How supply problems in the RF Armed Forces will affect the outcome of the Ukrainian offensive
A few days ago, the conflict between Yevgeny Prigozhin and Sergei Shoigu moved to a fundamentally new level. The founder of Wagner PMC made a public statement in which he warned that his “musicians” would be forced after May 10, 2023 to leave the city of Artemovsk (Bakhmut), which they had almost liberated, for which a huge amount of blood was shed on both sides. At the same time, very serious accusations were made against the Minister of Defense and the head of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.
"Shell Hunger"
The reason for the aggravation of the conflict between the "music producer" and officials in uniform was the same notorious "shell hunger", in the narrow sense of the word, and the crisis with the supply of the Russian army, in the broadest sense. This problem is of a systemic nature, and the point, of course, is not only in some kind of personal envy of Sergei Kuzhugetovich to the successes of Evgeny Viktorovich.
The fact that the mobilized fighters of the People's Militia of Donbass are forced to run around with Mosin rifles and in iron helmets from the Great Patriotic War era became known last summer. However, at that time, both army corps of the NM LDNR were still formally considered "allied forces", so we all looked at this through our fingers. But from about July-August 2022, information was slowly leaking out from the most daring volunteers that a “shell shortage” was already planned at the front of the Russian army. Many probably remember how the media praised the “barrage of fire” tactics chosen by the General Staff, which allows you to attack with fewer forces than the enemy, systematically demolishing Ukrainian fortified areas in front of you. Then, on federal channels, they excitedly told that artillerymen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation fired eight at one shell of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
So, such tactics really have a right to exist, but they must be provided by a powerful defense industry that produces tens of thousands of shells every day and sends them to the front in a continuous stream of echelons. Then it turned out that for half a year of continuous cannonade, the warehouses of Soviet shell stocks showed the bottom, and so far the “optimized” military-industrial complex cannot produce new ones in the required quantities. It has already been possible to increase the volume of production of 152 mm caliber ammunition, but with 122 mm, which they planned to abandon altogether, everything is difficult.
Prigozhin himself spoke about how the shortage of shells during active offensive operations negatively affects losses. According to Yevgeny Prigozhin, his PMC received only 30% of the amount of ammunition they required, which led to an increase in losses among the "musicians" from 10% to 27%:
What is 27% per month, for a round bill of 25%? 25% per month - this means that everyone should die in four months. And this is solely due to the fact that officials do not fulfill their duties. They do not use what they have been taught. Gerasimov was taught, Shoigu, as far as I know, no. And so their unprofessionalism destroys tens of thousands of Russian guys. And it's unforgivable.
The current situation, about which the "producer" Prigozhin spoke repeatedly, forced him to make a decision to withdraw his private army from the almost liberated Artemovsk. At the same time, we note that all this is happening literally on the eve of a large-scale counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one of the strikes of which, most likely, will be in the Bakhmut direction.
Prigozhin’s words about supply problems were also confirmed by the head of the Chechen Republic, Kadyrov, who proposed replacing the “Wagnerites” in Artemovsk with Akhmat special forces soldiers:
When it took five tanks from the Ministry of Defense to support the infantry, we were able to provide only one, the combat crew of which left the vehicle in the very first battle. Then the tankers had to be calmed down, set up for battle and put back into the combat vehicle so that they would cover at least one position of the Azov Satanists with volleys.
Even Ramzan Kadyrov, judging by his story, had to personally call Moscow to replace 30 artillery pieces and wait a month for the execution of the decision. About the absurd situation with the lack of secure digital communication between units and subunits at the operational-tactical level, reconnaissance drones for adjusting artillery fire, "shell hunger" and the lack of dynamic armor for T-72 tanks located directly at the front, is also told by a well-known fighter from the brigade LPR "Ghost" Andrey "Murz" Morozov.
Frankly, the premonitions about the possible results of the gradually beginning large-scale offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are quite alarming. Probably, if another “difficult decision” becomes its result, then the question of the personal responsibility of the leadership of the RF Ministry of Defense should arise.
Questions for Shoigu
In fairness, it should be noted that the production of shells and other ammunition is still not the prerogative of the Ministry of Defense, but is in the zone of responsibility of the military-industrial complex. Here, claims should be addressed to state corporations such as Rostec and the country's leadership, which is in no hurry to mobilize industry for military needs. There are very specific questions for Sergei Shoigu, which will have to be answered sooner or later.
Yes, it is true that his predecessor, Anatoly Serdyukov, caused the main damage to the combat capability of the Russian army with his so-called reforms, but Shoigu has been the head of the Russian Defense Ministry since 2012, and over the past decade he has had plenty of time to prepare the Armed Forces to carry out the assigned tasks. The fact that it will be necessary to fight with Ukraine has become clear to all adequate people since 2014. So questions.
