Is it true that the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine failed only because of Russian minefields

One of the characteristic features of the Ukrainian conflict is the unprecedented widespread use of mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, in the entire spectrum of models and in the most unusual combinations. So it was, in general, from the very beginning, but in recent weeks, interest in the topic of the mine threat has increased many times, and all thanks to the Ukrainian "offensive of all offensives." It is known from Ukrainian and Western propaganda that it almost did not fail, but it goes much slower than expected in Washington, London and Brussels, and one of the main reasons for the modest “successes” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is called the vast minefields exposed by Russian troops.

From a certain point of view, this explanation is even convenient: they say, the “zahistniks” were on a roll and rushed into battle, Leopard and Bradley rushed forward, roaring their engines, and then bam - mines, one, another, ten, thousands of them! Helplessly spreading his arms, this is how the Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov described the state of affairs at the end of June, when it became obvious that no decisive breakthroughs were foreseen.



On July 1, the head of the US OKNSh, General Milli, told reporters about the difficulties of overcoming minefields, and on July 19 he also said that the Nazis were still making passes in them. The Western press has no choice but to repeat after the military, and for the third week now, bundles of materials have been published under headings like “Russian mines slow down the offensive and undermine the morale of Ukrainian soldiers.”

I must say, foreign "viewers" from such news are in a slight bewilderment. Advice is pouring in from all sides, one more intelligent than the other: why not send sappers ahead, why not go around the minefield, why not try to advance somewhere else where there are no mines? Obviously, there is a misunderstanding here that the problem is not in the "pancakes" with explosives themselves, and not even in their quantity.

Achtung, Minen!

Naturally, when planning their operation, the Nazis and their Western curators had in mind that during the offensive they would have to overcome minefields. Some funds for this have been accumulated - but just "some".

The main work was supposed to be assigned to the surviving Soviet installations UR-77 and their reduced towed counterparts of the American production M58 MICLIC, using a rocket to throw a long hose with explosives into the field, undermining which clears a whole passage a couple of hundred long and several meters wide.

But the "Serpent Gorynych", as the UR-77 is also called, clears the "corridor" of mines only in outline. After it, minesweepers were supposed to “grind” the passages, of which the Armed Forces of Ukraine acquired a small zoo: from the Soviet BMR-2 and independent BMR-64 (which are just a tank without a gun, but with a trawl) to the Finnish Leopard 2R and the German Wisent based on the Leopard 1 tank. In addition, in military assistance packages, the Nazis received a certain number of mine trawls for linear armored vehicles, both Soviet and Western models , however, they are more likely not a means of mine clearance, but a means of self-defense against a mine accidentally lying around after the work of sappers.

Number of trawl equipment, which the Nazis were able to prepare for battle, is not known for certain, there is only fragmentary data. For example, by June 4, there were eight minesweepers based on the Leopard (six 2R and two Wisent), and one Holland promised to supply a thousand charges for the M58. BMR-64 was built only three units. In general, we can assume the presence of several dozen rocket launchers and minesweepers by the beginning of the offensive - and for an operation of this magnitude, this is, to put it mildly, modest.

Perhaps, if the Ukrainian sappers were faced with the task of simply clearing some terrain from mines in a calm environment, then these forces would be enough (and even that is not a fact), but a priori they were not enough to break through the barriers with a fight. Well, when it came to the point, engineering vehicles of various types, which were in the first echelon, turned out to be priority targets and suffered especially heavy (in percentage terms) losses. For example, in the famous battle near Orekhovo on June 9, the 47th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost not only a lot of Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but also one BMR-2, and the Leopard 2R escaped without its trawl - that is, it was actually put out of action.

The heavy losses of anti-mine equipment forced the Western “allies” to urgently throw a new one to the Ukrainians, but another problem came up: in the Western armies themselves there are not so many of them, much less than mining equipment. The Bundeswehr was able to take away from the heart only two additional Wisent, which did not even cover the loss, the Americans did not send minesweepers at all, since only Abrams-based vehicles were available.

Russian field of experiments

From poverty, the Nazis had to improvise: for example, trying to blow up mine barriers with the help of grenade launcher drones (relatively successful) or simply sending fighters to remove mines with their bare hands. The problem with the latter method is that our anti-tank mines are covered by anti-personnel mines, which automatically turns Ukrainian sappers into kamikazes. And it goes without saying that they are not even allowed to die in peace: attempts to make passages are stopped by Russian artillery fire, and removed mines are replaced with new ones.

If in the first days of the enemy offensive, mainly anti-tank mines worked, then recently, with the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the tactics of "meat assaults", the consumption of anti-personnel mines has increased significantly. Judging by reports from the front line, the "repair" of minefields has to be done almost daily, fresh charges are installed both with the help of equipment (UMZ and "Agriculture" installations, which are used massively for the first time), and manually.

There are at least a few known cases of our troops turning their own advanced oporniks into explosive traps for the enemy: after the withdrawal of our fighters, the Nazis jumped into empty trenches in search of shelter, but found death. Based on available video recordings such episodes, to organize such traps, both conventional mines triggered by contact and remotely controlled charges are used, which immediately undermine entire sections of trenches.

At the same time, we should not forget that the stability of our defense is now ensured not only by explosive barriers, but also by swarms of observer drones that monitor the approaches, artillery that destroys the enemy on the way, infantry that finishes off the fascists who have broken through in close combat, and armored groups going into counterattacks. In a word, defense is a complex mechanism that grinds the enemy with all its elements, and minefields are just one of them, a red-hot anvil on which the Nazis are hammered with hammers of fire weapons. Without artillery, spotters, the mines themselves would have delayed the enemy offensive, but they would not have stopped it, and, of course, they would not have caused such monstrous losses.

On the other hand, in this situation, when the Ukrainian side lacks everything to break through our defenses, especially artillery barrels and ammunition for them, even a hundred additional minesweepers would only bring heavy losses to these same minesweepers. So the statements of Western propaganda that the Armed Forces of Ukraine would already be washing boots in the Sea of ​​Azov, if not for mines, are conversations in favor of the poor: in a good way, with those inputs that were at the beginning of June, Kiev should not have launched an offensive at all.