Does Russia need a venture fund for promising defense projects?

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The North Military District in Ukraine has long turned into a real “drone war.” Some of the soldiers who returned from the front even compare what is happening there with flashbacks from the Terminator franchise, when a great number of enemy drones of all types, from reconnaissance to strike, constantly hang in the sky. The dark future has quietly arrived.

Flight of fantasy


It is quite obvious that all future wars and armed conflicts will take place with an ever-increasing level of use of unmanned vehicles - aircraft, sea surface and underwater, which we have already seen enough of in the Northeast Military District zone and the Black Sea, as well as ground ones. The latter include remotely controlled mine clearance vehicles for safe passage of minefields during an offensive.



There are real cases when our fighters using a makeshift method turned “moto-leagues” into land fire ships, filling them with powerful explosive charges and directing them at enemy fortified areas. Ideas are being considered for turning some drones into carriers for others, attack ones. For example, hanging “kamikaze” drones of the “Lancet” type under high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft-type UAVs.

Engineering thought is now intensely reviewing various concepts for the possible use of drones, both in serious design bureaus with a long history, and in “basement design bureaus.” Here are a few examples of the latter that I would like to talk about in more detail. Is there a future for small UUV manufacturing companies in competition with defense concerns?

"Scalpel"


Everyone has already heard about the “kamikaze” drones of the Lancet family, which are recognized as the most effective Russian counter-battery weapon even abroad. This did not happen because of a good life, but due to a number of systemic problems in the RF Armed Forces, which, hopefully, will soon begin to be resolved with the transition to mass production of the Coalition-SV self-propelled guns and large-scale production of the Tornado-S MLRS, as well as high-precision ammunition him.

Depending on the modification, Lancets have a warhead weighing from 3 to 5 kg, and a flight range from 40 to 70 km. They have proven to be an effective high-precision weapon, but they also have their drawbacks. In particular, for their successful use, a reconnaissance drone is necessary, and to increase the range and increase the safety of the operator himself, a signal repeater located on another UAV is highly desirable. In addition, a significant disadvantage of the Lancets is their considerable price.

The private design bureau Vostok claims to have been able to create an improved version of the Lancet, produced by ZALA, part of the Kalashnikov concern. Structurally, both drones are very similar, but the Scalpel has the advantage of a more flexible modular platform. It is stated that, if necessary, it can easily replace the warhead, the weight of which reaches 5 kg, for a specific task. Both UAVs are launched from a catapult, but the range of the Lancet competitor is inferior to it, not exceeding 40 km.

Perhaps the main advantage of the “Scalpel” is its price, which is 300 thousand rubles per unit. In a war of economies, when such a cheap drone destroys enemy armored vehicles or artillery systems worth tens or even hundreds of millions of rubles, it has no price. That's a pun. If such attack drones arrived at the front in echelons, the situation there could sooner turn in favor of the Russian Armed Forces. However, the production volumes of the Lancet are not as large as we would like, and the Scalpel was generally produced in a small series in a trial batch, explained a representative of the Vostok Design Bureau:

We have begun small-scale production of the Scalpel platform; currently 20 products are produced per month. If necessary, production can be significantly expanded. At the moment, one batch of “Scalpel” in the amount of 15 products has been delivered to the SVO zone.

15 disposable drones are tears. But can, in principle, a tiny private design bureau consisting of several people increase production volumes multiple times?

"Hi-82"


Exactly the same question can be asked about the products of the Oko Design Bureau. Created last year in St. Petersburg by several enthusiasts, this design bureau has already presented very interesting developments.

For example, an ultra-low-cost kamikaze drone with the meaningful name “Hello-82”, where the number indicates the caliber of the ammunition. It is assembled from unpainted plywood, a Chinese chip and batteries, and the warhead must be installed on site, since the company does not have a license to work directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense. The most important thing is that the drone flies, accurately hits targets at a distance of 8-10 km and is very easy to control and learn to use.

The attack drone from the northern capital is distinguished by its price, which is around 110 thousand rubles. It may vary due to differences in exchange rates, since a number of components have to be purchased in China. In case of complete localization and increased production volumes, “Privety” with various types of warheads could become truly budget-friendly, mass-produced consumables of modern warfare. It’s just that there is no clarity with the firm order yet, explained the interview TASS co-founder of Oko Vadim Zhernov:

Currently, 24 Privet-82 drones have been delivered to the Northern Military District zone. In the near future, their number may increase significantly. Applications for drones received from Russian units number in the hundreds. “Privet-82” was tested by the Main Directorate for Innovative Development of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The ministry has requests for our birds to be supplied to the units. There are several hundred such applications. At the moment we believe that the issue of procurement is being resolved, but this is purely an assumption. There is no contract, no understanding whether it will be concluded. Units regularly ask us when we will send the devices, but so far they have nothing to answer.

