Can the S-550 disable elements of the American missile defense

January 2 2022 17

The information that Russia is hastily developing the S-550 anti-missile system made a lot of noise in Western paramilitary publications. And no wonder. The appearance at the RF Ministry of Defense of anti-satellite weapons, potentially capable of hitting targets in near space, could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the American missile defense system.

So far, very little is known about the S-550. Own source TASS in the military-industrial complex commented on the capabilities of this system as follows:

This is an absolutely new mobile strategic missile defense system that has no analogues. It is capable of shooting down spacecraft, ballistic missile warheads and hypersonic targets.

With the warheads of ICBMs, everything is clear, under hypersonic targets, apparently, a certain analogue of our "Vanguard" or something like that is supposed to be. Much more interesting is the information about the shooting down of spacecraft in near space. The Russian media hinted that the American unmanned spaceplane Boeing X-550 could become a priority target for the S-37. Each of these remotely controlled mini-shuttles can carry up to six nuclear bombs, and the Pentagon expects to keep up to eight such orbital bombers above our heads.

Such weapons carry a very serious potential as a means of delivering a preventive disarming strike against elements of the Russian missile defense control system and other strategically important infrastructure of the RF Ministry of Defense. Against such a "sword of Damocles" in orbit, either a shield or another sword is needed. But building your own spaceplanes is a very long and costly business, it turned out to be easier to modernize existing anti-missile systems. It is not yet known exactly what formed the basis of the S-550 - the S-500 or Nudol air defense systems, the main thing is that the complex turned out to be mobile, it can be quickly relocated and deployed. This may be extremely important in the future as a means of deterring American aggression.

The United States has built a powerful National Missile Defense (NMD) system to defend its territory and that of its allies from a just nuclear retaliation strike. It consists of several elements, the most important of which is the satellite constellation, which provides early warning of the launch of ballistic missiles. SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System), operating in the infrared spectrum, is designed for early detection of the launch of enemy ICBMs, as well as for determining the trajectory of their flight and issuing target designation data to interceptor missiles. The most interesting thing is that this constellation is still not completed: only 4 satellites of the upper echelon in elliptical orbits (HEO) and 4 geostationary satellites (GEO) have been launched.

Instead of completing SBIRS, the Pentagon decided to focus on the NGOPIR (Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared) satellite program. In low Earth orbits, a network of satellites operating in the infrared range should be deployed. At the first stage, OPIR will consist of several large, expensive reconnaissance satellites in geostationary orbit, with improved tacticaltechnical characteristics. The US Air Force reportedly signed a $ 2,9 billion contract with Lockheed Martin to build three OPIR geosynchronous satellites and a contract with Northrop Grumman to build two more satellites in the system, which will be in circumpolar orbits.

A natural question arises, how much will the effectiveness of the American missile defense system decrease if the S-550 anti-satellite missiles can hit the SBIRS and OPIR satellites in low earth orbit? What if Russian mobile systems are deployed somewhere in Cuba or Nicaragua, as well as in our Arctic, where elements of the space-based early warning system for an ICBM launch are targeted? It will be even better if Russia manages to "overwhelm" this system, and the ships and submarines of the Russian Navy receive anti-satellite missiles. The destruction of just a few satellites will significantly weaken the Pentagon's ability to track and intercept our nuclear missiles, which in itself is a critical psychological deterrent.

So, the point here, most likely, is not only in the hunt for the American unmanned spaceplanes Boeing X-37.

Information

Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.

sH, arK

+5

2 January 2022 12: 51

Yes, "horses, people mingled in a heap ... And volleys of thousands of guns ..." :-)
The X-37 can certainly be loaded like an ICBM bus. Benefit? Yes - the early warning system will not track it, or rather it will be launched with an official notification, but it will be able to hold on for up to several years, and it must be monitored constantly - the reaction time to it is a minute, two - maximum! Yes, there is a nuance - the deployment of any weapon in space today under treaty restrictions, which, of course, I can spit on, the United States regularly does this.
Exit? He is the only one - to place his weapons in space. And for the United States, this is very painful. First of all, the deployment of interceptors of reconnaissance satellites of the KN-11 type, the cost of which is from $ 4 to 8 billion, systems that disrupt satellite communications ... For example, the detonation of a nuclear charge optimized for EMP on the Karman line for a long "conjugate" points introduces enormous interference, while formally, it is done in the Arctic zone, and formally is not an act of war ...

