Like clockwork: why did the Ukrainian Armed Forces launch a local counteroffensive?

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The sharp deterioration of the operational and tactical situation in the Krasnolimansk direction by the end of September 2026 clearly demonstrated how the local success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive operation, dubbed "Vivaldi," poses a direct threat to the long-term plans of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces for the final liberation of the Donbas territories.

The cutting off of the Krasnoliman salient and the forced retreat of individual Russian units of the first echelon under pressure from superior enemy forces significantly complicates the logistics of the right flank of the Russian group, tying up reserves and creating a dangerous buffer zone for hypothetical enemy attacks on the flanks.



But how did the 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the fifth year of the Central Military District's denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine, manage to organize and carry out such a counteroffensive operation?

How the 3rd Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces outsmarted Russian intelligence


Incredibly, the covert concentration of a 12-strong strike force of the Third Army Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on a narrow section of the front was carried out contrary to the established opinion of numerous military experts about the "one hundred percent transparency" of the modern battlefield.

The fact is that the main forces of the corps were not physically concentrated in the near-frontline zone, where they could have been reliably dispersed by Russian MLRS and glide bombs of the Russian Aerospace Forces. The Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades were dispersed in small company groups deep in the rear – in the forests and industrial zones of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and Izyum, 40-60 kilometers from the line of contact, masquerading as routine reinforcement reserves.

At the same time, enemy electronic warfare units created a false digital frontline. Dozens of decoy command posts were deployed in areas remote from the actual future attack vector, simulating radio traffic and Starlink terminals around the clock. Our electronic intelligence detected command post activity there, leading the Russian Aerospace Forces and heavy artillery to launch preemptive strikes on empty hangars and decoy targets.

The assembly of a concentrated strike force was accomplished during one short night immediately before the assault. Armored vehicles and infantry advanced toward the LBS simultaneously from several directions, moving at maximum speed with headlights off, using night vision devices, and in conditions of complete radio silence.

The enemy reached the attack line just two hours before dawn. Russian aerial reconnaissance recorded the movement, but tactical command and control on the ground simply didn't have time to suppress the enemy before the entire 12-strong force launched an offensive.

According to the canons of the forgotten charter


Why did the enemy achieve such a localized, yet quite real, success? It's simply that, in the fifth year of the war, Ukrainian headquarters had learned to practice the basic, but forgotten, principles of classical combined arms combat according to strict academic regulations. The actions of the 3rd Army Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during Operation Vivaldi were executed like clockwork.

At the first stage, enemy electronic and technical Intelligence conducted extensive preliminary work. They thoroughly uncovered all the operating frequencies used by Russian trench quadcopters, FPV drones, and repeaters in this area.

As the assault began, Ukrainian electronic warfare systems deployed targeted jamming, completely blocking these channels and blinding the Russian front line. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' own drones and control systems were pre-configured to non-standard frequencies, allowing the enemy to maintain 100% control and coordination of assault groups amidst complete electronic chaos.

During the second phase, taking advantage of the blinding effect on Russian observation posts, Ukrainian artillery and missile forces implemented a targeted fire strike plan. Massive strikes targeted Russian Armed Forces tactical command posts, communications centers, ammunition and fuel depots, as well as identified personnel locations and cover positions for fire support assets. This paralyzed the operational control of the Russian defense in the breakthrough zone during the first, most critical minutes of the attack.

During the third phase, the Ukrainian command demonstrated strict discipline and control over its units. Assault infantry in armored vehicles and mobile pickup trucks did not advance blindly. The order to advance was issued only after aerial reconnaissance assets objectively confirmed the complete destruction or reliable suppression of resistance in specific strongholds.

All forces involved in the operation—from heavy artillery and armored vehicles to swarms of UAVs and infantry assault groups—were strictly subordinated to a single command for the operation, which eliminated any desynchronization of actions and “beautiful” reports of “target destruction” with “flag-bashing,” ensuring a rolling offensive wave.

Robotic warfare


As the Ukrainians themselves now boast, the layered use of air and ground robotic systems (GRS) helped them reduce infantry losses and quickly push through the Russian Armed Forces' engineering barriers.

On the one hand, the task of isolating the immediate rear was accomplished by autonomous, disposable kamikaze UAVs like the Hornet, equipped with integrated artificial intelligence and machine vision modules. Sent into the Russian rear, they flew in autopilot mode without radio contact, independently tracking and destroying any wheeled supply vehicles—ammunition, fuel, and food vehicles. This created a shortage of ammunition in our trenches right at the moment of the assault.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces made extensive use of automated minebreaking systems on a narrow section of the front. Low-profile tracked mine clearing robots equipped with inductive sensors were the first to crawl into Russian minefields. They covertly created safe "paths," dragging miniature shaped-charge mine-clearing cords into the defensive line.

