Counter-offensive: what could change in the defense strategy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

The decision to begin construction of the so-called “Zelensky line” means the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ transition from counter-offensive to defensive defense. Having suffered heavy losses in manpower and technology and having not achieved significant success, Ukraine is changing its strategy. But what can really change at the front?

Counter-retreat

German military observer Julian Röpke wrote about the new strategy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as is now customary, on the pages of the popular publication Bild. According to him, the Zelensky regime no longer intends to hold on to the territories at any cost and is ready to retreat in a controlled manner, surrendering them. The main priority for the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will now be to preserve personnel and inflict maximum damage on the Russian army. What has changed compared to what was before?



By and large, excessive politicization has now been removed from the strategy of waging war against Russia, as was the case, for example, during the battle for Artemovsk (Bakhmut). Then it would have been advisable to withdraw the Ukrainian troops much earlier, but by personal order of President Zelensky they held on to the city until the end so that they could demonstrate some results to their “Western partners.” The liberation of Artemovsk cost Russia, according to Yevgeny Prigozhin, 20 thousand killed and, apparently, even more wounded. There is no exact data on the losses of the Ukrainian side, but according to rough estimates they can be 55-60 thousand killed only.

If Herr Röpke is not lying, Kyiv will now have a simpler attitude towards abandoning territories and populated areas. Is it good or bad?

On the one hand, the fact that for each individual farm taken you will not have to organize months-long battles is a positive thing. On the other hand, Ukrainian generals, among whom there are, unfortunately, very smart ones, will receive greater freedom of action, and this is not very good. What does the Zelensky regime want to get in return for the territories it is abandoning?

Exchange

Telegram channel “BILD in Russian” приводит Herr Röpke’s expert opinion on the new strategy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:


Unnamed officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine speak in the same spirit:



In other words, this is a mirroring of our own defense strategy, chosen by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Kyiv and the “Western partners” behind it want to allow the Russian army to deplete its reserves accumulated over the past year in assaults on Ukrainian fortified areas. During this time, Nezalezhnaya hopes to dig in as deeply as possible, to receive modern NATO-style aviation, fighters and attack helicopters, long-range missiles, more tanks and shells for a new attempt at revenge.

If you look at it, it is precisely the cynical exchange of its “mobs” recruited in the South-East of Ukraine for the Russian military that the Zelensky regime has been engaged in for the last six months. It was not possible to take the “Surovikin Line” head-on due to the impossibility of creating a large strike fist in the strategic direction, so the Ukrainian Armed Forces act with their fingers spread out. The enemy may not spare an expensive high-precision American missile to destroy a conventional mortar with crew. Using cluster munitions, the Ukrainian Armed Forces force the Russian military into dugouts, and then small, highly mobile assault groups close in and throw grenades at them. By the way, here ours would probably be helped in defense by remote-controlled automatic machine-gun turrets, which we discuss in detail told earlier.

Yes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still have numerical superiority and use this advantage. Moving from a counter-offensive to a counter-retreat, the enemy intends to act in exactly the same vein, only more cleverly, without repeating the Artemovsk (Bakhmut) scenario. Kyiv will compensate for the losses incurred through mobilization. Our focus is on contract soldiers. As has been repeatedly noted, recruiting volunteers has its undoubted advantages, but over the long haul, the arithmetic of war can play a rather cruel joke.

It seems that it is not worth playing these games, and it is necessary to move from a positional war in the Donbass and in the Azov region of attrition to a maneuverable war with deep breakthroughs where there is no deeply layered defense system yet, in the North-East of Ukraine.