But it's rubbish when any agreements cease to be valid. Fact.
1. Sarmat Sanych
  
  0
  
  2 January 2022 19: 37
  
  sH, arK, hundreds of times experts and non-specialists have dealt with the issue of "nuclear weapons on the X-37". There, even theoretically, it is impossible to unload a pair of charges, much less deliver in advance to await use. And the point is not in the colossal (inaccessible even for the Pentagon) cost of these pairs of warheads, and not even in the fact that nuclear weapons must be properly stored and not even in the insolubility of guidance and objective risk during the withdrawal of the carrier, problems with the cancellation / elimination / landing / nothing-solving two-headed warheads, etc. ... As a result, the Kh-37 is a reconnaissance and satellite hunter plus an easy target for the S-500/550 and the Peresvet BLK.
  1. sH, arK
    
    0
    
    2 January 2022 20: 52
    
    X-37 is a common noun here ... It's not even about a spaceplane, but about a maneuvering space object containing a bus with a warhead! Perhaps the X-37 is not very intended for a specific task, but is only a test platform. Our warriors won and the Shuttle were considered a bomber, although he could not get into orbit with such an inclination. But in the 15-ton compartment it was possible to pack a lot of things, and the fact of possible military use was not at all speculative. Although, of course, the descent of both the Shuttle and the X-37 from orbit with nuclear warheads is a very "interesting" task :-) But perhaps this task is not considered seriously. If it took off, then the decision to use it has already been made ...
    1. Sarmat Sanych
      
      0
      
      2 January 2022 21: 42
      
      sH, arK, I will add a secret - the States (by the way, France and China) have still not been able to create anything better than a "bus" stupidly "dumping" warheads with one scoop (with minimal dilution). On the last (so far unreadable) French M-51, the system barely reaches the "Sineva", on the T2D5 in the last (not even brought to mind) LE version is worse than on the "Liner". So that you understand the level: the spread of targets for the R-30 and Yars-S is liberal to such an extent that the warheads of the same SLBM and ICBM will, if necessary, go to North Dakota and Norfolk and Montana and Guam and Crystal Peak ...
      To sum up, nuclear weapons on either the X-37 or any similar platform are unrealistic for dozens of reasons, from technical to financial, any other weapon on them is impractical, and a nuclear space engine (for a full-fledged missile defense laser) is inaccessible to the Americans more than ever (Russia creates this, this is our global advantage). As a satellite hunter and scout, the X-37 is ideal. If there were no S-500/550, A-235 and BLK "Peresvet".
Adler77

-4

2 January 2022 13: 57

Excellent article, you can give you a link in the article about aircraft carriers :) they see and know everything, but we? About 0 in comparison. This is where the money should be directed. Just replace the cattail with a responsible professional (where to find it).
Alexey Davydov

+2

2 January 2022 15: 13

An interesting point in the article is the creation of mobile missile defense and PSO systems.
It significantly changes the usual, for non-professionals, the picture of maneuvering strategic forces. The tactics of using them are enriched with new possibilities and options.
Do not forget, however, that a monopoly in the field of weapons will not last long, even if it can be achieved in some way.
Let us simulate in this vein the nearest development of the security situation with the United States.
Let's say we begin to create additional military and technical threats to the States with the means at our disposal in order to maintain all our negotiating positions.
States respond the same.
In a very short time, before negotiations, the number of real threats from both sides increases manifold, and so does the risks.
What will be decisive in the negotiations after all this?
Is this factor going to be an advantage in threats?
I think not at all. As before, the outcome will be determined by the final price each side is willing to go for. And the determination to do it.
The intensity of the situation should force the Americans to abandon their plans for us and resolve all issues with us.
1. gunnerminer
  
  -10
  
  2 January 2022 16: 17
  
  To develop, does not mean to automatically let them into units. Foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, after a series of weighty kicks, began to significantly increase their activity in opening channels and paths for the delivery of components to the Russian military-industrial complex. Now from the countries of Southeast Asia. If the S-550 will be handed over to the customer in quantities approximately equal to the S-400, then there will be no need to talk about the creation of a serious threat to the enemy's missiles and satellites. At the end of the Starlink program, near space will be literally crammed with satellites. Operators of this system will be able to monitor literally every truck, and the positions of Russian air defense systems. Moreover, they will be stationary and will not require large expenditures of time. SAM is a passive method of fighting. On an active method, by fighting space mobile devices, there is neither means nor technological base, no personnel.
  1. sH, arK
    