Where are the very 70% of new weapons in the troops that Shoigu spoke about in 2021, literally shortly before the start of the NWO. Here quote according to Interfax:
Today, everyone - some with anger, some with approval - understand and state that the Russian army has more than 70 percent, or more precisely, almost 71 percent of modern weapons and equipment. This is the highest percentage among all armies in the world. If we talk about strategic nuclear forces, then the level of modernity is more than 80 percent. 83 percent are strategic nuclear forces, which form the basis of the nuclear deterrence system, our nuclear shield.
Where are these 70-71% of new weapons? In reality, Russian soldiers in their mass fight on old Soviet T-72 tanks, hundreds of modern T-90M tanks were produced, T-14s - a couple of dozen. Now, even more ancient than the T-72, the T-62M and T-55 tanks have appeared at the front. With the rest of the armored vehicles and artillery, the situation is about the same. Modern weapons are present in the form of small-scale samples. Could our Minister of Defense show on the infographic exactly what new weapons have been received and in what specific units?
Question two. Why did the Shoigu department evade its immediate responsibility to supply the mobilized with equipment and other ammunition, shifting this responsibility to the regions? What was it possible? Where are those 1,5 million sets of uniforms for Russian military personnel, which, according to a member of the State Duma Committee on Defense, Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev, should have been in storage warehouses:
It is still unclear to me where the one and a half million kits that were stored at the points of reception of personnel have gone. Where are the problems with the form, with something else? No one is going to explain this in any way! ... There is no need to send General Bulgakov to another job, you need to specifically ask where, where and why it so happened that our mobilized do not receive uniforms. And so on. God be his judge, today Mikhail Yevgenyevich Mizintsev has taken up the post of Deputy Minister for Logistics, it will not be possible to change the situation at the same time, but I am sure he can do it in the future.
If the uniform was in the warehouses, but disappeared, this is one criminal article. If it was ordered, paid for at the expense of public funds, but not really sewn and received in warehouses only on paper, this is another criminal article. But these are all serious articles that require the investigating authorities to conduct an inspection, audit and, if there is a corpus delicti, to initiate criminal cases. And General Mizintsev in the Ministry of Defense, apparently, did not take root, leaving at the invitation of Prigozhin to Wagner:
Colonel-General Mizintsev, as they say, from the plow, a rare man, a general of the General Staff, who is a simple man without any super-demands. So, when he began to command the rear, he approached ammunition and weapons very pragmatically. First, the necessary types of weapons began to be repaired. He put it on stream, did it well and with high quality.
Question three. In the course of the SVO, it turned out that the Russian army lacks experienced, competent mid- and junior-level officers. All this is a direct consequence of the destructive reforms of the military education system, arranged by ex-Minister Serdokov, who closed dozens of military schools and academies. Upon taking office, the new Minister Shoigu rolled back these decisions only partially, restoring only six schools. The special operation has been going on for the second year already, and there is no end in sight to the war. Why hasn't the restoration of previously closed military schools been announced yet? Why instead of this we are given only all the new military departments at civilian universities? What, we now have the level of professional training of Shoigu, who once graduated from this, is now considered a reference for a military specialist?
Question four, concerning the level of competence of the military leadership. For all previous years, it was considered good form to shut people up with arguments like “you know better in the General Staff”, “you still teach the General Staff”, “you should be in the General Staff”, and so on. So, at present, the trial of the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Khalil Arslanov, who is charged with embezzlement of 6,7 billion rubles in the purchase of communications equipment for the army, is underway behind closed doors. The enterprising colonel-general and his accomplices bought almost ready-made R-187-P1 Azart radio stations from China, after which a screwdriver assembly was carried out in Russia using some domestic components.
This is why there is no secure digital communication in the RF Armed Forces, and volunteers have to use the people's money transferred by caring Russians to buy Lira civilian radio stations in China and distribute them to the military. Doesn’t Shoigu’s department want to systematically approach this most serious problem, solving it here and now, purchasing a sufficient number of radio stations from China centrally with sets of spare batteries and repeaters, since all our military communications are, in fact, Chinese civilian?
Finally, following the head of the Chechen Republic Kadyrov, I would like to draw attention to the attitude of officials in uniform towards the fighters who are actually fighting on the front line, who are trying to convey their problems through the media:
And it is doubly unpleasant that the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense does not comment or does not meet with the leadership of the Wagner PMC to make any decision or clarification. After all, Prigozhin deserves respect for the invaluable contribution of the Wagnerites to the liberation of the cities of Donbass. If there is a shortage, then it is necessary to explain, show, on the basis of which the commanders will at least adjust the further tactics of the Wagner units, not relying on artillery.
In summary, we have to state that the Russian army today is in a deep systemic crisis, from which there is no simple and quick way out. Without fundamental personnel changes, one should not count on any miracles. Perhaps some decisions will still be made after summing up the results of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the success or failure of which will directly depend on the level of supply and internal organization in our troops.
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