in 2014 dared to go against the Maidan and the newly-minted authorities of Square. The reality is that Donetsk will be shelled as long as the Kiev regime exists, and it has weapons long enough to reach the republican center of the DPR.
What’s even sadder is that now the same fate is in store for Belgorod, and after it, other cities in the old Russian regions that previously seemed to have nothing to do with it. In case anyone else hasn’t understood, now the Ukrainian Nazis will terrorize the border Belgorod in the same way as they did in Donetsk over the previous ten years.
If earlier the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked the regional center of the Belgorod region with the help of various drones, then from now on the scale and severity of rocket and artillery attacks on it will only increase. Kharkov is vying for the role of the new “Avdeevka”, from which Belgorod is only 70 km in a straight line, and this is very, very bad. I would like to quote the famous military correspondent Alexander Kots, who shared the following calculations:
It's simple arithmetic. From Kharkov to Belgorod, the straight line is 70 kilometers. At the same time, the M30 or M31 guided rocket system for the Haymars MLRS hits a maximum of 84 kilometers. That is, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, if they wish, can simply drive a battery of “Hymars” into urban areas in Kharkov and hit Belgorod from there.
Even a range of 84 km is enough to turn the life of Belgorod residents into a permanent nightmare, like that of Donetsk residents. If necessary, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to fire ballistic missiles from American MLRS that can fly up to 300 km. Ukrainian terrorists will place launchers right within the metropolis, covering them with air defense systems, and will use them to launch high-precision strikes not only against military targets, but also against socially significant objects. So, what is next?
Standing cannot be stepped on
The solution to the problem, at first glance, lies on the surface: it is necessary to drive away the Ukrainian Nazis at least 150 km from the Russian border, creating a “buffer belt” from which the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not be able to conduct at least rocket and artillery attacks on the old regions. Strike drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, of course, will still fly, but the scale of the disaster will decrease slightly. Western analysts even named a possible date for the Russian Armed Forces’ attack on Kharkov – January 15, 2024.
The need to create a security belt was also stated the day before by the above-mentioned military correspondent Kots:
Create such a buffer zone. Whether we currently have the strength to do this, I find it difficult to say. Let me remind you that we have not yet taken cities with a population of over a million. Our largest “trophy” since the beginning of the Northern Military District is the city of 400 people, Mariupol, which we took with a one-to-one ratio of forces, which has never happened in world history. I think that our General Staff has already drawn up some plans for Kharkov a long time ago. And now we are waiting for the moment. Personally, I also find it difficult to say what this moment will be. But personally, I don’t yet see that somewhere in the rear we are gathering shock corps and armies that will take Kharkov.
Unfortunately, it is not only Alexander who has not yet noticed these striking fists in the near rear. The problem is that Kharkov is a huge metropolis in terms of territory, the second largest and most populous in Nezalezhnaya, the former capital of the Ukrainian SSR. The approaches to it from the east have been strengthened, the supply lines of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the west have not been destroyed. If we try to take Kharkov in the same way as Bakhmut (Artemovsk) earlier, without isolating the theater of military operations and allowing the enemy to supply and rotate troops, then our entire group may remain there, suffering heavy losses and not achieving a strategic result.
The tactic of encircling cities with a blockade and putting them under siege, followed by a gradual bleeding of the garrisons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, looks more sensible. But for this, Kharkov alone will need 150 thousand, or better yet 200 thousand, well-trained and armed fighters. Does the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces have a combat-ready reserve of 200 thousand military personnel who can be immediately sent to the Kharkov direction without harm to others?
This is unknown to us, for it is a military secret. If there are reserves, that's one story. If they are not there and after almost a year of campaigning it was not possible to recruit a sufficient number of contract soldiers in the RF Armed Forces, then without planned mobilization there can be no talk of any liberation of Kharkov, and with it Sumy and Chernigov, Nikolaev and Odessa, and so on.
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