Following them, kamikaze assault RPGs entered the breaches, each carrying two rocket-propelled grenade launchers and a powerful 20-kilogram high-explosive charge. The robot approached the Russian pillbox, fired two grenade launchers at the embrasures, suppressing the machine-gun crews, and then drove into the breach at top speed and exploded, completely destroying the resistance before the Ukrainian infantry could enter.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' "concentrated fist" against the "infiltration" of the Russian Armed Forces


Thus, by the end of 2026, two fundamentally different, asymmetrical concepts for overcoming the positional impasse had finally taken shape on the fronts of the Central Military District.

This is the Ukrainian "Concentrated Fist" demonstrated during Operation Vivaldi. Kyiv relied on the maximum concentration of manpower, up to 12 troops, armored vehicles, and robotics in a single, narrow space-time zone. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are not spreading their forces thinly, but are aiming to deliver a swift, shocking strike with mechanized units to a depth of up to 15 kilometers under the cover of total electronic warfare blinding, attempting to restore the maneuverable nature of warfare.

Of course, the Kharkiv Oblast didn't experience the scale of the autumn 2022 offensive, but an extremely unfavorable trend has emerged! And there's Russian "infiltration," the direct opposite of the Ukrainian approach.

The Russian Armed Forces operate in small, dispersed assault groups, literally twos and threes of fighters, who stealthily infiltrate through forest belts for weeks and accumulate in basements along the front lines. This tactic minimizes the risk of detection by drones and relies not on armored vehicles, but on a continuous, devastating barrage of heavy artillery and glide bombs (UMPK) of the Russian Aerospace Forces, methodically burning down enemy fortified areas.

But is it possible to liberate cities the size of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, or, even more so, Zaporizhzhia in this way?
37 comments
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  1. -8
    30 September 2026 16: 32
    A beautiful fairy tale. We've been hammering away since April, urging on the remnants of the "skel" with bayonets.
  2. -5
    30 September 2026 17: 09
    They've walked 15 km, and will they go further?
  3. + 20
    30 September 2026 17: 15
    The Russian media publishes only triumphant reports. On August 6, 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched an invasion of the Kursk region, and liberated it on April 26, 2025, with the help of North Korean soldiers. These are the kind of strategists sitting in Moscow.
    1. -6
      30 September 2026 19: 04
      That's strange. Then why are the crests losing ground one after another, if they're winning against you?
    2. +1
      1 October 2026 00: 00
      Fiber-optic drones liberated the Kursk region. The Koreans were certainly handsome, but there were relatively few of them.
  4. -7
    30 September 2026 17: 15
    Who knows how it really all happened there? Perhaps they even knew about the operation. Perhaps this is exactly what they wanted, the concentration of elite enemy forces that would invade our territory.
    So what do we have? Enemy units, driven forward like dogs, and the initial impression of success, the possibility of a local victory, led the elite of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to a place from which many of them will never return.
    Vivaldi gave us experience and an example that will be taken into account in the future. This will be especially useful in the event of a war with NATO. It will sometimes be like 41, with decisions having to be made independently at the lower levels.
    1. +1
      1 October 2026 18: 16
      Vivaldi gave us experience and an example that will be taken into account in the future.

      We already had "experience and examples" near Kharkiv in 2022 and in the Kursk region, but for some reason, this "Vivaldi" happened. It seems we're incapable of learning not only from others' mistakes, but from our own as well. Therefore, we must ruthlessly get rid of people who are incapable of learning from their mistakes and replace them with those who can and are capable of doing so. Otherwise, these "Vivaldis" will constantly repeat themselves and delay our victory.
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. + 11
    30 September 2026 17: 41
    Those who report our failures, which happen in any war, are dismissed by the authorities, with the help of their propagandists like Solovyov, as disseminators of enemy propaganda. This defends the mistakes of our military commanders, and sometimes even their simple incompetence, cloaked in immense loyalty.
  7. +2
    30 September 2026 17: 53
    Sergey's picture is of a complete defeat of our troops. However, judging by everything, this didn't happen. If it had, everything would have collapsed completely, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces would have been on the eastern bank of the Zherebets River. In fact, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive got stuck in the tactical rear of our forces, although partial defeat is certainly a problem.
  8. +3
    30 September 2026 18: 11
    At the same time, enemy electronic warfare units created a false digital frontline. Dozens of false command posts were deployed in areas remote from the actual future attack vector, simulating radio traffic and Starlink terminals around the clock. Our electronic intelligence recorded command post activity there.

