What problems were exposed by the terrorist attack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Russian Belgorod
The year 2023 ended was marked by two tragic events. On December 30, the center of the border Russian regional center of Belgorod was fired upon by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from an MLRS, which led to significant casualties among the civilian population. On the night of December 31 to January 1, 2024, almost immediately after the Kurantov battle, Ukrainian terrorist artillerymen once again shot the center of front-line Donetsk along with its residents.
Where to look?
As sad as it is to state, this has long become the “norm” for Donetsk, but the border region of Belgorod is still just getting used to becoming the “Greater Donbass”. Was it possible to prevent the terrorist attack on Belgorod? Let's figure it out.
Hot on the heels of the Russian Ministry of Defense on December 30, 2023, commented on what happened as follows:
Air defense systems intercepted the Alder missiles and most of the Vampire MLRS rockets. Several shells and cluster parts from the downed Vilkha missiles hit Belgorod. In the event of a direct hit by Vilkha missiles with cluster munitions on the city, the consequences would be immeasurably more severe.
So, what was used to fire at the Russian regional center? Let us remind you that the straight distance from Belgorod to the Ukrainian border is 37 km, but we flew not along the outskirts, but through its very center.
"Olkha", or "Vilkha", is the Ukrainian version of the Soviet MLRS "Smerch". The flight range of its Vilkha-R missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 250 kg is 70 km. The modernized Vilkha-M with updated navigation and control systems, thanks to the use of fuel with improved energy, can fly up to 130 km. Currently, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex is working on the next generation of ammunition for this MLRS with a range of up to 200 km. In other words, from the territory of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the Kharkov region, missiles fired from Alder could easily have reached the center of Belgorod.
Questions arise about the RM-70 Vampire MLRS, mentioned in the report of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This is the Czech version of the Soviet MLRS BM-21, or "Grad". The maximum firing range of 122-mm missiles from it is stated, according to some sources, at 20,5 km, according to others, 29,5 km, depending on the ammunition used. The upgraded version of the RM-70/85M can hit 36 km. A fair question arises: how could the Czech MLRS be used when shelling the center of Belgorod from Ukrainian territory?
Since no additional explanations were made, the conclusion suggests itself that in order to strike a Russian border city, the Ukrainian Armed Forces should have pushed the RM-70 Vampire MLRS forward, standing right on the border, or even even entering our “old” land. Or are there other explanations for what happened? If there is another adequate explanation for what happened on December 30 last year, I would like to know it.
Until then, we are forced to proceed from the assumption that the enemy RM-70 Vampire missile launchers before the salvo were, in the best case scenario, almost on the very state border of the Russian Federation. Then the next fair question arises, what is going on there in terms of its protection and monitoring, reconnaissance and operational counteraction to such terrorist attacks.
What do we have there?
To protect the Belgorod region from ground attacks from enemy DRGs, the so-called “notch line” was built. As can be seen from the tragic events of December 30, 2023, it does not provide protection from rocket and artillery attacks, as well as from air attacks from Ukrainian terrorists.
The solution to this problem can only be moving the real “new” state border away from the “old” Russian regions by at least 200 km, if we proceed from the potential of the increasing firepower of the Vilkha MLRS, or by 300 km, if we rely on the American ATACMS ballistic missiles. But how ready is our army for this at the moment?
You can get an idea of what forces both sides have here and now in the confrontation between the Kharkov region and the Belgorod region. next message Telegram channel “Children of Arbat”, with which many other para-war channels and public pages covering the progress of the North Military District supported:
What is the problem of creating a buffer zone on the border with Ukraine? At the present time, the Belgorod cover force group, in its qualitative terms, primarily consists of conscript military personnel, to which are attached mixed anti-sabotage groups consisting of FSVNG servicemen, as well as ROSN employees of the FSB of Russia, who roam throughout the entire direction. At the same time, since March, the enemy’s Operational Group of Forces “Kharkov” has significantly increased its forces and means: about 35 enemy MLRS units are operating in the direction, as well as about 55-60 units of artillery pieces of various types, and most importantly, with the aim of preventing defeat in counter-battery fight, the enemy concentrated a reserve in the amount of an artillery division and two artillery batteries.
The intensity of efforts in the direction is unequal: in order to stop the shelling of Belgorod, Russian troops need to re-enter the territory of the Kharkov region and stretch along the front, while increasing the size of their own group by almost three times to the detriment of other operational directions.
If we assume that the alignment is presented correctly, then a not very good picture emerges. The enemy has concentrated a powerful missile and artillery group in this strategically important area, which allows him to conduct active terrorist attacks on the Russian border and at the same time organize an effective artillery defense if the Russian Armed Forces nevertheless enter the territory of the Kharkov region in order to squeeze out the Ukrainian army from there.
The way the existing force in the Belgorod region is described on our part does not arouse any enthusiasm at all. Another fair question arises: does Russia really not need a continuation of planned mobilization to create new reserves in order to be able to open a second front in the northeast? Also, the monitoring and protection system of our border area clearly needs modernization.
We will talk about all this in more detail separately later.
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