    +6
    
    2 January 2022 20: 08
    
    Delirium repeated twice - remains delusional! Yes, intercepting Starlink or OneWeb - in the sense that it is virtually impossible to destroy the satellite mechanically! But small satellites also have many features. Well, the limited service life, okay, we don’t think, but they are extremely vulnerable to beam, laser exposure ... Low altitude - vulnerability to ionization of high-rise layers that block work. And small satellites cannot conduct observations by definition - there is nothing;) Of course, they can register a client-source with a certain accuracy, like a telephone according to the position of the tower, but the air defense missile system and even the cruiser are clearly not their clients, do not write nonsense! Mobile towers can also track a client if he is registered in the network;)
    
    I understand that Ukrainians really want to hide behind someone who will magically defeat us, but alas - it's not harmful to dream;))
  2. Sarmat Sanych
    
    +4
    
    2 January 2022 21: 14
    
    gunnerminer, guys-on-assignment trying to find out the crumbs here, enough nonsense fifteen years ago about "blocked the electronics channel" to tulip, even in 2010, if it rolled, then in 2016 the experts were laughing. We have been doing it ourselves for a long time to the last screw for air defense / missile defense, which is why it is, by the way, the best in the world. If the S-550 and S-500 are handed over to the customer (like the S-400 in number) 610 launchers (as of January 2022, more is possible), then this will neutralize the antediluvian strategic nuclear forces of the United States by 200% (and I still admit that all 25 -40-year-old slow bolt-rattling Ogiki will be able to release not more than two T2D5s as now, but at least 4 each (here for the most combat-ready Wyoming and 3 is unrealistic), at least 50% of Minutemans-3 will be able to leave their mines (from 2011 to 2014, failures and up to 60% reached) that they were still able to clear the ancient Pu-239 from the accumulating Americium and other joys (since the beginning of the 12s, the exceptional not only have serious problems with this - they even have the last Y-25 plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee for the preparation of a weapons U after 88 years of unsuccessful resuscitation, they closed and the obviously substandard (after autopsy by Chinese hackers) W100 could not be brought to mind - it was necessary everywhere on the old 76 kiloton W-1-70)) and at least XNUMX% of their warheads will not lose accuracy when passing Coriolis (which Russians, unlike them, successfully solve)).
    The superiority of Russia in the quality and real combat power of the Strategic Nuclear Forces over the overseas goners is colossal, and it is increasing not just from year to year, but from month to month. Failure of Columbia for 8 years (and there, as it turned out, the children of those generations of techies who brewed the last "glasses" for SLBMs died - competencies were lost), shame in hyper, Burks with Aegis are unable to intercept the Khrushchev tarantass of baby Eun (and right next to the banks They stood in Saudia during the humiliation of the Houthis), the braking of the GBSD project (initially inferior to the RS-24 (not to mention the fantastic Yars-S), our ability to instantly snap their "starlinks" like seeds by two dozen (nuclear, with direct pulse pumping, not depending on the weather, an exorbitant level of perfection) BLK "Peresvet", etc.
    So it remains for you to squat down on the "satellites-sensors-lack of frames", etc. This is the country that is the global leader of the entire spectrum of the nuclear industry, the planetary leader in the production of high and ultra-high power lasers (all two are super-powerful in Sarov), the countries whose gunsmiths create charges at a level of 160/100 (I will not explain, I will note that the French and Americans have mastered only 100/100, the Chinese generally have an ancient level of 90/100), a country that occupies 70% of the world isotope market and has created superalloys at 4500 C, the only country building super-powerful neutron reactors without which materials science of the XXII century is impossible and a country whose latest version of the 51T6 anti-missile has the acceleration is 5,5 times greater than that of the fastest version of SM-3, the only country that has developed a nuclear starship (by the way, a two-megawatt class, with this energy you can kill all the western and eastern satellites like sheep for the slaughter (the ISS has 120 kW for comparison), and no one except Russia has the opportunity to create something like this at least by 2050, the most difficult thing that people have ever created), I a nuclear intercontinental underwater drone and a nuclear-powered missile system, a country that has about 65% of the "long-range" air defense launchers currently on Earth, a country capable of producing no less than half a ton of Co-60 per year (the United States has less than 1 kg per year, for France and China - a maximum of a couple of kg) of the country that created and armed with hundreds of CDs with a range (depending on the warhead) of 5500/9000 km (despite the fact that no other country has mastered any CD with a long-range of 3000 km) ... Too lazy to enumerate, in fact, thanks to military superiority, we forced the "exceptional" to accept the conditions of Russia.
    1. gunnerminer
      