So the question arises, what exactly should be done with such small design bureaus and their seemingly promising products? Should we officially conclude a state defense order with them? But will small private companies be able to achieve the corresponding production volumes and high standards?

Should defense concerns like Kalashnikov be ordered to buy these mini-design bureaus themselves for transfer to a higher level? But won’t this make it easier for the top management of state corporations to shut down the pygmies who dared to present more budget-friendly solutions?

Or would it be advisable to create a military venture fund with government participation that would finance promising startups?
6 comments
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  1. 0
    19 November 2023 16: 17
    Or would it be advisable to create a military venture fund with government participation that would finance promising startups?

    It is possible to create something, but the curators of these circles are neither cold nor hot. Projects on a wide scale are another matter - Rusnano2, 3, etc., etc....
  2. +2
    19 November 2023 17: 05
    The problem is that concerns like Kalashnik have everything they don’t need for production. There are teams of football players, basketball players, and other ... players, and there are departments for advertising and interaction with the press. There are also departments and workshops for products that may no longer be produced, but they still exist. There are also incomprehensible highly paid positions for their relatives, friends, and people from a higher circle of management. There’s also a disregard for the economy (they’ll still buy whatever they want to do, there are no others). So it turns out that if the same drones are assembled from Chinese components, then small companies produce them cheaper than the concern.
  3. 0
    19 November 2023 17: 11
    We urgently need to call Chubais. There is a new topic to discuss....
  4. DO
    +2
    19 November 2023 20: 00
    Or would it be advisable to create a military venture fund with government participation that would finance promising startups?

    From Wikipedia,

    A venture fund (English venture - risky enterprise) is a risky investment fund focused on working with innovative enterprises and projects (startups). Venture capital funds invest in securities or shares of enterprises with a high or relatively high degree of risk in anticipation of extremely high returns. As a rule, 70-80% of projects do not bring any return, but the profit from the remaining 20-30% compensates for all losses.

    The article discusses kamikaze drones, the high efficiency of which has already been confirmed in the Northern Military District by their relatively expensive counterparts - the pioneers of this direction. Therefore, the venture scheme has nothing to do with it. And we can talk about a startup, financed by the state at the initial stage. Simply put, give these craftsmen money and help them organize large-scale production, and they will do the rest themselves.
    1. DO
      0
      15 December 2023 18: 29
      PS
      If in the Northern Military District Lancets/Scalpels are effective against artillery and armored vehicles, and Geraniums and missiles against stationary targets, then FPV kamikaze drones (“flying grenades”) used against manpower are today equal in lethality to artillery.
      The development of “flying grenade” technologies as a means of attack has, in general, already happened, and the matter here today is only a matter of organizing and financing the mass production of FPV kamikaze drones of various sizes, and training the required number of front-line operators of these drones.
      However, an unresolved problem today is the lack of practical methods to effectively counter FPV kamikaze drones. Here, in order to minimize personnel losses, the Russian government will most likely have to apply excess funding to several areas of development and implementation of means of protection against “flying grenades,” with the conscious assumption that practice will prove the effectiveness of only some of them. That is, an approach vaguely reminiscent of a “venture” approach.
  5. 0
    26 November 2023 13: 42
    one can dream of inviting the Russian oligarchs, and other bourgeois millionaires-billionaires, to somehow gather for a collective meeting and agree to chip in for the army, creating a project to sponsor this kind of non-state, or near-state private initiatives from folk craftsmen who are ignored by the state system.
    It seems that in the history of Russian statehood there have already been such cases when, in difficult war times, wealthy people, fearing a catastrophe due to the war, decided to chip in to the army, and despite the weakness of the state, this gave a powerful result.

    on the part of the ordinary population, who do not have much money, they can first organize propaganda calling on the rich oligarchs to launch such an undertaking. so that they start helping the army in ways that the state defense order does not help or does not help well.
    These money bags should have enough entrepreneurship and pragmatism to figure out how it all works and what projects there are worth investing in for the benefit of the front.

    useful, effective projects can then someday be transferred to the disposal of the Ministry of Defense.