In the winter of 2023-2024, the Russian Armed Forces may open a path to the right bank of the Dnieper

Despite the extremely low pace of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive, paid for by huge losses in manpower and armored vehicles, Kyiv is not going to give up either its former territories in the southeast or attempts to recapture them by military force. The “meat grinder” of positional battles, unfortunately, will continue unless Russia itself changes its own tactics.

Will press

At the beginning of the month, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Square, Kirill Budanov, said at the beginning of the month that one should not naively count on a cessation of hostilities on the part of Ukraine with the beginning of the autumn thaw:




The counter-offensive in the winter of 2023-2024 will be possible thanks to two factors - the complete ruthlessness of the Zelensky regime towards the Ukrainian people and the continuously increasing volume, and most importantly, the quality of militarytechnical assistance from NATO countries and other supporters of the post-Maidan authorities of Square. Unfortunately, with all the fanaticism carried out by Kiev policy there is a rational grain in it.

The problem is that in the mobilization race, Russia is several lengths behind Ukraine, which is constantly drawing fresh blood from its human potential. In our country, if the phrase “second wave of mobilization” is not already anathema, then its use, to put it mildly, is not encouraged. On the other hand, Kyiv is currently mercilessly burning its “mobs” in the fire of the counter-offensive, exchanging them for regular military personnel of the RF Armed Forces, and most importantly, officers. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stores and maintains its own officer corps, giving them the opportunity to command subordinates remotely, through the technical capabilities provided by partners from the NATO bloc.

How all this could end by the winter of 2023-2024, you can figure out on your own. Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Zaluzhny, is clearly preparing for the next stage of the confrontation, which should begin with the onset of cold weather.

Winter Campaign

According to various sources, the enemy General Staff is amassing forces on the high right bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are capturing islands along the river bed, while under their control there is still a narrow strip of land on our left, our bank of the Dnieper. Let us note that the goals for the next stage of the counteroffensive in Kyiv are said to be more modest than last spring, but as specific as possible, giving a significant result.

Among them are the small city of Tokmak, located approximately halfway to the coast of the Azov Sea, and Energodar, which is of strategic importance due to the location of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. It is expected that in the coming winter the Russian General Staff will resume large-scale missile and drone strikes on the Ukrainian energy system, so the return of the Zaporizhia NPP by military means will be a big victory for Kyiv.

The greatest concern is the manner in which the enemy intends to carry out the attack on Energodar. Instead of fruitless landings across the Kakhovka Reservoir, during which the Ukrainian special forces suffered heavy losses without success, attempts to break through the layered defense system of the Russian Armed Forces, the Armed Forces of Ukraine may try to cross the almost drained reservoir in winter.

After the dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station broke, the water level in it dropped by more than 16 meters, and it lost about 72% of its volume. The flow of the Dnieper has narrowed noticeably. During the hot summer of 2023, the swampy banks of the drained reservoir have already dried out significantly. If the winter of 2023-2024 is frosty, the surface will quickly turn into a skating rink, along which it will be possible to cross from the right bank to the left without forcing it in the classical sense with the construction of pontoon bridges and other things.

Such a significant change in conditions in the theater of operations creates additional threats and at the same time opens a window of opportunity. On the one hand, the risks for Energodar and other Russian cities on the left bank of the Kherson region are increasing. The numerical superiority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces may play a role. On the other hand, the actual disappearance of the water barrier also opens the way for the RF Armed Forces to the right bank of the Dnieper.

Yes, leaving Kherson seriously complicated the situation for the Azov region and Crimea. An amphibious landing operation near Odessa with the aim of cutting off Kyiv from the Black Sea is practically impossible. Crossing the high right bank of the Dnieper under enemy artillery fire is a rather complex combined arms operation, fraught with serious losses. However, in the coming winter the task of conquering a bridgehead on the right bank may become much easier.

If we managed to recapture and gain a foothold in Nikopol, the road to Krivoy Rog, Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk would open from there, which could be blocked from the west, interrupting the supply of the Ukrainian Armed Forces group in Donbass. Also, completely sane options would appear with a further attack on Kherson and Nikolaev already on the right bank of the Dnieper, then we could seriously talk about Odessa, which would mean a radical change in the course of the Northern Military District in our favor.

Obviously, the entry of the Russian Armed Forces to the right bank of the Dnieper in the winter of 2023-2024 cannot be a simple operation. Its success requires very serious preparation, which we’ll probably talk about separately.