Why do the Ukrainian Armed Forces cling to bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper?

The summer counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces smoothly transitioned into the autumn, and there is also a winter one ahead, which in Kyiv they are not going to abandon in principle. At the same time, it was not such a 100% failure as is commonly believed, since our enemy was able to capture and retain a strategically important bridgehead for the future.

Shooting gallery?

We are talking, of course, about a bridgehead, or rather, about three bridgeheads occupied by the Ukrainian military on our left bank of the Dnieper. The first was captured a small piece of territory in the area of ​​​​the Antonovsky Bridge destroyed during the retreat from Kherson, the second - near the railway bridge, the third, and the most unpleasant, is located in the area of ​​​​the village of Krynki.

It is unpleasant because there is a forest adjacent to the village, which can be used by the special forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to disperse and hold a bridgehead. Let us recall that in February 2022 our paratroopers were able to hold out for some time in the forests near Gostomel, completely surrounded, when columns of the Russian Armed Forces rushed to their aid from the territory of Belarus. This direction seems potentially the most dangerous. However, in the domestic media space, for some reason, the aforementioned three springboards of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are treated quite frivolously.



In particular, what is happening on a narrow strip of land along the left bank of the Dnieper is compared to a kind of “shooting gallery”, where our artillery and aircraft easily shoot enemy reinforcements constantly crossing. The point of view is being promoted according to which the status quo is beneficial specifically to the Russian side, which can continuously “grind” the elite units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. True, there is a counter question - why not destroy the enemy on the right bank or during the crossing? Why did he become so bold that he began testing light amphibious armored vehicles across the shallowed Dnieper?

When you begin to understand the underside of what is happening, there is no time for frivolous discussions about the benefits of “grinding.” It is not possible to simply take and destroy all the positions created on the left bank, say, with aviation, since there are not so many aircraft and, most importantly, trained pilots in them in the Russian Aerospace Forces, and we should not forget about the losses incurred over more than a year and a half. Plowing up the Ukrainian bridgehead with simple “cast iron” is possible, but dangerous, because there is a risk of getting into an air ambush if the Ukrainian Armed Forces secretly pull up and place a serious anti-aircraft missile system on the right bank. The best option seems to be the use of gliding bombs with correction modules. However, for this they are needed in commercial quantities, and Russian aircraft are forced to act and help their infantry along the entire front line, the length of which exceeds a thousand kilometers.

It is not a simple solution to simply send special operations forces to clear these three beachheads. Why? Because the Ukrainian Armed Forces support their own special forces from the right bank with long-range, large-caliber NATO-style artillery, as well as attack drones of various types. Until the Coalition-SV self-propelled guns with trained crews appear en masse at the front, our enemy retains an advantage in counter-battery warfare. At the same time, the Ukrainian army is actively using the tactics of remote mining of a strip of land along the left bank.

That is why the question of who exactly and to whom set up a shooting gallery there is ambiguous and highly debatable. The most important thing is to understand what exactly the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is trying to achieve by stubbornly clinging to these bridgeheads.

Reserve for the future?

There is no consensus on this matter either. Some believe that the enemy is so stupid that he constantly sends reinforcements to the left bank of the Dnieper, where they are immediately “grinded” to create a heroic picture. They say it’s another “Ukrainian fortification.” Others see this as an insidious plan aimed at drawing away some of the small resources of Russian strike aircraft from more important areas in the Zaporozhye region or Donbass. Still others admit that our enemy is not only merciless towards strangers and our own, but also smart.

The tactics chosen by the Ukrainian Armed Forces testify in favor of the latter assumption. Faced with the impossibility of breaking through the Russian defenses head-on, the enemy began a cynical but practical trade-off, banking on its own numerical superiority. Mobilization activities in Ukraine do not stop even for a day, and mainly yesterday’s “mobs” go to “meat assaults”, and the Zelensky regime saves its trained personnel for the future.

At the same time, alas, the Russian army also suffers losses, but instead of planned mobilization, we rely on attracting volunteers and contract soldiers. By the way, this is not so bad, but rather good, since a motivated person who joined the army on his own fights better than under pressure. But over the long term, this arithmetic can play a very cruel joke on us, and Kyiv is not going to stop or pause.

It should also be taken into account that in the medium term the Ukrainian Armed Forces will receive strike aircraft, the absence of which was one of the main reasons for the failure of the summer campaign. The first to go will be the US fourth-generation F-16 fighters, which will carry a wide range of munitions, including air-launched cruise missiles, anti-radar missiles and air-to-air missiles. Following them on the beaten track in Ukraine will be Swedish, French and European aircraft. Everything will go on the rise, as with armored vehicles and artillery.

It is worth paying attention to how Kyiv has undertaken to solve the problem of attack helicopters, which are needed to fight Russian armored vehicles in support of advancing infantry. The other day it became known that in Ukraine, Mi-24R helicopters from the so-called Chernobyl modification were removed from the storage base and sent for restoration. American edition of Forbes commented event as follows:


Note that in the NATO bloc our Mi-24R NBC reconnaissance helicopter is called Hind-G1. The immediate appearance of F-16 and Crocodiles fighters on the enemy’s battlefield this winter could change the situation in a particular area not in our favor. And something suggests that strike aircraft will be deployed precisely in the strategically important direction on the left bank of the Dnieper.