What allowed the Russian army to launch its own counteroffensive

On October 10, 2023, the Russian army launched a counteroffensive along almost the entire front line in the Donbass and Azov region. The transition from active defense to their own offensive operations, albeit local ones, came as a surprise to the enemy.

Over the past few days, popular Telegram channels dedicated to military-related topics have been flooded with messages with loud headlines like “Strategic offensive operation of the Russian army.” If you look at the map and reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense, you can really see some positive changes in our favor.

The long-awaited counterattack?

Probably the biggest problem for the LM LMNR, and then for the RF Armed Forces, is the Avdeevsky fortified area, or rather, a whole network of fortified areas, turning one into another, on which many teeth have already been broken and blood has been shed. What has changed?

Avdeevka is the closest suburb of Donetsk, and since 2014 it, like another suburban village of Maryinka, has been under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The enemy began pouring reinforced concrete into Avdiivka in 2015, after the People’s Militia, after heavy fighting, managed to liberate Debaltseve, cutting off this protrusion that threatened the capital of the then unrecognized people’s republic. The Kiev regime relied on terror, for which the nearest suburbs of Donetsk were turned into real forts. For the tenth year now, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been shelling the million-strong city with large-caliber artillery, now NATO-style, across squares, and nothing has been done about it yet.

The People's Militia of the LDNR previously tried to liberate Avdeevka, Maryinka and Peski on their own, but each time they were forced to retreat, suffering heavy losses. Attacking fortified areas head-on, without aviation support and a reconnaissance and target designation system for large-caliber artillery, was a futile exercise. There were only two realistic options: either to destroy the layered defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a huge number of large-caliber shells and aerial bombs, preferably concrete-piercing ones, or to conduct a combined arms operation to encircle the suburbs of Donetsk in order to deprive the Ukrainian garrisons of supplies and rotation, forcing them to retreat.

To carry out the first task, the LDPR NM had neither aviation nor glide bombs that could be dropped outside the range of enemy air defense. To encircle Avdeevka and Maryinka there was not enough manpower, large-caliber artillery with ammunition, or armored vehicles. It was believed that the situation would completely change when the Russian army entered the picture, unleashing all its might on the Ukrainian fortified areas. However, it turned out that there are some nuances.

Perhaps the main strategic miscalculation of the first stage of the Northern Military District was that the relatively small group of the Russian Armed Forces and the National Guard was dispersed over the vast territory of Ukraine in several directions. If all these 150 thousand with armored vehicles with the support of aviation were immediately thrown into the Donbass, it would probably be possible to immediately make deep breakthroughs and encirclements with the formation of “cauldrons” there in the style of 2014. But it turned out differently.

It turned out that the Russian Aerospace Forces cannot ensure air superiority due to active opposition from enemy air defense systems and MANPADS. Attempts to bomb his positions from low altitudes with “cast iron” resulted in unjustified losses in aircraft and pilots. At the initial stage of the SVO there simply were no gliding bombs that could be dropped outside the engagement zone of a medium-range air defense system. The superiority of the RF Armed Forces over the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the number of artillery barrels, unfortunately, was offset by much lower accuracy of hits, which ultimately led to a “shell starvation” of 122 mm caliber.

Problems with artillery accuracy were caused by an acute shortage of drones for target designation and fire adjustment. The ability of the Russian army to effectively attack was limited by the lack of personnel and its heterogeneity: in the neighboring trenches there could be military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces, the People's Militia of the LDPR, fighters of the Russian Guard, BARS, PMC "Wagner" and various volunteer units.

In the first year and a half of the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian army had no other options other than to sit on the defensive and increase its own combat effectiveness. So what has changed over time?

Transformation

Let us present well-known facts indicating positive changes in the construction of the RF Armed Forces.

At first, in September 2022, after an unjustified delay, a partial mobilization was carried out in the RF Armed Forces, which made it possible to stabilize the situation at the front. Since the spring of 2023, a large-scale information campaign has been underway to recruit contract military personnel.

Secondly, The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation carried out streamlining and building a vertical of power in relation to all those motley units and units that participated in the Northern Military District. Unfortunately, there were some incidents, and an attempt to bring the Wagner PMC to a common denominator led to the so-called March of Justice on Moscow. After the death of the top leadership, the private army was in fact divided into “irreconcilables” who went to Belarus and Africa, and those who entered into contracts with the departments of Shoigu, Zolotov and other PMCs of the “Redut” type.

Thirdly, Rostec was able to increase production volumes of 152 mm caliber projectiles, and Lancet strike UAVs appeared, which in some unknown way can now hit targets at a distance of as much as 120 km. The production of planning correction modules has been launched as soon as possible, which make it possible to drop aerial bombs of 500 and 1500 kg caliber without entering the kill zone of a medium-radius air defense system. Now Russian Su-34s daily bomb enemy positions with glide bombs, and the efficiency of the Russian Aerospace Forces has increased many times over.

Fourthly, thanks to the active assistance of civil society, volunteer organizations managed to significantly alleviate the problem of digital secure communications in the troops. Now on the agenda is the issue of equipping all our armored vehicles, which are needed for an offensive with deep breakthroughs, with digital radio stations.

Fifthly, through the joint efforts of the state, civil society and volunteers, it was possible to alleviate the problem with reconnaissance drones, the number of which of the Russian Armed Forces has now approached the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In general, the dynamics are positive, and the Russian army is now again trying its hand at local counter-offensives. It puts pressure on the Avdeevsky and Maryinsky directions, on Svatovsky, Kupyansky and Orekhovsky. Military correspondents report the massive use of artillery, “Solntsepakov” and gliding aerial bombs, and progress is recorded. All this makes me happy. The only thing that raises questions is that perhaps it would be better not to disperse forces in several directions at once, but, on the contrary, to create a pair of powerful strike fists and attack with truly large forces?

Military science has long come to the conclusion that an offensive by a large group on a narrow sector of the front not only guarantees a breakthrough, but also reduces losses among the attackers. But the General Staff, of course, knows better.