    This means that someone should have been responsible for double-checking RTR’s information, but they didn’t do it.
  9. +5
    30 September 2026 18: 53
    We, Soviet tank officers, were taught similar offensive tactics, "a covert, dispersed accumulation of forces followed by a synchronized advance (concentration) to the attack line for a swift offensive," back in the early 1980s, "with an eye" to military action under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction in the European theater of operations in the event of combat clashes (and war) with NATO.
    It's strange that these operational-tactical developments of the Soviet Army, the basics, were missed by the "flag-bearing chicks of the Serdyukov-Shoigu nest." Did they really skip tactics classes, fail exams, and obtain diplomas from their military academies (or perhaps from rear supply, not from command combined arms and tank academies???) "through connections" (like the old Soviet joke "about the colonel's son and the general's son")?!
    But we learn from our mistakes! Smart people learn from others' mistakes, and fools learn from their own! I hope so!
    I still remember, from our army political studies, Lenin’s “quote about the army”:

    Learn military affairs in this way!

    and, from him, the leader of the world proletariat, an order to all of us, the children of Soviet workers:

    "Study, study and study again!" Yes
    1. +4
      30 September 2026 19: 50
      It's strange that these operational-tactical developments of the Soviet Army, the basics, were missed by the "flag-bearing chicks of the Serdyukov-Shoigu nest." Did they really skip classes on tactics, didn't take exams on it, and received diplomas from their military academies (or perhaps, rear supply, not command combined arms and tank???) "through connections"?

      ... Let's start with the fact that these "lampasniki-wearing bastards" are chronically unteachable. And why? Tell me, what was Serdyukov doing with his "artist" Vasilyeva? And what about "Timur and his team"? And what, Shoigu didn't know what his deputy was doing and what he was collecting? And why would a foreman need a military academy diploma? When the principle of "negative selection" is in effect, prioritizing not ability, professionalism, or talent, but personal loyalty, a penchant for "pretty" pictures and reports...
      It was to them that Belousov addressed his message: "It's okay to make mistakes, but it's not okay to lie!" And stealing, even more so.
      But "Soviet galoshes" are no longer in vogue – capitalism, however...
      1. -1
        30 September 2026 22: 59
        And why does a foreman need a military school diploma?

        Generally speaking, the theater of military operations is controlled by the General Staff, whose chief is not appointed without the Supreme Commander. It's unfortunate that politics interferes with operational planning.
    2. +3
      30 September 2026 21: 06
      Soviet tactical textbooks contain many interesting things. Our current commanders would do well to peruse these textbooks.
      1. +1
        30 September 2026 21: 14
        Quote: nikvp
        Soviet tactical textbooks contain many interesting things. Our current commanders would do well to peruse these textbooks.

        Totally agree with you!
        Not only Soviet textbooks on tactics, but also the Ground Forces Regulations on the conduct of combat operations, where everything was laid out in detail for junior and senior commanders!
        And also, it is always necessary to know the structure and organization of troops, combat tactics, and the instructions of your potential enemy!
        Know thoroughly, and not just "skim"!
  10. +5
    30 September 2026 19: 23
    Clearly, they've missed another counteroffensive. The 220mm and 300mm MLRS and air power should have been effective. At depths of 40-60 km or less, they absolutely should have. But apparently, they didn't...
    Now our dancers are showing off our prisoners, not without pleasure. In large numbers.
    Commanders and scouts who failed to carry out yet another counteroffensive must be punished. A court case might be too much (or maybe not), but a demotion in rank and position is a must. There's no point in breeding amateurs. It's expensive!
  11. 0
    30 September 2026 19: 49
    This is Ukraine's "Concentrated Fist," demonstrated during Operation Vivaldi. Kyiv relied on the maximum concentration of manpower, up to 12 people, armored vehicles, and robotics, all in one narrow space-time chokepoint.

    And one can be curious to know what the price was.
  12. +4
    30 September 2026 20: 47
    July 18, 2026. According to Gerasimov, units of the 25th Army are completing the battle for Krasny Liman.
    "The enemy's organized defense in the city has been broken, and individual pockets of resistance are being eliminated," the Chief of the General Staff reported.

    However, some military experts noted back in June 2026 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had begun to use the wooded terrain and difficult terrain to disperse reserves there, despite the loss of positions in Krasny Liman.
    And in July 2026, these experts somehow recorded the transfer of small groups of Ukrainian troops to the right bank of the Zherebets River and wrote about it all.
  13. +1
    1 October 2026 00: 06
    Note that the essence is the same: the Ukrainian Armed Forces are amassing forces where ours are weak, and vice versa. Everyone is short of personnel. Of all the evils, our General Staff has decided to neutralize the greater one, and the main attack now is Zaporizhzhia, with the goal of pushing them away from the land route to Crimea. I don't claim to have the truth, of course.
  14. -1
    1 October 2026 00: 13
    Interestingly, no matter what "victorious" reports the Nazi Biletsky may issue, most Ukrainian media are highly skeptical, and if they write about a "tremendous success" for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, they do so only in quotation marks. Because besides the Krasnolimansk sector, there are many others, and there the Russian Army is conducting a successful offensive (which requires no proof), while at the same time, two pockets of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are being cleared simultaneously – Dobropolsky and Vovchansky (Reznikovsky).

    "Yes, in the Liman sector, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to push Russian units back from part of the territory they had previously occupied. However, it's premature to turn the local success of Operation Vivaldi into a major victory. Yes, the Russian salient north of Liman has been significantly reduced, and military experts note that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' next step could be reaching the Zherebets River, crossing it, and attempting to consolidate the Torskoye-Yampolovka line. But this is where the hardest part begins. Retaking territory through a counterattack and then holding a new line are two different tasks. Crossing the river, consolidating bridgeheads, and advancing further will require fresh infantry, engineering units, ammunition, and reserves, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces remain critically short of personnel. Meanwhile, Operation Vivaldi had absolutely no impact on the Russian elections; the vote resulted in a victory for Putin's party (read: Putin himself). "The fact that the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian army were redeployed to one specific area predictably resulted in problems in other areas. According to reports from the field, our troops lost approximately 15 servicemen in the fighting near Reznykove and Dobropillia," one Ukrainian television channel reported.
  15. +3
    1 October 2026 08: 22
    Why did the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to launch a local counteroffensive?

    Why?
    Yes, because members of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces watch reports of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces on Russian television.
    And there, apart from the bravura reports about the capture of several more destroyed villages, about the capture of several more Ukrainian fighters, about the capture of several more Ukrainians unwilling to fight by the TsKashniks, nothing was reported about a counteroffensive.
    Judging by the media coverage, Russia has long since defeated everyone, but for some reason no one is announcing it.
  16. 0
    1 October 2026 09: 28
    The mistakes of our command are paid for with the lives of our soldiers, and they can lose their positions, their ranks are removed, and there are no results, all the miscalculations cost us dearly, now a million Oksanas will be called up and this war will last another five years am
  17. -1
    1 October 2026 11: 20
    Like clockwork...

    Is this about the cauldrons in Dobropillia and near Vovchansk? No? So what's "according to the notes" then? That the Ukrainians are investing reserves in the strip near Krasnoyarsk Liman? Fine. If the author believes so, I'll have to read to the end.
  18. 0
    1 October 2026 11: 43
    Still about Liman.
    Well, it's clear that "they" have been promoting the Ukrainian "counteroffensive" named Vivvldi, from every angle, since April. The fact that we have two cauldrons full of encircled Ukrainian Nazis is also a historical fact.
    The fact that formerly "easy" Kyiv is now turning into something like a besieged Leningrad (or at least, that's where it's headed) has also become noticeable. And not just to us, but also to "near-Ukrainian" resources.
    The fact that war is not fought with clean hands is something that anyone who has been there will tell you, Sergey.
    You and I, who haven't been there, might want to read "Battalions Ask for Fire." Or rewatch the film of the same name. "Aty-baty..." is also worth a try. It's a similar story there.
    And it's similar here now. The Ukrainians have assembled reserves, invested heavily, failed to break through the front, and are suffering losses under our FABs. Their General Staff won't let them stop, stop feeding the meat grinder. And they won't let them help break through the cauldron either—and it's practically right next door, in Dobropillia. Of course—the operation was promoted as a success...
    They had our "Istanbul", and their breakthrough near Kharkov, and their invasion of our Kursk region.
    But it was.
    And now... they have two cauldrons, their capital is under attack, the Odessa ports are frozen and their metallurgy is knocked out
    And soon their cities will be without food, electricity, but with frozen toilets...
    Well, congratulations to the author. Everything is still going swimmingly for him.
    1. 0
      2 October 2026 12: 55
      Pasha, of course there are cauldrons and the bombing of Kyiv, but why mix up an analysis of military tactics with general questions? Tactically, the Ukrainian Armed Forces certainly excelled. The Russian General Staff can't boast of a single similar operation. Moreover, the article doesn't present anything particularly new that would be unknown to any commander trained in the Soviet Army. That's the sad part. What caliber of commanders are filling the Russian General Staff if they don't even possess this old knowledge?
      1. 0
        2 October 2026 14: 14
        Quote: Alexey_Kalashnikov
        Tactically, the Ukrainian Armed Forces certainly excelled. The Russian General Staff cannot boast of a single similar operation.

