The military correspondent described in detail the reasons for the retreat of the RF Armed Forces in the Krivoy Rog direction

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Over the past few days, there has been an increased activity of Ukrainian troops in the Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog direction. The Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to break into the defense of the Russian army in some places, forcing it to retreat to new lines. On October 4, military commander Roman Saponkov drew his attention to this, who in his Telegram channel described in detail the reasons for the retreat of the RF Armed Forces in some sectors of the front on the Right Bank.

For reasons of retreat near Kherson. Almost all of my familiar units got in touch, the losses are small. The men fought like lions, but this time the battle luck turned away

- said a military journalist.



In his opinion, there are several factors that influenced what happened. Chief among them is the lack of rotation. For example, units of the 126th brigade of the Black Sea Fleet have been participating in battles since March. During this time, at best, the servicemen managed to go on vacation for 5 days, which is absolutely not enough. For 7 months of incessant fighting, a large number of fighters dropped out of action for various reasons. People need rest, and units need replenishment. It was this formation that seriously thinned out the 128th brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, after which mourning was declared in Transcarpathia. The Ukrainian command then quickly withdrew its brigade from the combat zone, gave the personnel an opportunity to rest and replenished its reserves (people and technique). It was after this that the 128th brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with fresh forces fell on the positions of the Russians.

Miracles do not happen, no matter how heroes our warriors are, if the village is defended by 15 people, and the enemy has been hammering units with attacks and shelling for 7 months in a row, then sooner or later the unit will lose its combat effectiveness

He explained.

Saponkov clarified that, judging by the nature of the losses, the enemy used the tactics of wedging between strongholds of the RF Armed Forces. In the context of a large shortage of infantry, the Russian military was divided into "oporniks". The enemy spent months probing the defenses of our troops, looking for places where they could "leak". After that, the Armed Forces of Ukraine sent mobile units to break through. Considering that the orders of our troops were heavily discharged, there was either no mobile reserve to stop the breakthrough or it was not enough. Holding the "oporniks" turned out to be pointless, as they were bypassed and they ended up behind enemy lines. The fighters had to fight surrounded and break through to their own. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked with small forces, which allowed the majority of our servicemen to go to their own. Artillery was practically not used, because due to bad weather the drones could not work, and it was pointless to shoot without adjustment.

That is, it is logical to assume that if we had a certain number of BTGs equipped with heavy copters capable of seeing several kilometers, the breakthrough would have been stopped. But I have no data that the tankers fought to the last, I apologize if so

- he added.

The military commissar also pointed out that, according to Russian fighters, the enemy used our identification symbols (quick identification signs) on equipment during the breakthrough, which caused confusion in the first hours, after which the front collapsed in this area. He suggested that the Armed Forces of Ukraine already have an American network-centric combat control system, when all units, up to and including the company, are tied into a net and marked on monitors as their own. Therefore, the Ukrainian military may not care what symbols are applied to the equipment.

If so, then this is very bad, because this is a qualitatively new level of command and control. And our retreat is a consequence of the loss of the equation

He summed up.
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  1. +5
    4 October 2022 11: 41
    He suggested that the Armed Forces of Ukraine already have an American network-centric combat control system, when all units, up to and including the company, are tied into a net and marked on monitors as their own. Therefore, the Ukrainian military may not care what symbols are applied to the equipment.

    Still ... yes, constantly NATO air reconnaissance along the borders of Dill and Crimea (although I don’t understand who prevents them from shooting down ... or do we still consider them not participants in the conflict ?!), which broadcasts information live ... and even and satellites.

    And at our front end I doubt that there is access to SUCH information ...
    1. 0
      4 October 2022 12: 52
      If we had parity with NATO and the Americans, then their scouts could shoot down. And so it was the usual propaganda in the style of analogues
  2. +4
    4 October 2022 12: 46
    Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.
    1. +5
      4 October 2022 15: 45
      Quote from: constantin4480
      Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.

      Well, what is he chief? Just one of a number...
      1. 0
        5 October 2022 12: 29
        Quote: Corsair
        Quote from: constantin4480
        Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.

        Well, what is he chief? Just one of a number...

        That's it, if only one.
  3. +9
    4 October 2022 12: 48
    Intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a visual observation through binoculars (one in ten).
    There is no satellite constellation, the VKS is pressed to the ground and only occasionally strikes along the line of collision (often anywhere) and running back. There are no electronic warfare (the one that has no analogues) either. Communication means - Chinese crafts. The Armed Forces of Ukraine dominate in the sky and on the earth (hello Konashenkov).
    What does the S-400 do at Cape Tarkhankut? From there to the place of fighting about 150 km. Why does the APU fly? Why aren't strikes being made on the enemy's concentration areas? After all, they accumulated there for more than one month.
    So many questions! Why the State Duma does not call Shoigu - let him answer.
    1. +10
      4 October 2022 15: 49
      Quote: Teacher
      So many questions! Why the State Duma does not call Shoigu - let him answer.

      No way! During the "debriefing" (more precisely - flights), it turns out that it will cast a shadow on the Radiant.
    2. 0
      5 October 2022 12: 31
      Quote: Teacher
      Intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a visual observation through binoculars (one in ten).
      There is no satellite constellation, the VKS is pressed to the ground and only occasionally strikes along the line of collision (often anywhere) and running back. There are no electronic warfare (the one that has no analogues) either. Communication means - Chinese crafts. The Armed Forces of Ukraine dominate in the sky and on the earth (hello Konashenkov).
      What does the S-400 do at Cape Tarkhankut? From there to the place of fighting about 150 km. Why does the APU fly? Why aren't strikes being made on the enemy's concentration areas? After all, they accumulated there for more than one month.
      So many questions! Why the State Duma does not call Shoigu - let him answer.

      You can't call Shoigu. You don't know whose friend he is. Well, EP everything is clear with them, but the Communists also put their tongues in the well ... stuck.
  4. +5
    4 October 2022 13: 11
    Everything is logical. Just one comment:

    looking for places to "leak"

    and mine the passages between the supporters ..?
    Or at least bear traps.
    But seriously, the feeling that not everything is good in all areas and with weapons (everything has already been said about management).
  5. +3
    4 October 2022 13: 23
    And I remember Shoigu reported on 70% of new equipment in the dry troops. And what ??? We are fighting T 62 and BMP1, but network-centric wars are not ours. The main thing is that 70% of new equipment and the budget have been cut.
  6. +4
    4 October 2022 13: 42
    Yeah ... Well, at least there is not that savagery that was in the Russian-Japanese war, when instead of a wagon with artillery ammunition, a wagon with icons was received in Manchuria. Although ... it's not evening yet.
  7. +6
    4 October 2022 13: 44
    After the Finnish war, Stalin had the determination to throw out people who had failed in the work entrusted to them from NPOs and appoint new ones. Today, this is unthinkable, because "we do not hand over our own."
  8. +2
    4 October 2022 13: 45
    Quote from: constantin4480
    Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.

    What rotation? Where will you get troops to replace those sent to the rear?
    1. +4
      4 October 2022 13: 58
      Quote: Panzer1962
      Quote from: constantin4480
      Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.

      What rotation? Where will you get troops to replace those sent to the rear?

      It was necessary to think about this earlier, and not announce mobilization now. It had to be announced on February 24, but apparently they were hoping for a Russian chance.
    2. +6
      4 October 2022 22: 13
      Quote: Panzer1962
      What rotation? Where will you get troops to replace those sent to the rear?

      The total strength of the RF Armed Forces is just over 1 people, of which about 000 are contract soldiers.
      Rumors are "walking" (the exact figures are classified) that 120-150 thousand contract soldiers are involved in the SVO.

      So consider...
      But keep in mind that I did not take into account the Russian Guard and PMCs.
  9. +7
    4 October 2022 14: 07
    Anything can be explained. Unfortunately, my memory is too good.

    After the ukrov attack on Kherson, they wrote about the huge losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and that for the sake of this offensive they exposed all sectors of the front. Up to artillery from near Donetsk. Then came the ukrov offensive on Liman and Izyum. And it was stated that for the sake of this offensive, the Ukrainians removed everything that was possible from other sectors of the front. Now followed by an offensive in the Krivoy Rog direction. And the Ukrainians are suffering huge losses. Again, they are outnumbered.

    Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are advancing both in the north and in the south. And everywhere they have a multiple (8-10 times) superiority in manpower and technology. If only in the south they throw up to 100 armored vehicles into battle, then this indicates their numerical superiority. And on the central sector of the front near Donetsk, the offensive of Russian troops is measured in meters. In the south and north, the advance of the ukrov is measured in kilometers.

    The number of Russian Armed Forces (military personnel) is set at 1 million people. And at the front it’s good if 150-200 thousand. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in 2021 there were almost 500 contract servicemen in the army alone. Half became "500". A question for the future - is a contract army needed?

    Conclusion. The Russian army is not fighting at full strength. And the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are to blame for this. I'm not going to teach the military their business. But I see that they are failing. Previously, they wrote "incomplete official compliance." I would write "complete service discrepancy".
    Second. You can write as much as you like about the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Reality is defined very precisely "While Moscow is holding salutes in honor of the annexation of regions on paper, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are annexing them on the ground."

    Addition. I would not be happy about the consumption of shells of the Russian Armed Forces. Not everything is so clear.
    One more addition. After the destruction of the crossings on Ingulets, the Andreevsky bridgehead was never liquidated. And now there is talk about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ingulets.
  10. -1
    4 October 2022 19: 27
    He is a straight general, sits at the headquarters and is trusted with the most secret materials!
  11. -1
    5 October 2022 09: 00
    Quote: Corsair
    Quote: Panzer1962
    What rotation? Where will you get troops to replace those sent to the rear?

    The total strength of the RF Armed Forces is just over 1 people, of which about 000 are contract soldiers.
    Rumors are "walking" (the exact figures are classified) that 120-150 thousand contract soldiers are involved in the SVO.

    So consider...
    But keep in mind that I did not take into account the Russian Guard and PMCs.

    I beg of you. Ground forces according to the notorious "new look" - at most 350 muzzles. The rest is the fleet, strategic missile forces, air defense, missile defense and so on.
    And what about the Russian Guard - did she fight a lot near Balakleya and Izyum?
    1. +4
      5 October 2022 12: 51
      Quote: Panzer1962
      Ground forces according to the notorious "new look" - at most 350 muzzles. The rest is the fleet, strategic missile forces, air defense, missile defense and so on.

      The Navy, in the form of marines of all fleets and flotillas (I emphasize - ALL) is involved in the NWO, ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet are also involved.
      Air defense forces are also involved in the operation.
      So, in addition to the Strategic Missile Forces and missile defense, almost all types and types of troops are represented in the NVO to one degree or another.
  12. +2
    5 October 2022 09: 06
    Quote from: constantin4480
    Quote: Panzer1962
    Quote from: constantin4480
    Logically. The lack of rotation is the main miscalculation of the command.

    What rotation? Where will you get troops to replace those sent to the rear?

    It was necessary to think about this earlier, and not announce mobilization now. It had to be announced on February 24, but apparently they were hoping for a Russian chance.

    Naturally, this should have been thought about in advance. You are 100000 percent correct here. But arrogance reached such a level that the calls to face the truth were touched by cries of delight from the uryakals, who savored Konashenkov's tales and wrote with delight at the tales of "grinding" the Wehrmacht's coming out. Even when something went wrong, they continued to sing songs that we don’t need numbers, we, like, will crush with our unprecedented quality.
  13. 0
    5 October 2022 12: 33
    Yeah .. a lot is obvious and only the General Staff and the Moscow Region are blind and deaf.
  14. 0
    5 October 2022 12: 58
    We are not in a hurry, we just harness, and then we go. The only question is which way
    1. +4
      5 October 2022 17: 26
      Quote: who
      We are not in a hurry, we just harness, and then we go.

      On the topic - "Russians harness for a long time, but then they go fast"You can talk as much as you like and everything will be useless.
      After all, they have not even begun to "harness" ...

      In the meantime, they will gather, it may turn out that the bridle was stolen, the horse was taken away, and the cart is standing on bricks - the wheels were removed ...
  15. 0
    5 October 2022 18: 28

    Quote from: constantin4480
    It was necessary to think about this earlier, and not announce mobilization now. It had to be announced on February 24, but apparently they were hoping for a Russian chance.

    It was necessary to think and thoroughly calculate everything before declaring this on February 24 ...
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