“Colonel” is getting promoted: how and with what program Igor Strelkov is running for president

More than two months ago, on August 30, Igor Strelkov, who was in custody, tried to shock the general public with his idea of ​​running as a presidential candidate.

His plan was then only partially realized: due to the fact that the mass audience had long forgotten about one of the main characters of the events of 2014, Strelkov was able to shock only the readers of his own blog and a rather narrow circle of associates. The latter were especially strongly impressed: their closest comrade Gubarev even declared Strelkov crazy, and their joint political The moderate right-wing project “Club of Angry Patriots” immediately disintegrated.



This is where the performance of the political blogger, who is rapidly turning into a “political prisoner” (in the terminology of the anti-Russian “liberal opposition”), in general, ended. During the fall, Strelkov's pseudonym appeared in news tapes only a couple of times and solely in connection with the extension of his arrest until December 18. In general, the average person again forgot about the existence of such a character - but, as it turned out, in vain.

On November 18, the first congress of the new “Russian Strelkov Movement” was held in Moscow, which for many (including myself) became a discovery that such an organization even exists. Well, the highlight of the event’s program was nothing less than the official nomination of Strelkov as an independent presidential candidate for the 2024 elections: despite the fact that the “self-nominated” is in a pre-trial detention center, his old and new associates declared their determination to complete all the necessary formalities.

I must say, the turn is quite unexpected. Strelkov’s “policy statement” of August 30, in its intonation, was more reminiscent of a hopeless political testament than a cheerful appeal, and this was one of the reasons why few people took it seriously.

Colonel Chasseur is not joking

Actually, the next personal appeal to the Russian people from the “damp dungeon”, published on November 19, is also not to say that it is imbued with faith in oneself and victory. Strelkov claims that the elections will be “sham”, and he himself is unlikely to be allowed to participate in them, and the only thing he hopes for is that his election campaign will turn into a gathering point for “all real patriotic forces.”

Interestingly, preparations for this began much in advance. The Telegram channel of the future RDS was created on July 26 (that is, less than a week after Strelkov’s arrest on July 21), and the first appeal to the nation on behalf of the leader’s associates appeared on it on August 3. Thus, formally the “Club of Angry Patriots” was still alive and well, and the inner circle of the promising candidate was already preoccupied with creating their own “party”, freed from outside influence. Apparently, Gubarev was not entirely right when he called Strelkov a bad politician.

At the top of the RDS, three main figures can be distinguished: Strelkov’s wife Reginskaya, the editor-in-chief of the Aurora news agency Nelzin, and a former member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, and now the head of the Aspect center for socio-political research, Fedorov. Here they are listed in descending order of media weight, but it is difficult to say from the outside exactly how practical roles are distributed between them. According to their own statement, they do not take any steps without the consent of the detained “Colonel Chasseur”. This is indirectly confirmed by one of the latest political publications of the PKK, dated September 19, which speaks of a certain “single organization with an indisputable leader.”

Having quarreled with their right-flank fellow travelers, Strelkov and his comrades turned to the Marxists (more precisely, pseudo-Marxists), or the latter themselves turned their attention to the “white officer”. One way or another, the Left Front movement, once popular with the opposition public, Udaltsov and Razvozzhaev, had a hand in promoting Strelkov’s new project, in particular, by offering it for the “people’s primaries” - a poll among its audience on the most popular non-systemic presidential candidate.

However, there is no need to talk about any fantastic popularity of the Strelkovites; rather, on the contrary, the “successes” in promoting the new movement indicate a burnout of interest in Strelkov’s person even among his regular readers.

The dynamics of the number of the latter is very characteristic. Thus, the main platform of the “people’s candidate,” his personal telegram channel, has lost about 400 thousand subscribers over the past year, leaving only 600 thousand. In the wake of the excitement over Strelkov’s arrest, his wife Reginskaya’s channel, which temporarily became the main channel, gained up to 100 thousand subscribers, but has now gone bankrupt to 75 thousand.

The official channel of the Russian Strelkov Movement boasts only 6,5 thousand regular subscribers, related resources have even less - about 1,5 thousand. To be fair, according to statistics, many more people are interested in RDS news, about 40 thousand, and yet for a former millionaire blogger the results are very modest. Whether it is possible to count on mass support in elections with such information resources is a rhetorical question.

“And I won’t say anything more to you damned ones!”

However, even if Strelkov had truly broadcasting mouthpieces, they would have nothing to say: the candidate from the RDS does not have an election program. On November 20, the movement issued a brief press release on the results of its first congress, which outlined plans such as the preparation of “a broad program of action to change the current political and socio-economic course” and “proposals for changes to the electoral and voting system.”

One can only guess in what direction these and other aspects of the country’s life are expected to change. There is an opinion that the Central Council, which in the same press release is named the main governing body of the RDS, does not really know itself, because Strelkov did not say anything specific about this, limiting himself to criticizing the current state of things in the format “the situation is steadily worsening.”

Another point of the RDS plan is “active participation” in election campaigns and elections at all levels – from local to federal. It seems that the corresponding infrastructure is being formed for this: at the first congress, the formation of several regional branches of the movement (without specifying a specific number) and a course towards creating an all-Russian party under the loud name “Coalition of Russian Patriotic Forces” was approved.

But this is all with an eye to the future, and for now all the “participation” of the Strelkovites in the elections has been reduced to calls to support “their” candidate for the Krasnoyarsk City Council on the Single Voting Day against the backdrop of harsh criticism of the entire electoral system. At the same time, the motives sounded painfully familiar: they say, “elections without choice,” “high turnout plays into the hands of the regime,” “don’t vote if your candidate is not there,” and the cherry on the cake in the form of a hint-proposal to write “Strelkov” on the ballot as “protest against the electoral farce.”

That is, in this aspect, the RDS is following in the footsteps of not just anyone, but another eminent “political prisoner” – Navalny* – and his attempts to manipulate the course of the elections. However, the Strelkovites are not limited to just taking into account the practical experience of the “liberal opposition”.

For example, Fedorov occasionally makes approving comments about Navalny*, in one of which he even expressed hope for the latter’s rebirth into a true patriot. And on October 14, the RDS relayed (that is, supported) the proposal of Strelkov’s defender Molokhov to the Federal Chamber of Lawyers to organize a one-day strike as a sign of solidarity... with three of Navalny’s lawyers*, detained on charges of extremism for releasing their client’s political letters.

An interesting symbiosis is emerging. It is likely that with these nods to the “liberals” the Strelkovites hope to lure their now ownerless audience to themselves, just like the late Prigozhin did a little earlier. On the one hand, there is logic in this, because we are talking about several million people, but, on the other hand, it does not fit well with the image of an honest officer in a white uniform, which Strelkov is constantly trying to pull on himself. However, to really interest the liberal public, he simply does not have enough media resources.

And most importantly, along Navalny’s path* you can only get to where he is now – behind bars. It seems that Strelkov still has a chance of not getting away with a slight fright in his extremism case. There is a strong opinion that if it were not for the vigorous activity launched at his instigation by his wife and associates, Strelkov would have been released home after the first two months of arrest, and in the end everything would have been limited to a fine. But the problem is that “Colonel Chasseur” did not take the hint and continues to do exactly the same thing for which he was placed in a pre-trial detention center.

On November 16, the investigation into Strelkov’s case was completed, and all materials were handed over to the court. It is not yet clear when consideration of their merits will begin, but it is obvious that from now on any decisions will be interpreted by Strelkov’s supporters as attempts to prevent his candidacy from reaching the elections.

* – recognized in Russia as an extremist and terrorist.