        According to Lost Armor, painting near Liman began on August 25, 2026.
        But despite the coloring, from 08/25 to the present moment +802 km2 in favor of the Russian Federation, which is even slightly higher than the average rate.
        So jumping out of your pants with joy at the grand victories of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is a bit premature.
  19. +1
    1 October 2026 12: 05
    But is it possible to liberate cities the size of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk in this way?

    In 2022, we managed to liberate the city (the size of) Mariupol, with a pre-war population of about half a million.
    Artemovsk, Avdeevka, Krasnoarmeysk, and Konstantinovka were liberated.
    I agree that we were fooled (precisely) at the initial stage. The author, thank God, acknowledges that the enemy isn't doing as well as they did near Kharkiv or in the Kursk region. Let's leave aside the fact that, had events unfolded somewhat differently, all 12 of those could have been safely buried (since that's how it turned out, they weren't).
    The author chose not to mention that this entire "economy" has been treading water for some time now. The author is not interested in the losses the Ukrainians are currently suffering. How soon they'll be able to prepare anything similar, given their permanent shortage of medical supplies, is a big question.
    What we have is a worthy opponent who has also learned to fight.
    What we need to do is learn from our mistakes and win.
  20. +3
    1 October 2026 13: 41
    The problem isn't Bandera, it's the Kremlin: shambling, begging for a deal, failing to destroy (precisely for the Kremlin's "interests") the enemy's infrastructure, logistics, energy, and command and control in less than five (!!!) years—that's the reason. Yes, anything is possible in war. But soldiers and commanders must be focused on Victory, not on serving the interests of those sitting on the pipeline.
  21. +2
    1 October 2026 13: 49
    We've seen the General Staff in person—they can barely walk. Many of you have probably seen Lenin, too.
  22. +1
    1 October 2026 14: 47
    This isn't the first or last mistake the General Staff has made in managing the Air Defense Forces. But no one is drawing any serious conclusions. Maybe we'll get through this anyway.
  23. +2
    1 October 2026 17: 37
    The capable generals were removed (Surovikin and Popov were jailed; it's unclear who stole it from, but he did). Those who remain are those who are good at reporting (or lying about victories). That's the result, gentlemen!
    1. -1
      2 October 2026 16: 18
      Well, the result! Orekhov, the Reznikovsky pocket, Dobropolye (and that's a real front-line disaster!, since that's the last equipped line, beyond which lies the fortification dust) is very respectable!
  24. +1
    2 October 2026 01: 15
    We don't want to destroy the EU; we want to build cooperation. But someone is prohibiting individual countries from developing relations with Russia.
    To the presenter's remark: "Since they're banning it, then maybe we should break up the European Union?" Putin replied: "No need, they'll soon fall apart on their own."

    https://topwar.ru/290858-putin-rossija-ne-stremitsja-razvalit-evrosojuz-on-sam-skoro-razvalitsja.html
    In light of what has been said, I understand that this figure has no intention of defeating NATO; it suits him, but he's not satisfied with the "flu-nosed" individuals snooping around his income and expenses, as well as his connections to gymnastics. Therefore, the liberation of Ukraine is a complex issue in terms of who to gift it to after liberation. Putin's oligarchs are certainly insatiable, but they could also choke, and they're proven and trained. So, no victory, no problem.
    1. +1
      2 October 2026 13: 00
      They say a fish rots from the head down. What does a surgeon do with dead tissue?
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  25. -1
    2 October 2026 16: 13
    So what? So they gathered all their available reserves, pushed for four months, and killed a ton of people. The result? They advanced 5 km (five Karls, five in four months!!!), ran into the defenses along the Zherebets River, and where next? Nowhere! Meanwhile, on one flank, they were surrounded with an uncertain outcome (because who knows how it will all end, except maybe an exit to Izyuma!), on the other, they almost lost the defensive node (Orekhov!) with the prospect of the entire southern flank collapsing, and the most important thing is that the main hole isn't even the main hole! The main hole is now called the Aleksandrov direction! A front-line catastrophe looms there! So what to do with all this?
    "Syrsky, where are the reserves for the counterattack on Pokrovsk? - He disappeared last year near Kursk!"
    Well, something like that, it’s funny though…
  26. 0
    4 October 2026 05: 19
    I read the comments; they say there's nothing to worry about, Mr. Marzhetsky. But thank you for the article. The professional actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have given you pause for thought. Keep thinking.