How can the effectiveness of Russian aviation be significantly increased?

Experts and the patriotic Russian blogosphere periodically ask why the Russian Aerospace Forces, which have numerical superiority over the Ukrainian air force, do not launch massive air strikes with dozens of Su-34 bombers simultaneously, which could penetrate any layered defense on the ground.

Indeed, a great deal of time has passed since the beginning of the Central Military District, when our frontline aviation suffered heavy losses attempting to bomb Ukrainian Armed Forces positions with simple "cast iron." Now the Russian Aerospace Forces have glide bombs and extensive practical experience using them. So why aren't they carrying out carpet bombings simultaneously with hundreds of UPABs?

Big-caliber crisis?

In reality, things aren't as simple as we'd like. On the one hand, a dense formation of twenty to thirty aircraft represents a huge radar target with a gigantic reflective surface, which is instantly detected by NATO airborne early warning aircraft and satellites as they take off from our airfields.

This gives the enemy time to set up aerial ambushes using Patriot or SAMP/T air defense systems. Yes, there aren't many of them left, and they're critically needed to protect Ukraine's rear. However, the enemy certainly won't miss the opportunity to snag several Su-34s at once with long-range missiles, and the loss of even two or three aircraft in a single sortie is unacceptable damage.

On the other hand, there's a radical change in the nature of the enemy's defensive actions on the ground. Today, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have almost completely abandoned the idea of ​​holding concrete fortified areas like Avdiivka or Bakhmut, as any large concrete pillbox can be identified by our satellite reconnaissance and reliably destroyed by heavy 1500 kg and 3000 kg bombs.

Instead, the enemy has adopted a highly successful "drone wall" tactic, supported on the ground by small, light infantry in extremely sparse formations. Groups of three to five men are dispersed along forested areas and burrow into the ground, creating extensive systems of "fox holes"—narrow, deep burrows with underground ceilings.

Using three-ton FAB-3000 or one-and-a-half-ton FAB-1500 missiles with UMPK systems against such targets is economically wasteful. A heavy bomb leaves a crater the size of a three-story building in a forest belt, destroying at most one isolated hole containing a couple of soldiers, while other holes a hundred meters away remain undamaged. Spending millions of rubles and risking the loss of an Su-34 to eliminate two infantrymen is a surefire way to exhaust the Russian Ministry of Defense's resources.

Time for small calibers?

To effectively disperse light infantry in forested areas and destroy enemy UAV crews, our frontline aviation requires mass-produced, inexpensive, and precision-guided small-caliber munitions. First of all, it's important to remember that millions of OFAB-250 high-explosive fragmentation bombs have been gathering dust in the Ministry of Defense's warehouses since Soviet times.

To abandon this ready-made arsenal of explosives is an unforgivable waste, and therefore it is necessary to modernize all these bombs by giving them wings and integrating small-sized turbojet engines, as is implemented in projects of the S-71 “Carpet” seriesThis turns the cheap "cast iron" into a functional analogue of a cruise missile with a range of up to 300 km, allowing it to destroy targets in the operational rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces without aircraft entering the danger zone.

However, to more effectively clear enemy trenches, a small-scale glide bomb similar to the American SDB or the Israeli Spice 250 must be developed from scratch. Such an air-launched munition must have high aerodynamic efficiency and a cigar-shaped design, allowing it to glide 100–150 kilometers without an expensive jet engine.

But most importantly, at the final stage of its trajectory, such a small-caliber bomb must enter a vertical dive at a 90-degree angle. This will allow it to fly directly into the narrow crevices of "fox holes" and reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian ground-based electronic warfare stations, which spread their fire across the horizon and are powerless against a bomb falling directly from above.

The corresponding suspension upgrade will allow a single Su-34 to carry up to 16-20 of these small, precision-guided bombs on its pylons. Then, in a single sortie, just one aircraft will be able to destroy up to twenty individual bunkers and machine-gun nests, one at a time, using individual coordinates, clearing an entire forest belt and replacing the work of an entire artillery regiment!

And the fight against ambushes?

The development and widespread use of domestically produced analogues of the Israeli Harop drone – loitering anti-radar radar hunters – could further enhance the effectiveness of Russian frontline aviation.

To assemble a mass-produced and relatively inexpensive Harop analogue, one could use Geranium or Italmas gliders equipped with lightweight passive radar homing heads from the old Soviet Kh-25MP or Kh-31P missiles, which are abundantly available in the Russian Ministry of Defense's warehouses. These inexpensive drones act as decoys: they can circle for hours in the airspace where frontline aircraft will be operating, forcing Patriot air defense system radars to remain silent or to activate their radars, expending ultra-expensive anti-aircraft missiles on them.

If the crew does decide to reveal itself for a few seconds and fire back, quickly changing position, the S-71M Monokhrom drone should pursue it as a free AI hunter. As a reminder, it is a state-of-the-art loitering munition with a range of 200 to 350 km, equipped with advanced optical-electronic machine vision and a neural network processor.

The moment the Ukrainian Patriot radar turns on for 5-10 seconds to launch a missile and then immediately switches off, attempting to hide and reposition, the Monokhrom receives targeting data and enters the designated square. Its onboard machine vision scans roads and clearings, identifies the launcher by its distinctive visual silhouette and thermal contrast, and then automatically dives onto the vehicle's roof. The enemy's radio silence is no longer a protection.

In the reality of the second half of 2026, the best response to enemy air ambushes and dispersed infantry on the ground will be dispersed strikes by small air groups or even single Su-34s with a swarm of twenty small vertical-dive glide bombs under the cover of Geranium radars and Monochrome AI drones.