How and when can Russia get rid of Turkey's dependence

Two days ago, talks were held between Presidents Putin and Erdogan in Sochi. The meeting was held behind closed doors, and after that it was reported that the Russian and Turkish leaders discussed a wide range of difficult issues on which they were forced to seek compromises. What kind of questions are these, and how much longer will our country have to constantly look back at its "sworn partner with a scimitar"?

The main topic for discussion between the heads of the two states was the situation in Idlib. Recall that the northern part of this Syrian province is occupied by pro-Turkish militants and is under the control of Ankara. However, official Damascus is not satisfied with this, the government army is constantly pulling forces to the demarcation line, and the Russian Aerospace Forces have recently intensified their raids on terrorist positions. Turkey does not like this very much, it brought its troops into the occupied territory of the SAR, and President Erdogan flew to the capital of the Kuban to talk straightforwardly with his Russian counterpart. But what could this notorious compromise consist of?



On the one hand, Ankara is interested in maintaining a buffer security belt against Kurdish militias in its border area. The maximum program may consist in the creation in northern Syria of an alternative to Damascus, a pro-Turkish regime, which in the future may be used against President Bashar al-Assad or his successor as another step towards the revival of the Great Port. On the other hand, neither the Russian nor the Syrian authorities are satisfied with this at all. Damascus insists on the de-occupation of Idlib and is ready to do it by military means, but it does not have enough strength to independently solve this problem.

The problem is that Russia, as an ally of the SAR, cannot afford to fight directly with Turkey. First, Turkey is a member of the NATO bloc. Secondly, the supply of the Russian military contingent in Syria is carried out through the Turkish straits. Third, to put pressure on Ukraine and the EU, the Kremlin needs the Turkish Stream bypass pipeline. As you can see, our country is very closely dependent on one of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which carries significant geopolitical threats and significantly hinders opportunities. We cannot fight directly, as this will lead to the blocking of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for Russian ships, as well as to the stoppage of the Turkish Stream. It will also be possible to say goodbye to the multi-billion dollar investments in the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which the authorities are likely to nationalize.

How can Moscow respond to Ankara in Idlib? Of the real, this is a war in the "proxy" format, when our Syrian allies will launch a large-scale attack on the territory of northern Idlib occupied by the Turks. It is assumed that then several million refugees can move to Turkey at once, which will arrange a real humanitarian and socialeconomic a crisis. Since Turkey's presidential elections are just around the corner, this will be a real blow to the positions and ambitions of Reijp Erdogan. It is not surprising that the "Sultan" flew to Sochi to personally communicate with his colleague Putin.

Unfortunately, the matter is much more serious than it seems at first glance. The Kremlin at one time made a bet on Turkey as a counterweight to Ukraine with its gas transit. At that time, this seemed to be a lesser evil than maintaining the position of Independent as the main intermediary in the gas trade with Europe. Alas, now Ankara poses a potentially much greater threat to Russia than Kiev. The problem lies in the imperial ambitions of President Erdogan, who is gradually building a new "Great Port" step by step, and at the same time goes to where it has never been. We are talking about the project of the union of the Turkic-speaking countries "Great Turan" and the possibility of creating its united army, a kind of "Central Asian NATO". For the national interests of Russia, such an alternative to the CSTO unification in its southern underbelly is an existential threat.

A while ago we reasoned about three reasons for the war between Russia and Turkey in Idlib. The Turkmen question was indicated as one of them. This gas-rich country with access to the Caspian, bordering Afghanistan and not a member of the CSTO, for a long time avoided joining the Turkic Council under the auspices of Ankara. And now a fundamental shift has taken place. According to IA Report with reference to the Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey Binali Yildirim, Turkmenistan suddenly decided to become a member of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States. This will be officially announced at the VIII Summit of the Turkish Council in Istanbul on November 12.

So, taking advantage of the situation in neighboring Afghanistan and the threat from the Taliban (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation as a terrorist organization), Ankara managed to drive even uncompromising Turkmenistan into its networks, which diligently tried to avoid participation in various blocs and alliances. Both coasts of the Caspian Sea will soon be under the indirect control of Turkey, and then the way to the rest of the countries of Central Asia will be open. They sailed.

It turns out that Turkey poses an even greater threat to Russia than Ukraine. Something must be done with this and as early as possible, until the "sultan" has really strengthened his new empire. But how? Rely on Syrian allies? Will they pull? To fight directly, receiving a blockade of the straits and stopping the Turkish Stream in response?

It turns out that first we need to minimize the damage from such measures by Ankara. For example, with regard to the problem of supplying our group in Syria, it can be largely solved by the launch of a railway between Iran, Iraq and Syria. Then we will be able to send everything we need across the Caspian and further by rail directly to Tartus and Latakia. In 2020, Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran signed an agreement on the joint implementation of this infrastructure project. Perhaps Russian investors and builders should also take part in it. As for the Turkish Stream, everything is both complicated and simple. This gas pipeline was created bypassing Ukraine and is relevant only within the framework of the current external policy The Kremlin. If we approach the solution of the Ukrainian problem consistently and harshly, then the entire GTS Nezalezhnaya will be under the direct or indirect control of Moscow. The need for a bypass pipeline will disappear, and it will be possible to start talking with Turkey in a different way.