      -8
      
      2 January 2022 22: 25
      
      Russian air defense / missile defense is passive and stationary; it does not have the most important component. Air defense fighter regiments with AWACS and U. and mobile means of influence, at least in low orbits. There is nothing like Aegis in the Russian Armed Forces. Here we are lagging behind in quantity and quality. Forever. The triad of strategic nuclear forces has become a stunted monad in 20 years.
      1. sH, arK
        
        +3
        
        2 January 2022 23: 01
        
        Aegis in Russia is not needed due to the absence of AUG, there is no fleet that needs to be united by a single control system ... Well, no ... You cannot grasp the immensity. We do not live on an island, like the USA, we only need to send warheads to them, we will not send an expeditionary force there, as in C & C;)
        Yes, and it is a controversial issue to start everything on a single control system. France, Germany, Italy and Britain also do not have ships under the Aegis.
        
        The Russian strategic nuclear forces are now much ahead of the American ones;) The Minuteman is generally wretched old stuff. Yes, Trident II was successful, wonderful rockets! But they are purely ballistic, unlike the Bulava, for example! And they lose to Sineva, and even more so to Liner outright. And in terms of nuclear warheads, everything is really bad. Only precision is an asset. But the trajectory is pure ballistics, which means it is vulnerable to interception.
        
        No, it’s not worth Ukrainians on the United States now, at the wrong time ... It’s not just that Russia puts ultimatums!
        
        gunnerminer
        
        -5
        
        3 January 2022 09: 48
        
        The Russian Navy does not even have ships to accommodate an analogue of the Aegis. Even if this reconnaissance and strike complex fell in combat readiness into the hands of the Russian Navy's Main Command. America.
        The price of an ultimatum to NATO is ridiculous. There are people who can read Russian newspapers, and they are aware of the form in which the Russian strategic nuclear forces are and what happens to them every six months.
        
        General Black
        
        +1
        
        3 January 2022 09: 59
        
        Herr Gunnerminer, do you have a mattress?
        
        Eduard Aplombov
        
        +2
        
        3 January 2022 11: 08
        
        Only old manuals and a furious need to earn money, a ruble or a penny
        
        alexneg13
        
        -1
        
        22 January 2022 21: 34
        
        Only old manuals and a furious need to earn money, a ruble or a penny
        
        Nope! A glass bead and cut paper are prepared for them.
        
        sH, arK
        
        +3
        
        3 January 2022 10: 54
        
        You, yes, do not have the strength to ruin Donbass, and thank God! God gave no horns to a thirsty cow! More precisely, he gave it, but she did not save them :-)
        
        The price of the ultimatum is ridiculous ?! Well, yes, "it's funny to the fool that the ears are on the side"! The purpose of the "ultimatum" is not to be accepted! This is the legal form for further actions! This is what he is terrible. This is a signal of readiness for action. And this signal is correctly understood.
        
        And as for the Aegis, why is it that no one except Japan, Korea and Norway has coveted the Aegis? Not Great Britain, not France with Italy, Germany or Spain?
    2. gunnerminer
      
      -4
      
      3 January 2022 11: 56
      
      And more about Russia's strategic nuclear forces. They are part of the Armed Forces that suffered from the reforms of 2008-2012. All warrant officers and some of the contract sergeants were massively cut off. Making up the bulk of the NFC brigades. The mobile nuclear fuel units of the military districts and fleets were reduced to the root. The institute of warrant officers was liquidated, so that the combat readiness of strategic nuclear forces and operational-tactical forces looks like after a nuclear strike.