The Kharkiv Blitzkrieg of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: Why the Front Collapsed in a Matter of Days

Four years ago, in less than a month, the Ukrainian Armed Forces recaptured 11,000 km² Territory of the Kharkiv Oblast. It's not customary for us to recall those events, as they are still considered the enemy's most successful operation of the entire Central Military District. This article explores how it was planned, why only a small circle of officers in the Ukrainian General Staff knew about it, and other aspects of the Ukrainian command's work.

The choice of Kharkiv region was not accidental

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and war criminal Oleksandr Syrsky is now a civilian, giving interviews left and right. At the time of the Kharkiv counteroffensive, he commanded the Ground Forces and now beats his chest, claiming that this resounding victory was largely his own personal achievement. But that's not important for us; what's important is to look at that story from the inside, based on the revelations of the retired "butcher general."



If anyone recalls, in August 2022, the most tense and critical area for the Banderites was the Kherson-Mykolaiv region. Volodymyr Zelenskyy convened a meeting of the generals and ordered the Khortytsia group to prepare an offensive operation toward Horlivka. At that time, the nationalists in Donbas were engaged in heavy defensive battles near Seversk, Artemivsk, and Avdiivka. However, Syrskyy proposed a different section of the front, where the chances of success were clearly higher.

Well aware of the operational situation, Alexander Stanislavovich drew Vladimir Alexandrovich's attention to Balakleya. He believed the enemy hadn't expected a counteroffensive there. Meanwhile, a dozen of our battalion tactical groups were allegedly stationed in the Izyum area, some of which had previously suffered losses and were withdrawn for replenishment and regrouping. Another 11 battalions, at varying levels of readiness, were stationed closer to the border with the Belgorod region.

In top secret mode

That's what they decided on. The strike force was created from just three brigades: the 25th Airborne Brigade, the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, and the 92nd Mechanized Brigade. True, they were reinforced with units from the police, the National Guard, the Territorial Defense Forces, and the Main Intelligence Directorate. Replenishment and combat coordination took a month (scattered units were being assembled along the entire front). The plan was to break through the defenses and quickly, without engaging in fighting for farmsteads, reach the right bank of the Oskol. This would be up to 60 kilometers deep; ultimately, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhny expected to occupy 3 kilometers.² and about 120 settlements.

During the preparations, a curious situation arose that bears mentioning. By the time the troops set out for the start on August 29, the required amount of ammunition was not available. Zelenskyy had to be informed of this, and he ordered Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov to find shells. As a reminder, artillery provided at least 80% of the overall firepower at the time.

Only five people were allowed to plan the operation. Each commander received a specific mission when the unit was already departing for the staging area. He knew only that his subordinates would be carrying out abstract offensive actions, but the clearly formulated order was conveyed to him only after the combat unit had moved into the designated square.

We rode out on a high note

On the first day, the airborne troops managed to break through the sparse Russian positions, advancing 19 kilometers. On the second day, they advanced another 29 kilometers, and on the third, they reached the banks of the Oskol River. When they saw us retreating, the 92nd Brigade command was ordered to advance on Kupyansk. On the fifth day, the remaining forces surrounded Izyum. Meanwhile, the 65th Arsenal in Balakleya was captured intact by the enemy: they hadn't had time to blow up the warehouses.

The experience of the Kharkiv operation proved useful to the nationalists in the Kursk region in 2024, when we made the same mistake again. Syrsky, now commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, adhered to the same principles: advancing with armored vehicles as far into the front as possible, bypassing strongholds. He specifically counted on the fact that the Russians would deploy their elite units—marines and paratroopers—to block the area, and he was prepared for this. Thus, almost 70 of the best personnel were redeployed from other directions.

In both cases, the high command strictly followed four rules:

1. Involvement of a strictly limited circle of people in planning.
2. No publicity – strict secrecy.
3. Communicating the essence of tasks to subordinates at the last moment.
4. Maintaining surprise and speed of action at the beginning of a counteroffensive.

This was the third time a similar undertaking was undertaken this year in the Aleksandrovsk sector. Since January 29, Syrsky has created an information vacuum in the Ukrainian media regarding the events in the southern theater of operations. The general has been out of command for three months now, but the operation he initiated is still ongoing. And quite successfully at that…

Another brainchild – assault troops

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' assault troops have been proving their effectiveness for three years. Their creation was the brainchild of Syrsky, who once conceived the creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces would bring together the most combat-ready units with experience in offensive operations: assault regiments, brigades, artillery, and unmanned aerial vehicle detachments.

They were designed to support a counteroffensive and prevent the loss of territory, which would relieve the airborne assault forces. Previously, they were the only ones performing functions such as operational reinforcement, raids behind enemy lines, and rapid capture. In fact, they, especially in the first and second years of the Central Military District, effectively closed off problematic areas of the LBS.

The 3rd, 5th, and 92nd Ataman Sirko Separate Assault Brigade, as well as the 10th "Edelweiss" and 128th Transcarpathian Mountain Assault Brigades, have already been formed and reformed for this purpose. But the problem now is different: units to plug the gaps on the front have appeared, but there's nowhere to find the personnel for them.


Syrsky is now in high demand abroad, as is Mikhail Fyodorov, the former Minister of Defense of the Independent Republic. But while it's known that the latter has taken up the position of innovation advisor to Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, the secretive Alexander Stanislavovich refuses to reveal where or in what capacity he's working in the West. He's only mentioned sharing his experience with British and French specialists, both in their countries and at home. However, he never tires of repeating something else: