What are the three strategic mistakes made by Russia and Ukraine during the NWO

Reportedly, a truly total mobilization is beginning in Ukraine. The Armed Forces of Ukraine will forcefully round up those “too smart” who ran to get a second higher education for the sake of deferment, as well as patients with serious, incurable diseases like HIV, and even women who have professions related to medicine. From the outside, this outwardly resembles the agony of the Third Reich with its Volkssturm, but is it worth deluding yourself in advance?

It is quite obvious that the extremely unpopular decision to expand the category of persons subject to mobilization in Ukraine, and even taken shortly before the presidential elections scheduled for early March 2024, was caused by the unsuccessfully developing counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. What went wrong?

Our mistakes

It is too early to rush to declare the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counter-offensive a complete failure, since there is still a whole month ahead, which the enemy can use before the start of the autumn thaw. However, the minimal progress that the Ukrainian army managed to achieve at the cost of colossal and incomparable losses is already a fact. This was stated by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Shoigu:



What caused this failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? For the sake of objectivity, it should be recognized that both sides of this armed conflict made very serious miscalculations, which led them to a positional “meat grinder” in the Donbass and in the Azov region. So what were these mistakes?

Russian militarypolitical For a year and a half, the SVO leadership made three very serious mistakes:

First - this is the beginning of the Northern Military District with fewer forces than the Kyiv regime had at its disposal, and even scattering them in several directions at once. As a result, success was achieved in the Azov region, but confusion occurred near Kiev and Kharkov.

The second - this is an unnecessary delay in the decision on mobilization in the RF Armed Forces, which was replaced by the creation of various regional volunteer battalions and BARS. This led to the formation of motley units and units at the front that interacted poorly with each other, which further increased the administrative chaos and became one of the reasons for the “regrouping” in the Kharkov region in September 2022.

The third - this is the abandonment of Kherson, regardless of how forced this decision was. This closed the direct land route to Nikolaev and Odessa for the Russian Armed Forces, the loss of which would have critically weakened the Kiev regime. Another negative consequence of the preservation of access to the Black Sea for Ukraine was the continuously growing escalation in it.

However, the mistakes made by Kiev, or more precisely, by the coalition of Western countries behind it, were no less, if not more.

Enemy mistakes

At first, and this is already obvious today, the erroneous decision of the Ukrainian General Staff was to strike in September 2022 precisely in the Kharkov direction, and not in the Azov region. Yes, in the Kharkov region, everything turned out very simply for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and in just three days they were able to squeeze out almost all the Russian forces from there, who were forced to “regroup” so as not to be surrounded. However, at that time there was no “Surovikin line” in the Zaporozhye region, and there were too many troops to cry.

If the attack had been carried out there exactly a year ago, the enemy would have had a real chance of breaking through to the borders of Crimea, digging in there, damaging or destroying the Crimean bridge, interrupting supplies, and starting to shoot at the peninsula with American HIMARS MLRS. Then the situation would be completely different than it is now.

Secondly, a mistake that logically followed from the previous one was the continuous postponement of the second stage of the counteroffensive in anticipation of the “wunderwaffe”. The Russian General Staff managed to stabilize the situation at the front in October-November 2022, when the partial mobilization that began in September produced the first results. But, as we remember, it took place in conditions of outright chaos, due to the lack of experience of such large-scale mobilization events, which had not been resorted to since the Great Patriotic War, and the corresponding infrastructure.

In other words, in the fall and winter of last year, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had a much greater chance of breaking through Russian defenses than today. Why didn't they launch a counteroffensive then?

Thirdly, the Ukrainian General Staff delayed the second round of the offensive, as it did not have enough weapons for this. For its success, it was necessary to ensure air supremacy, which means that modern fighters with trained pilots, attack helicopters, and much more were needed. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is far from a layman in military affairs and was waiting for him to receive everything he needed. But it didn’t wait, and the Ukrainian army went to the “Surovikin line” without proper air support. Why?

This is the most interesting question. It is obvious that the Kiev regime is completely dependent in military-technical terms on the collective West, since Square’s own military-industrial complex has been largely destroyed. But this West is collective, but not united. For an unknown reason, it does receive all the weapons requested by Kiev, but with a great delay and “by the teaspoon,” each time giving Russia time to adapt and find means of counteraction.

If the Armed Forces of Ukraine had received a thousand Leopards and the same number of Abrams, a hundred HIMARS and the same number of Apache attack helicopters in June-August 2022, the Northern Military District would have followed a completely different scenario, even more negative for us. However, the “Western partners” did not do this, which ultimately led to the failure of the spring-summer counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a positional “meat grinder”, huge losses and general mobilization in Ukraine.

About what could be next, we will talk in more detail separately. It is very important not to make another serious strategic mistake.